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Abstract 
 
Financial and industrial economists are increasingly recognising the interaction 
between capital structure and firms’ strategies in the product market. A debate 
exists regarding the nature of the relationship between firms’ product market 
power and financial leverage. Particularly, researchers have asked whether the 
relationship is positive, negative or non-linear. 
 
This thesis contributes to this research agenda by developing game-theoretic 
models, and conducting empirical tests. Specifically, the thesis examines the 
effects of market power on a firm’s use of long-term debt. In the theoretical 
models, following Fairchild (2004b), market power is represented by product 
differentiation. When firms’ products are highly differentiated, firms are 
considered as having local monopoly power in their own product markets, and 
thus face low product market competition from each other. As their products 
become less differentiated (or equivalently, their market power decreases), firms 
engage in more intense competitive interaction. In the empirical study, following 
Pandey (2004), Tobin’s q is used as the proxy of market power.  
 
In the theoretical study, the relationship between product differentiation, long-
term debt, and product market competition is modelled using a framework of non-
spatial Cournot competition, and a spatial model with Bertrand competition. Both 
models generally show that long-term debt softens product market competition. 
That is, it induces firms to become more myopic as shown by a reduction in 
output in the non-spatial model and an increase in prices in the spatial model. 
Furthermore, the study demonstrates that the use of long-term debt depends on 
degrees of product differentiation. In the non-spatial Cournot model, the all-equity 
(zero debt) is the financial equilibrium for all levels of product differentiation (in 
contrast to Fairchild 2004, who demonstrated a non-linear relationship between 
product differentiation and long-term debt in a Bertrand setting). In the spatial 
model, the predation effect dominates the use of long-term debt. The equilibrium 
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debt level is increasing (decreasing) in product differentiation (competitive 
interaction).  
 
The empirical study investigates the effects of market power (Tobin’s q) on long-
term, short-term, and total leverage in four Southeast Asian tiger economies. 
Using panel data and the two-way fixed effects estimation, the study finds that the 
predation effect dominates when considering long-term debt, whereas the limited 
liability effect dominates when considering short-term debt. Market power does 
not seem to have any effect on the total debt position of sample firms. Overall, the 
empirical study demonstrates the complex relationship between capital structure 
and market power, adding support to Pandey’s (2004) empirical analysis and 
Fairchild’s (2004b) theoretical work.  
 
The study also finds evidence supporting the pecking order theory and the agency 
costs argument. Furthermore, the study employs a two-step generalised method of 
moments (GMM) technique and finds that sample firms adjust their leverage 
ratios towards their target levels. The speed of adjustment does not only vary from 
country to country but it also differs according to types of leverage. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Capital structure research has grown extensively and developed from the seminal 
work of Modigliani and Miller (1958). According to their irrelevance proposition, 
M-M I, in a world of perfect capital markets, a firm’s value is unaffected by its 
capital structure. Over the past decades, researchers in corporate finance have 
focused their attention on the question: what would happen if the strict 
assumptions of the ‘frictionless world’ of Modigliani and Miller (1958) did not 
hold? In asking this, academics have subsequently developed rigorous alternative 
capital structure theories, and employed data to empirically test their resulting 
hypotheses. These alternative theories of capital structure have strongly argued 
that because of the imperfect capital market, a firm’s value is not independent of 
its capital structure, and there exists an optimal capital structure that maximises 
firm value.   
  
From the mid 1980s, there has been growing attention paid to the interaction 
between a firm’s financial decision and its decisions regarding the product market. 
Traditionally, the two seemingly unrelated decisions were studied in isolation. The 
corporate finance literature, which analysed a firm’s financial decision, 
overlooked strategies in the product market. That is, for these researchers the 
product market is typically assumed to offer an exogenous random return that is 
unaffected by the firm’s debt-equity position. The industrial organisation literature 
mainly concentrated on a firm’s strategies in the product market, whilst ignoring 
the effect of the firm’s capital structure. In other words, the firm’s obligations to 
its investors and the possibility of financial distress are ignored in this modelling 
of the strategic interaction between the firm and its rivals in the product market. 
Whilst focusing separately on the financial and the product market decisions is 
clearly useful in understanding certain aspects of both the firm’s financial 
structure and strategic output market behaviour, a focus on the interaction between 
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the product market and capital structure offers an alternative interesting insight 
into the determinants of capital structure.   
 
Turning now to consider the interaction between capital structure and the product 
market, Harris and Raviv (1991) identified two approaches. The first is concerned 
with the relationship between a firm’s capital structure and the characteristics of 
its inputs and product. This includes how the firm takes the perception of: 
customers, suppliers, and employees into consideration, when making its financial 
decisions. In addition, the approach examines how debt can be used as a 
bargaining device by the firm or its non-financial stakeholders, to obtain a 
favourable position.  
 
The second approach, which by far has received the most research attention, 
examines the relationship between capital structure and product market 
competition. The approach describes how a firm’s financial decision affects its 
product market strategy, when competing with other firms in the product market. 
In general, there are two main opposing models that explore the interaction of 
capital structure and product market competition. First, the ‘strategic use of debt’ 
or ‘limited liability’ models, examine how firms can use debt strategically to 
commit to certain product market behaviour. This argument has been theoretically 
led by Brander and Lewis (1986), whose model has been extensively assessed and 
augmented in many subsequent works. Second, the ‘deep-pockets’ or ‘predation’ 
models suggest that an unlevered firm has a strategic advantage over its leveraged 
rival. This argument dates back to the deep-pockets or the long-purse argument of 
Telser (1966), who suggested that a firm with high retained earnings (deep-
pockets) is more able to sustain any losses, as a result of engaging in predatory 
actions, such as price-cutting or increasing output, until it has successfully driven 
its highly leveraged rivals out of the market.  
 
Although the research in capital structure and product market competition has 
extensively grown from the pioneering work of Brander and Lewis (1986), the 
question of whether debt actually induces aggressive product market behaviour or 
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softens product market competition, remains. The research, thus far, has shown 
that the answer to this question depends, not only on the types of product market 
competition (Bertrand competition versus Cournot competition), but also on the 
types of product market uncertainty. Recently, there has been increased attention 
in this research area, which also specifically examines the effect of product 
differentiation. In the research into capital structure and product market 
competition with differentiated products, it is argued that the strategic use of debt 
depends on the degree of product differentiation. Thus far, the research has mainly 
examined the effect of product differentiation on short-term debt (Wanzenried, 
2003; and Haan and Toolsema, 2008) and research into the effect of product 
differentiation on long-term debt remains sparse. One exception is the work by 
Fairchild (2004a and b), who examined the effect of product differentiation in 
Bertrand (price) competition.  
 
Another research area of capital structure and product market, which has not 
received much attention, is the relationship between the former and product 
market structure. Up to the present, there has been a continuing a debate about the 
nature of this relationship. On the one hand, there is an argument suggesting that 
the relationship is linearly positive, owing to the limited liability effect. That is, 
for strategic purposes, an oligopolistic firm is expected to have higher debt than a 
firm in perfect competition. On the other hand, the deep-pockets argument of the 
predation model postulates a negative relationship between capital structure and 
product market structure. In contrast to the linear relationship, Pandey (2004) has 
suggested that the interaction between capital structure and product market 
structure could be non-monotonic, owing to the two opposing effects: the limited 
liability and predation effects. Pandey (2004) empirically found that a firm 
strategically uses debt to increase its output and thereby increasing its profits at 
low and high levels of market power. At the intermediate level of market power, 
the firm reduces its use of debt, in order to avoid predatory action from less-
leveraged rivals.    
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In fact, it is Pandey’s (2004) empirical work on the relationship between capital 
structure and market power that motivates this thesis’ research objective. That is 
to say, the key research question of this thesis is: how does a firm’s market power 
affect its use of debt in the product market? In order to investigate this, a 
theoretical study and an empirical investigation to examine the relationship 
between capital structure and market power are implemented.  
 
First, the term ‘market power’ used in this thesis has to be defined. It follows 
Fairchild’s (2004b) definition of the term ‘market power’ is adopted and used 
throughout this thesis. Fairchild (2004b) suggested that when product 
differentiation is high, each firm is viewed as having local monopoly power in its 
own product market, and thus the intensity of product market competition is low. 
As the degree of product differentiation decreases, rivals engage in more intense 
product market competition, because their market power diminishes. Hence, the 
term ‘market power’, in this thesis, refers to high product differentiation or low 
competitive interaction. The notion of the ‘market power’ term used is somewhat 
different from the more conventional ‘market power’ term, which refers to the 
operational meaning of market structure.  
 
In the theoretical study, two differentiated-product models (the first being non-
spatial and the second spatial) are developed to examine the relationship between 
market power, long-term debt, and product market competition. By employing 
models with differentiated products, the thesis contributes to the growing research 
area of capital structure and product market competition, under the framework of 
differentiated products.  
 
In the empirical study, firm-level data for four developing countries from the 
Southeast Asian region are utilised, to empirically examine the effect of market 
power on capital structure. The financial information of listed firms across 
industry sectors are obtained from the CEIC Asia database, available on 
http://www.securities.com. Following Pandey (2004), Tobin’s q is used as the 
proxy for market power. Long-term debt, short-term debt, and total debt, 
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measured at book value, are used as capital structure proxies. Some firm-specific 
variables, which are known as determinants of capital structure, are also included 
as control variables. Therefore, the empirical study not only examines the effect of 
market power on capital structure, but also its findings contribute to the general  
research in capital structure, which has traditionally concentrated mainly on the 
developed countries. In addition, the decision to use three types of debt as the 
dependent variables also asserts the importance of recognising the differences in 
the effect that market power may have on different types of debt.  
 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
relating to the research area. In order to provide a general background, this chapter 
begins with a brief outline of the theories of capital structure that do not relate to 
the product market. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the literature on 
the relationship between capital structure and the product market and this section 
is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section reviews the stakeholder 
theory of capital structure and considers the perception of the non-financial 
stakeholders and the bargaining role of debt. The second sub-section provides a 
review of the interaction between capital structure and product market 
competition. This sub-section also reviews the theoretical arguments of the 
relationship between capital structure and product market structure. A review of 
related empirical evidence is given at the end of each sub-section. 
  
In chapter 3, non-spatial and location models of product market competition and 
debt are developed. The timeline implicit in the models is such that the financial 
decision is made prior to the product market decision. In the non-spatial model, 
two firms with similar but differentiated products compete in Cournot (output) 
competition, within a one-shot game. The model is then extended to incorporate 
firm myopia and the possibility of collusion over the financial contract within an 
infinitely repeated game. In this non-spatial model, the exogenous degree of 
market power is represented by product differentiation. In the location (spatial) 
model, the effect of market power is examined, which is represented by the 
transportation cost per unit, on the level of long-term debt, and how this, in turn, 
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affects Bertrand (price) competition. Three variants of the spatial model are 
considered: the linear transportation cost case, the quadratic transportation cost 
case, and the vertically differentiated case.   
 
Chapter 4 begins with a brief review of the theoretical framework, which 
comprises a review of: measures of capital structure, market power, and other 
firm-specific determinants of capital structure. This is followed by a description of 
the data and variables included in the estimation. The estimation strategy 
comprises the static model and the dynamic panel model. In the former, the linear 
and non-linear effects of market power on capital structure are studied, whereas in 
the latter, the speed of the adjustment of capital structure is investigated. The 
statistical software packages used are STATA (version 9) and EViews (version 
6.0). 
 
In the final chapter, chapter 5, conclusions to the analysis of the theoretical 
models and the outcomes of the empirical investigation are presented. Regarding 
the former, the interest lies in whether market power has an effect on the use of 
long-term debt in the differentiated-product models. By way of extension, the 
empirical study considers short-term debt and total debt, as well as long-term debt 
in the context of developing countries. Moreover, it aims to elicit whether capital 
structure and market power act in a positively linear direction or otherwise. The 
chapter concludes with a brief discussion on limitations of the research, and 
proposals for avenues for future academic investigation and modelling.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
Financial economists have traditionally analysed a firm’s capital structure 
decision without regard to product market behaviour, whilst industrial economists 
have focused on product market behaviour, without consideration of a firm’s 
financing decision. However, since Brander and Lewis’s (1986) seminal work 
researchers are increasingly recognising the strategic interaction between the 
firm’s capital structure decision and product market behaviour. This is the focus 
of the thesis.  
 
In order to set the scene, in this chapter traditional research that analyses corporate 
financial decisions, without relating them to the product market, are reviewed. The 
chapter then proceeds to discuss the research into the interaction between capital 
structure and product market, which motivates the theoretical analysis in chapter 3 
and the empirical investigation in chapter 4.  
 
Brealey and Myers (2000) defined capital structure as a mix of securities issued 
by a firm, ranging from pure debt to pure equity and any hybrid securities, such as 
convertible debt. It is fundamental for a firm to find a particular combination of 
capital structure that maximises its overall market value and best appeals to its 
investors. From this, one might ask the question: ‘which combination is the 
optimal capital structure?’ As a consequence, researchers in corporate finance 
(and perhaps many other relating fields) have been searching for answers. One can 
observe that the paths to each answer lie in the famous proposition of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). With the assumption of a frictionless world, Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) stated that a firm cannot change the total value of its securities just 
by splitting its cashflows into different streams. The firm’s value is determined by 
its real assets, not by the securities it issues. The capital structure is irrelevant, as 
long as the firm’s decisions are taken as given. The complete separation of the 
investment and the financial decision implies that any method of financing, or any 
 8 
combination of capital structure, is as good as any other. When the strong 
assumption is relaxed, researchers in corporate finance have argued that the 
financing decision matters and they are then able to offer answers to the above 
question about the optimal capital structure. Answers lie in the alternative theories 
of capital structure, which include: the trade-off theory, the agency costs 
argument, and the signalling/asymmetric information argument. In addition to 
these theories of capital structure, starting from the mid 1980s, researchers from 
both the industrial organisation and corporate finance fields began to recognise 
that a possible link exists between product market and capital structure. Hence, 
another answer to the question is possible, deriving from the perspective of a 
firm’s decision in the product market. The aim of this study is to focus on product 
market competition through the lens of the product market as a whole.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.1, some existing theories of 
capital structure that are not related to the product market are outlined. Then a 
review of the literature on the interaction between capital structure and the product 
market is presented in section 2.2. This section is divided into two sub-sections. 
The stakeholder theory of capital structure will be reviewed in the first, 2.2.1 and 
the capital structure and product market competition approach is then discussed in 
the second, 2.2.2. Each sub-section consists of an overview of theoretical papers 
and a review of the related empirical evidence. The chapter ends with a brief 
chapter summary in section 2.3.   
 
2.1 Capital Structure Theories 
 
As briefly mentioned above, Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated that a firm’s 
financial decision is independent of its investment projects. In a world where the 
capital market is perfect with no taxes, asymmetric information, and agency costs, 
then there is no combination of capital structure that is better than any other. The 
firm’s market value is given by the discounted future cashflow. Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) showed that the WACC (the weighted average cost of capital), 
which is used as the discount rate, is unaffected by the amount of debt. Debt is 
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assumed to be risk-free. Thus, capital structure is irrelevant as long as the firm’s 
investment decision is taken as given. This proposition of the complete separation 
of the investment and financing decision, also known as M-M I. Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) introduced the importance of the tax-shield benefits of risk-free 
debt, and argued that the expected rate of return on the common stock of a levered 
firm increases in proportion to the debt-equity ratio expressed in market values, so 
long as debt is risk-free. This implies that a firm should borrow as much as 
possible, as debt interest is tax deductible. This is known as their second 
proposition, M-M II. However, it is more reasonable to suggest that beyond the 
debt capacity, debt is no longer risk-free. The rate of return on risky debt is higher 
than that which is at a risk-free rate, and this in turn increases the WACC, thereby 
reducing firm value. Increasing debt beyond the debt capacity increases the 
probability of bankruptcy.  
 
If there is a gain from leverage, because of tax deductibility on interest expenses, 
and if bankruptcy costs are nontrivial, then it is possible to construct a theory of 
the optimal capital structure, as the tax advantage of debt is traded off against the 
likelihood of incurring bankruptcy costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that 
neither bankruptcy costs nor the existence of tax subsidies can explain the use of 
preferred stocks or warrants which have no tax advantages, and there is no theory 
which really explains the fraction of equity claims held by insiders, as opposed the 
share held by outsiders (no agency costs). Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argued that according to the M-M II, no debt should ever be used in the absence of 
tax subsidies. However, there is some evidence of debt having been used prior to 
introduction of taxes subsidies (Copeland and Weston, 1992).  
 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) notorious proposition would apply well if firms 
were operating in an ideal world, with no agency or information problems, but in 
reality, firms are not operating in such ideal situations and firm value is not 
independent of capital structure. In the real world, managers may have incentives 
to act for their own benefit, at the expense of investors, termed the incentive or 
agency problem. This argument has been led by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who 
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argued that the existence of agency costs provides strong reasons for arguing that 
the probable distribution of future cashflows is not independent of capital and 
ownership structure. They defined the principal-agent problem as a contract under 
which principals (shareholders) engage an agent (manager or owner-manager) to 
perform services on their behalf. If their goals are utility maximisation, then it is 
possible that the agent will not act in the best interests of the principals. In 
general, there is no way that the agent makes the optimal decision, from the 
principals’ viewpoint at zero cost, because the agent can gain utility from his 
consumption of non-pecuniary benefits (perks), for example: fancy offices, private 
jets, and an easy life. These benefits are attractive to the agent, but are of no 
interest to the principals—in fact they reduce firm value.  
 
Consider a firm which is wholly owned and managed by an owner-manager. This 
owner-manager will not consume any perks, because he will bear the full cost of 
such actions. Now suppose that the owner-manager has to raise some capital. If 
the entrepreneur chooses to issue equity, the firm is then partially owned by 
outside shareholders. The owner-manager will no longer have full ownership of 
the firm, and this gives him an incentive to consume perks, as the cost is now 
partially borne by other shareholders. Consequently, this leads to a reduction in 
firm value. Rational shareholders expect such behaviour of the agent/owner-
manager, and thus engage in some monitoring or disciplinary mechanisms to 
ensure that the owner-manager cannot take such perquisites. These monitoring 
and the disciplinary mechanisms are not costless, and the owner-manager will 
have to bear such cost. This cost is known as the agency cost of equity.  
 
Debt is another option that prevents the agent/owner-manager from consuming 
perks. It induces him to take fewer perks, as his equity stake rises, resulting in an 
increase in firm value. However, there is a cost associated with debt. The owner-
manager will have an incentive to invest in a risky project, because the owner-
manager benefits if it is successful, whereas debt holders will have to bear the 
loss, if it is not. This is also known as risk-shifting, which causes conflict between 
shareholders and debt holders. Debt holders will insist on various types of 
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protective covenants and monitoring devices, in order to protect their wealth from 
raids made on it by shareholders. However, the costs of these covenants are 
nontrivial and these costs may increase as the proportion of debt-financing 
increases. There is an indirect cost of lost investment, which increases when the 
covenants become more restrictive. The firm loses its flexibility to make 
investment, financing, and dividend decisions because of restricted covenants. 
Moreover, the firm faces a higher probability of bankruptcy when its leverage 
increases. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that an optimal (value 
maximising) capital structure was obtained by trading off the benefits of debt 
(increased managerial equity ownership) and costs of debt (risk-shifting). Given 
increasing agency costs with higher proportions of equity on the one hand and 
with higher proportions of debt on the other, there is an optimal combination of 
outside debt and equity that will be chosen, because it minimises total agency 
costs.   
 
The disciplinary role of debt was also mentioned by Jensen (1986) in his free 
cashflow model. He posited that a manager with excess cashflow has an incentive 
to select projects that may or may not have positive net present values, when 
discounted at the relevant cost of capital. One way to introduce discipline into the 
investment process is to force the manager to borrow money, as this creates a 
commitment to make interest payments. Hence, free cashflow is removed from 
managerial disposal. Moreover, Dewatripont and Tirole (1991) developed a model 
of managerial moral hazard, which explains how debt is used as a disciplinary 
mechanism, working on the basis that an unobservable managerial effort level 
affects a firm’s profits. Because debt holders have liquidation rights, if the firm 
performs badly, a high level of debt induces the manager to exert more effort and 
work harder to increases the level of profits.   
 
Ross (1977) argued that implicit in the M-M I is the assumption that the market 
knows the firm’s return stream and it values this stream to set the firm value. 
However, what is in fact valued in the market place, are the perceived stream 
returns for the firm and there is a possibility that changes in the capital structure 
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may alter the market’s perception. In this signalling model, the manager, as an 
insider, has access to information about the firm’s expected cashflow, and will 
choose to send unambiguous signals about the firm’s future. Moreover, such a 
manager with high ability will use debt as a means of sending favourable signals 
to the market, in order to distinguish his ability from those with low ability. The 
latter cannot mimic the same actions, because issuing debt increases the 
probability of bankruptcy, and they do not have sufficient cashflow to back them 
up. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) expounded the signalling property of equity. Their 
model assumes that a manager acts in the interests of initial shareholders and one 
way to encourage this assumption is to make the manager a shareholder. The 
manager is assumed to know the true future value of the firm and of any projects 
that it might undertake. Thus, there is asymmetric information about the future 
prospects of the firm, which is created by the fact that insiders are assumed to 
know what future state, good or bad, will arise. The market, however, does not 
know anything except for the expected firm value under each state of nature. 
When the state of nature turns out to be good, equity is undervalued by the 
market, and therefore the manager avoids issuing equity. In contrast, when the 
state of nature turns out to be bad, equity is overvalued by the market, and 
therefore if the firm issues new equity this will immediately signal to the market 
that the firm is being overvalued. New investors will realise this and the share 
price and firm value will fall.  
 
The following numerical example helps illustrate the argument.1 Consider a 
situation in which there are two equally likely states of nature. That is, the 
probabilities of having good news and bad news are 50-50. A firm has current 
assets of A. The net present value (NPV) of a new project is b, with the initial 
cash outlay of 100. The value of the firm is V.  
 
                                                
1
 The numeral example is taken from Dr. R. Fairchild’s MSc. Corporate Finance Lecture Notes. 
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p = 0.5 Do Nothing Issue Equity 
 Good Bad Good Bad 
A 250 130 350 230 
b 0 0 20 10 
V 250 130 370 240 
 
The expected firm value when doing nothing = 0.5(250) + 0.5(130) = 190. 
The expected firm value when issuing equity = 0.5(370) + 0.5(240) = 305. 
The expected firm value has increased when the firm invests and issues equity. 
The new investors receive 100 and the old shareholders receive most of the 
payoff, 205. 
 
The old shareholders’ wealth can be calculated as follows; 
Good news and do nothing = 250 
Good news and issue equity = (205/305)* 370 = 248.69 
Bad news and do nothing = 130 
Bad news and issue equity = (205/305)* 240 =161.31 
 
The old shareholders are better off doing nothing in the good state, because the 
positive NPV project is not large enough to offset the fraction of the ownership 
that they have to sacrifice by issuing new shares. Thus, the argument that follows 
this is that the old shareholders cannot take advantage of their inside information, 
because the very act of issuing new shares in a bad state, i.e. when they think the 
firm is overvalued, will reveal information to the market that bad news is coming. 
New investors, who are rational, will recognise this and the share price will fall 
and thus the firm value will decrease. Because of this signalling property of 
equity, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggested that a firm should finance its 
investment with retained earnings, as these contain least signalling cost. When the 
internal financial resource is exhausted, debt should be issued prior to equity. The 
argument demonstrated here gave rise to their pecking order theory.   
 
In addition to the alternative theories of capital structure outlined above, 
Damodaran (2001) suggested that there are three alternative views of how firms 
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choose a financing mix. Firstly, the choice of debt and equity can be determined 
using the growth life-cycle model. He argued that firms with high growth should 
use less debt than more mature firms. This is consistent with Jensen’s (1986) free 
cashflow model, which predicts that young firms with positive growth 
opportunities should have low debt, because the tax-shield benefit is very small or 
nonexistent, as earnings are low during the early stages of the firm’s life cycle. 
However, as firms become mature, the separation between owners and managers 
tends to grow and thus, debt can be used as a disciplinary mechanism. Secondly, 
firms can choose their financing mix based on a comparison with like firms within 
the same industry and at the same stage of the life cycle. Lastly, there is evidence 
that firms may choose to follow a financing hierarchy, from most to least 
preferred choice between retained earnings, debt, and equity. This is consistent 
with Myers and Majluf (1984) pecking order theory, in which they argued that 
debt financing would be preferable to equity, because debt’s payoff has lower 
correlation with the future states of nature. 
 
2.2 Capital Structure and Product Market 
 
Traditionally, in the corporate finance literature, a firm’s product market decision 
is typically assumed to be unaffected by its financial decision. On the other hand, 
the strand of literature regarding industrial organisation often ignores the strategic 
effect of a firm’s financial decision on product market behaviour. This separation 
of the financial and the real decision is clearly useful for understanding certain 
aspects of capital structure and of strategic behaviour in the product market. It was 
not until the mid 1980s that researchers from both strands started to recognise a 
possible interaction of the two seemingly unrelated decisions and the importance 
of considering them mutually. A firm’s financial decision can affect and be 
influenced by its interaction with the product market decision that concerns its 
non-financial stakeholders, besides its debt holders and shareholders. These non-
financial stakeholders are, for example: employees, customers, suppliers, and 
rivals in the product market. This section provides a review of the existing work, 
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theoretical as well as empirical, regarding the interaction between capital structure 
and product market.  
 
This thesis follows Harris and Raviv (1991) and thus classifies the link between 
capital structure and product market into two approaches. The first approach is 
known as the stakeholder theory of capital structure, which emphasises the 
relationship between a firm’s financial decision and the characteristics of its 
product and input factors. The second approach, which has received by far the 
most attention from researchers, in both the finance and industrial organisation 
fields, and is the focus of this thesis, discusses the relationship between capital 
structure and competition in the product market. This approach highlights the 
strategic interaction of a firm’s financial decision and competition in the product 
market. This chapter now proceeds to review the stakeholder theory of capital 
structure, and some empirical evidence for this, in sub-section 2.2.1. It then 
reviews the strategic interaction between capital structure and product market 
competition and empirical evidence supporting this approach in sub-section 2.2.2.  
 
2.2.1 The Stakeholder Theory of Capital Structure 
 
The approach underlines the relationship between: capital structure, product 
characteristics, and input factors. Generally, there are two main aspects of the 
approach; one aspect concerns the perception of the non-financial stakeholders on 
the firm’s financial structure, and the other examines the bargaining role of debt. 
 
a) The Perception of the Non-Financial Stakeholders  
 
Titman (1984) argued that the liquidation and the bankruptcy costs, if incurred, 
are not imposed only on shareholders and debt holders, but also on non-financial 
stakeholders. His argument stresses the importance of taking customers, suppliers, 
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and employees into consideration, when a firm makes its financial decision, 
because the firm’s explicit or implicit contracts with these non-financial 
stakeholders may have an effect on the firm value. Therefore, the non-financial 
stakeholders should also be considered, along with financial investors, as 
claimants to the cashflows. The more indebted the firm is, the higher the 
bankruptcy and liquidity costs it could incur. If the firm is unable to settle its debt 
and is forced to liquidate, this might impose some costs on non-financial 
stakeholders, for example: customers are not able to obtain products, parts, and 
after-purchase service; suppliers are left with a large input inventory; and 
employees are made redundant. Foresighted non-financial stakeholders expect 
these costs associated when dealing with a highly leveraged firm and 
consequently, these costs might be transferred to the firm’s shareholders in the 
forms of: customers demanding lower prices for the product; suppliers being 
reluctant to do business or even stopping their deals with the firm; and potential 
employees might prefer to seek employment from other low-leveraged or non-
leveraged firms, who can provide them with more opportunities for advancement. 
Titman (1984) argued that these effects are particularly more pronounced for a 
firm that produces a durable or unique product than for non-durable producers. 
Therefore, a firm, especially a durable good producer for which the above effects 
are important, should use debt modestly.  
 
Cornell and Shapiro (1987) extended Titman’s (1984) explicit claims argument by 
considering the effects of implicit claims. These implicit claims are what non-
financial stakeholders understand they should be provided with by the firm, but 
prove difficult to specify by contract. They are for example: promises of 
continuing supply, deliveries made on time, product enhancement, and job 
security. As the payouts of implicit claims are uncertain, the prices the non-
financial stakeholders may pay for these claims will depend on the condition of 
the firm, including its capital structure. Cornell and Shapiro (1987) suggested that 
debt has a signalling property that may convey information to the non-financial 
stakeholders. A firm can use debt to signal its intention to make payment or to 
bond promised payouts on implicit claims. In other words, the value of these 
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claims is sensitive to information about the firm’s debt level. The firm should 
therefore consider this information as affecting the price of implicit claims. Thus a 
product’s price should include the value of future service contracts, as well as that 
of implicit claims. Cornell and Shapiro (1987) argued that a young firm, which 
relies on its sale of implicit claims but which has not yet developed a large stock 
of organisation capital, should not use debt excessively. This is because it may 
face a higher probability of bankruptcy, and hence customers suspect that their 
implicit claims will not be paid. As a result, they will pay less for the firm’s 
products.  
 
A similar argument to that presented above, in which debt was considered as a 
signalling device to non-financial stakeholders, has also been presented by 
Maksimovic and Titman (1991). In their model, debt affects customers’ 
perception of the quality of the product. A firm with products that can be easily 
switched from high to low quality and with customers who cannot distinguish the 
quality until they are consuming the products, will be expected to use less debt, 
ceteris paribus. Customers might be reluctant to buy products from a highly 
leveraged firm, even though there would not be any costs imposed on them, if the 
firm goes bankrupt (Titman, 1984). This reluctance arises from the firm’s inability 
to honour its promise on implicit contracts and its damaged reputation. 
Furthermore, Maksimovic and Titman (1991) argued that a firm with a financial 
shortfall will not reduce the product quality when its financial condition is 
observable. As debt may affect customer perception of the product quality, the 
firm with the need to maintain its reputation for being a high quality producer, is 
expected to ensure that it has less debt. However, if the firm is faced with 
financial distress, it will reduce the quality of the product in order to avoid 
bankruptcy, i.e. debt diminishes the firm’s incentive to produce high quality. 
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b) The Bargaining Role of Debt 
 
This aspect of the approach examines how capital structure is used as a bargaining 
mechanism in a firm-supplier and a firm-employee relation. This bargaining role 
of debt is thought to be pronounced, particularly in manufacturing industries, 
because most firms in this sector are often characterised by networks of 
contractual relations with suppliers, as few of them are vertically integrated. 
Equally, in some manufacturing industries, firms rely on their employees, 
especially those skilled workers making specialised products. Thus, suppliers and 
employees have an important impact on firm value and operating performance. In 
the firm-supplier relationship, it is sometimes observed that when one party has 
more bargaining power than the other, the former seeks opportunistic behaviour 
that violates their mutually beneficial contract. This aspect of the stakeholder 
theory of the capital structure approach suggests that debt can improve the 
efficiency of the contract, by reducing the bargaining power of the party seeking 
opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, it is observed that in firm-employee relations, 
debt can be used to mitigate threats from labour unionisation.  
 
Subramaniam (1996) analysed the firm-supplier relationship, in which a firm 
makes an up-front investment and enters into a long-term contract with a supplier. 
A hold-up problem occurs when the supplier no longer has an incentive to commit 
to the agreement and demands a larger share of the revenue. Subramaniam (1996) 
argued that even when the hold-up problem is solved, the underinvestment 
problem can remain. This is because the firm rationally anticipates that the final 
revenue will have to be shared with the supplier. It will thus invest up to the point 
where the marginal surplus accrued to it is zero and this leads to the problem of 
inefficient investment (i.e. underinvestment). Subramaniam (1996) showed that 
the underinvestment problem can be mitigated, if the firm issues debt and retires 
equity, i.e. debt is swapped for equity. As debt holders are the first claimants, 
increasing the firm’s debt reduces the surplus that has to be shared with the 
supplier. In addition, the increased probability of bankruptcy, due to higher debt, 
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also increases the firm’s incentive to invest, which in turns mitigates the 
underinvestment problem.  
 
In his subsequent paper, Subramaniam (1998) theoretically analysed the other 
possible scenario for the hold-up problem; that is when a firm has more 
bargaining power and seeks opportunistic behaviour. For example, a firm may 
lower the offered input price once its supplier has incurred set-up costs, or it may 
demand more features in the product or extra services, such as new packaging and 
new delivery conditions. However, any foresighted supplier will anticipate such 
opportunistic behaviour by the firm and as a result of this hold-up problem, fewer 
suppliers will be willing to provide service to them. This, in turn, leads to higher 
input prices and fewer sourced inputs, and consequently to a suboptimal 
production level. Subramaniam (1998) showed that debt can be used as a credible 
commitment to mitigate the hold-up problem: increasing debt induces a firm to 
increase its output, which in turn increases the demand of the input quantity, and 
thus promotes entry in the supplier industry. Furthermore, the model examines the 
cost of increased debt in terms of the agency problem. The use of debt and the 
consequent deviation in the firm’s output away from the value-maximising level, 
exacerbates the conflict of interest problems between shareholders and debt 
holders. The rationally anticipated debt holders will increase the price of debt. 
Therefore, the optimal financial decision can be obtained from a trade-off between 
the agency cost and the benefit of improved sourcing efficiency in the supplier 
market. For the optimally leveraged firm, the equilibrium input costs are lower 
and output is at its maximising value.  
 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (2000) extended Subramaniam’s (1998) model 
to analyse the link between debt financing and product-market decisions, by 
explicitly incorporating a firm’s contractual relations with its suppliers in the 
strategic interaction between a firm and its rivals. The firm’s financing choice is 
observed, by not only its suppliers, but also simultaneously by its rivals. As 
discussed by Subramaniam (1998), debt has strategic advantage as it alleviates the 
hold-up problem in the firm-supplier relation and encourages more suppliers into 
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the industry. According to Brander and Lewis (1986), debt also induces the firm 
to capture a fraction of its rival’s market share, if they both engage in Cournot 
competition where outputs are strategic substitutes. That is to say, the firm 
increases its output, which induces its rival to decrease its output. This is 
discussed further below in section, 2.2.2. However, Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (2002) argued debt financing as a commitment to larger output and 
for encouraging more suppliers to service the firm, may not always be profitable 
to the firm, especially when the supplier industry is endowed with external 
economies of scale. An industry with external economies of scale, is one that has 
economies of scale that are external to the firm, but are internal to the industry. In 
such an industry, increased competition would mean lower minimum average 
costs and subsequently, lower input prices for all the downstream firms. 
Therefore, the gains to the firm from encouraging more suppliers to enter the 
market may be offset by this decrease in industry input costs and the consequent 
subsidy this provides to the firm’s rivals. Therefore, using debt as a strategic 
commitment helps reduce the input costs of the rival, which enables it to produce 
more. Moreover, the strategic advantage of debt is lost, if this subsidy effect is 
large. In sum, a unilateral increase in debt increases the firm’s output as well as its 
rival’s, whilst imposing the cost only on the firm. 
 
Another examination of the role of debt in alleviating the hold-up problem by the 
supplier was given by de Fraja and Piga (2004). Using the principal-agent 
framework, they showed that the agent (a franchisee or a firm) always chooses 
higher debt than required in the investment, for strategic purposes. Debt protects 
the agent from being held up by the principal (a franchiser or a supplier), because 
it forces the principal to incur part of the initial investment costs. However, debt 
also increases the likelihood of bankruptcy and decreases the franchiser’s 
expected profits, which induces the conflict of interest problem. de Fraja and Piga 
(2004) showed that this problem can be solved by an up-front restriction on the 
franchisee’s ability to borrow.  
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As already mentioned, in a firm-employee relation, debt can be additionally used 
to protect a firm from threats of labour unionisation. Bronars and Deere’s (1991) 
work showed that debt can be used to protect shareholders’ wealth when it faces a 
threat from labour unionisation. The intuition is similar to Subramaniam’s (1996) 
firm-supplier model discussed above. When bankruptcy is costly, issuing debt 
obliges the firm to pay a portion of revenue to its debt holders. This limits the 
revenue the union can extract without driving the firm into bankruptcy. 
Shareholders will prefer the above method to the strategy of increasing 
employees’ payoffs, in an effort to prevent unionisation. Bronars and Deere 
(1991) also empirically showed a positive relationship between industry 
unionisation rates and industry average debt-equity ratios. A similar argument was 
presented by Perotti and Spier (1993), who suggested that when profits are 
insufficient to fully meet the promised wages of the employees, a firm can use 
debt to bargain with them. Issuing debt causes debt-overhang, which presents 
employees with the credible threat that the firm will forego a profitable 
investment, if the employees do not agree to a wage reduction.   
 
In addition to the role of debt in alleviating the underinvestment problem, 
Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) analysed the cost of debt that a firm may incur 
when it increases it. In Dasgupta and Sengupta’s (1993) model, the firm increases 
its debt prior to the negotiations with its employees. In the negotiation phase, the 
expected payoffs to employees are effectively reduced, because debt holders are 
the first claimants and the higher the debt level, the lower the surplus which 
accrues to employees. Once the financial decision is made, the employees choose 
their levels of effort to maximise their payoffs, net of claims by debt holders. 
Owing to their smaller share of the payoff, the employees choose the level of 
effort which is not the first-best level. In this way, increasing debt thus raises the 
moral hazard cost. The optimal choice of debt is therefore derived by balancing 
the bargaining role of debt against the moral hazard cost of employees. In 
addition, Dasgupta and Sengupta (2003) showed that the use of debt depends on 
the bargaining power parameter of the firm: the higher the parameter, the lower 
the debt the firm employs. Their model demonstrates that the employees’ payoff 
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(net of effort cost) is not necessarily decreasing in the firm’s bargaining power 
parameter. This is because as the firm’s bargaining power increases, it reduces 
debt level, which effectively increases the divisible surplus and as a result, the 
share of the employees’ payoff may increase.  
 
In contrast to the argument presented above, Sarig (1998) argued that debt 
weakens a firm’s bargaining position vis-à-vis employees who possess firm-
specific human capital. Facing a greater probability of bankruptcy, a high-
leveraged firm is more susceptible to employees’ threats to seek other jobs than 
other, less levered firms. His argument also applies to negotiations with suppliers 
of specialised input factors, indicating that the manager of a highly leveraged firm 
is more vulnerable to suppliers’ threats to curtail their supply than less leveraged 
firms. Sarig (1998) also provided empirical evidence that is consistent with his 
model. He found that the bargaining ability of employees or their level of 
unionisation is a determinant of the firm’s leverage and the share of profits that 
employees receive is positively correlated with the level of debt. 
 
c) Empirical Evidence  
 
The section proceeds to examine the empirical evidence, from the relevant 
literature, on the relationship between capital structure and product and input 
market.  
 
Piga (1998) empirically examined the role of debt in the vertical relationship 
among Italian manufacturing firms. The results supported the argument that 
sellers (suppliers) have high debt, in order to alleviate the hold-up problem and to 
increase their bargaining power, vis-à-vis their buyers. This was shown by the 
significant and positive relationship between debt and firm supplier. 
 
Kale and Shahrur (2007) carried out an empirical examination of how a firm may 
use debt to strategically affect a relationship-specific investment with its suppliers 
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and customers. Their multivariate analysis of industry and firm level data showed 
that relationship-specific investment, which is proxied by: suppliers’ R&D 
investments, customers’ R&D investments, and the intensity of joint ventures and 
strategic alliances, is negatively related to debt level. This result supports the 
argument proposed by Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991) that a 
firm with a unique product, or whose reputation depends on its product quality, 
should be low leveraged, if it expects to engage in a relationship-specific 
investment with its customers. The negative effect of the R&D investment is 
pronounced in firms that belong to concentrated industries and in those firms with 
a high market share. This finding implies that the effect of customer relationship-
specific investments on debt is stronger when there are few alternative suppliers of 
that product in the industry. The study also addressed the endogeneity problem of 
the relationship between capital structure and product market, and the results 
indicate a negative effect of the expected leverage variable on that of R&D 
investments. This has contributed to the research of the capital structure and 
product market competition approach, which will be reviewed in the next sub-
section. 
  
In addition, Kale and Shahrur (2007) investigated the bargaining role of debt and 
hypothesised that a firm may choose high debt when it faces suppliers or 
customers who have relatively higher bargaining power. Using industry 
concentration as the supplier/customer bargaining power, the study found that a 
firm that faces concentrated suppliers or customer industries tends to have higher 
levels of debt. This positive effect is weaker for a firm with a high market share in 
its industry and this suggests that the high market share of the firm is a substitute 
for debt as a bargaining mechanism.  
 
Matsa (2007) used data on manufacturing firms from the 1970s through to the 
1990s, to investigate the effect of the proportion of employees covered by 
collective bargaining, on current debt and profit. Consistent with Kale and 
Shahrur (2007), Matsa (2007) empirically found that debt improves a firm’s 
bargaining position when negotiating with labour unionisation. Matsa (2007) 
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argued that a firm with high liquidity is subjected to demands for higher wages 
from its employees, so increasing debt reduces the firm’s liquidity and thereby 
lessens labour unions’ power.  
 
Frank and Huyghebaert (2006) examined the role of non-financial stakeholder 
costs as a determinant of capital structure, by using a sample of first-time business 
start-ups. By using both accounting data and detailed surveys, the study found that 
an increase in non-financial stakeholder liquidation costs decreases the debt ratio 
and the proportion of bank loans in total debt. The study found that a firm reduces 
its vulnerability to the bargaining power of non-financial stakeholders, by limiting 
its use of debt. This is shown by a decrease in debt ratio and in the proportion of 
bank loans in the total debt. These findings are consistent with the model proposed 
by Sarig (1998).  
 
In contrast to Maksimovic and Titman’s (1991) view that a firm whose quality 
and reputation are important to its customers’ perceptions should restrict its level 
of debt, Bandyopadhyay and Das (2005) empirically showed that financial 
securities, such as debentures and commercial papers, can be used as a signal of 
firm quality, and they give the firm strategic advantage in the product market. 
They used a sample of 533 listed Indian firms across industry sectors, from 1989-
2000, to test how the use of short-term financial securities, as a signal of firm 
quality, affected firm performance in the product market. The results show that 
short-term securities, like debentures and commercial paper, are positively related 
to sales by the firm. Bandyopadhyay and Das (2005) found that a firm can issue 
these short-term securities to gain strategic advantage in the product market, for 
example: reducing capacity constraints, building distribution networks, and 
engaging in product innovation. They argued that firms that issue these financial 
securities must pass the scrutiny of the credit agencies or banks that guarantee 
these loans and therefore, these financial instruments can be viewed as a sign of 
the good financial health of the firm.  
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2.2.2 Capital Structure and Product Market Competition  
 
The research that is most relevant to this thesis is now considered, that is to say, 
this sub-section reviews the approach that examines how a firm’s financial 
decision relates to its own and its rivals’ product market strategy. In general, there 
are two main arguments that offer explanations, regarding the relationship 
between capital structure and product market competition. The first is the limited 
liability effect of debt or the strategic use of debt argument that suggests that debt 
has a strategic use, because it induces a firm to engage in a certain product market 
strategy. The second argument states that an unleveraged or low-leveraged firm 
can gain strategic advantage in the product market, by engaging in predatory 
action to eliminate its highly leveraged rival. This second argument is derived 
from the long-purse (deep-pockets) argument of the predation model and these 
two arguments are discussed below.  
 
a) The Limited Liability Effect of Debt 
 
Amongst the pioneering work on this approach, Brander and Lewis (1986) 
introduced the limited liability effect of debt in a Cournot competition model (i.e. 
firms competing in output) with homogenous products. Their two-period model 
analysed the effect of short-term debt on the product market decision, within a 
static game (i.e. one-shot game). In the first period, firms simultaneously make 
their financial decisions. They then decide how much output to produce in the 
second period, given their own and their rival’s first period financial decisions. 
The game ends, the operating profits are realised, and interest is paid out to debt 
holders, before any net profits can be given to shareholders. In this scenario it is 
noted that the operating profits are subjected to some random, but favourable, 
product market uncertainty; the higher the state of product market uncertainty, the 
greater the operating profits. 
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Brander and Lewis (1986) theoretically showed that because of product market 
uncertainty, debt has a strategic use in the product market. Based on Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) risk-shifting hypothesis, they argued that the first-period debt 
induces a firm that maximises its shareholder value and to commit to producing 
more output, in order to increase profits. Because of the limited liability, the 
shareholders’ losses are protected by the value of salvageable assets (for 
simplicity, the model assumes these to be zero) and debt holders bear any shortfall 
in the firm’s profits. As the firm increases its debt, and thus its future debt 
obligations, the critical state in which the firm just breaks even rises, which in turn 
reduces the number of non-bankrupt states, in which shareholders optimise their 
payoffs. The low non-bankrupt states become irrelevant to shareholders. Thus, 
debt induces the firm to pursue a more aggressive product market strategy, i.e. 
increasing output, to optimise profits, as much as possible, over the ‘smaller’ non-
bankrupt states. In Cournot competition, outputs are strategic substitutes, that is to 
say, the marginal profit and output of one firm falls as the output of the other firm 
rises. An increase in debt causes one firm to expand its output at its rival’s 
expense. In this model, both firms make their decisions simultaneously, and 
therefore they obtain short-term debt and consequently increase their output levels 
in equilibrium. As a result, firms are worse off because their increased output 
reduces price levels and thereby decreases their profits. Debt financing in Brander 
and Lewis’s (1986) Cournot competition model, leads to the prisoners’ dilemma-
like behaviour, namely, both firms increase debt and produce more than they 
would if debt financing were restricted. 
 
In their companion paper, Brander and Lewis (1988) considered how the 
bankruptcy effect may have linkage between financial and product output 
decisions. As before, two firms were engaged in Cournot competition with 
homogenous products. To avoid the limited liability effect of debt, the model 
posited that both firms, simultaneously, were making financial and product output 
decisions to maximise total firm value. The operating profits made were said to be 
conditional on the firm’s and its rival’s output, as well as some favourable product 
market uncertainty. Brander and Lewis (1988) showed that with fixed bankruptcy 
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costs, debt induces a firm to increase its output in the product market, which is 
somewhat counterintuitive. One would expect a firm with more probability of 
bankruptcy, owing to increased debt, to be more conservative. However, Brander 
and Lewis (1988) suggested a reason for this counterintuitive result was that 
increasing debt corresponds to high values of the break-even state, in which the 
firm earns just enough to pay debt holders. Given that the reaction curves are 
downward and the operating profits rise as the product market uncertainty 
increases, the firm has an incentive to increase its output for any output produced 
by its rival. This is similar to the argument given in their 1986 paper. With 
proportional bankruptcy costs, a U-shaped relationship exists between debt and 
output. The output is at its minimum where the firm earns just enough operating 
profits to pay debt holders.  
 
Some criticisms have been made of the validity of Brander and Lewis’s (1986) 
work. An obvious example is that the conclusion from Brander and Lewis’s 
(1986) model does not seem to show that firms are better off with the strategic use 
of debt in Cournot competition and rather, both firms would be better off if debt 
was restricted. Another point, as argued by Dastinar (2003), is that Brander and 
Lewis (1986) did not ensure that the debt taken does not exceed the financial 
requirement. Some firms might recapitalise by increasing their leverage, in order 
to fend off takeover attempts and the money obtained from the debt holders may 
not be invested, but transferred to shareholders. In addition, Brander and Lewis 
(1986) did not specify how the face value of debt is determined. Although some 
might doubt the robustness of the specifications in Brander and Lewis’s (1986) 
model, one cannot deny that their model certainly asserts an important linkage 
between financial and product output decision. That is to say, debt induces a firm 
to be aggressive in the output decision, and thus the financial and product market 
decisions should not be made independently. Evidently, subsequent papers were 
based on their arguments and many used their work as a platform for developing 
their models, for instance: Maksimovic (1988) analysed a Cournot competition 
model within a finitely repeated game, Showalter (1995) examined the limited 
liability effect of debt, when firms compete in Bertrand competition and       
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Glazer (1994) studied the effect of long-term debt. These papers developed their 
arguments under the framework that firms produce homogenous goods and along 
with other relevant papers are now reviewed in more detail below.   
 
Maksimovic (1988) extended Brander and Lewis’s (1986) one-shot game model, 
to examine the sustainability of collusive agreements in an infinitely repeated 
game, with stationary demand. He showed that the higher the firm’s debt, the 
stronger is its incentive to deviate from the collusive equilibrium, by producing 
more output. Because of the limited liability effect, debt induces a firm to become 
more aggressive in the product market, in order to earn higher profits. This is 
consistent with Brander and Lewis’s (1986) argument that debt toughens product 
market competition. Moreover, in Maksimovic’s work (1988) it was shown that 
debt increases the payoff of deviating, thus causing collusion to be less 
sustainable. Additionally, Maksimovic (1988) examined factors that determine an 
upper bound of debt level, at which a grim-trigger strategy, where all firms 
produce at a collusive output level, can be sustained. This upper bound level of 
debt depends on: the number of firms in the industry, the discount rate, and the 
elasticity of demand. He showed that the upper bound level of debt declines as the 
discount rate increases, and increases as the number of firms in the industry grows 
and when there is increasing elasticity of demand.  
 
A similar argument was presented by Stenbacka (1994). In a Bertrand competition 
model with stochastic demand fluctuations, he showed that debt decreases the 
incentive to sustain collusion. His argument was that because a firm has stronger 
incentives to deviate from collusion in periods of high demand realisation, an 
increase in debt reduces the level of demand, above which, the collusive price is 
not sustainable. In other words, debt raises the number of high demand states, in 
which a firm has an incentive to deviate from the collusive price agreement. 
Stenbacka (1994) argued further that an optimal debt level can be derived as a 
trade-off between this negative incentive effect of debt against the tax-shield 
benefit.  
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Many authors have argued that debt does not commit a firm to becoming more 
aggressive in product market competition. Instead, it induces more collusive 
behaviour in the product market. This argument has been led by Showalter (1995), 
who analysed the limited liability effect of debt when firms compete in Bertrand 
competition. By employing a model in which two firms with homogenous 
products compete in prices, Showalter (1995) argued that debt does not have 
strategic use for all types of product market uncertainty, as shown in Brander and 
Lewis’s (1986) model. In Bertrand competition, debt is strategically advantageous 
under demand uncertainty, but not under cost uncertainty. Because prices are 
strategic complements in Bertrand competition, the marginal profit and 
equilibrium price of one firm rises corresponding to a rise in its rival’s price. 
When demand is uncertain, high prices are encouraged through large debt levels. 
By increasing its debt, a firm optimises over high demand states and therefore 
chooses a higher equilibrium price. A rival firm reacts by increasing price, raising 
the expected profit of the leveraged firm. When costs are uncertain, however, a 
firm taking on debt will place emphasis on low marginal cost states and choose a 
lower equilibrium price. This will induce its rival firm to decrease its price, 
causing a decrease in the expected profit of the leveraged firm. Firms that face 
cost uncertainty will therefore use zero or negative levels of debt, in order to keep 
the price high. Showalter (1995) showed that, unlike Brander and Lewis (1986), 
debt softens product market competition, when firms compete in Bertrand 
competition.  
 
Similarly, Faure-Grimaud (2000) theoretically showed that debt can induce firms 
to become less aggressive in the product market. In Faure-Grimaud’s (2000) 
model, the debt contract is endogenously written as an agreement between a firm 
and its lender. Upon repayment, the firm will be rewarded for prompt payment. If 
the firm is unable to repay its debt, it will not be rewarded. This is also viewed as 
the firm’s bankruptcy cost, which is proportional to the probability of default. The 
model shows that the bankruptcy cost of debt can dominate the limited liability 
effect, which then induces the firm to become less aggressive in the product 
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market, in order to limit the size of the default and to gain more chances of 
receiving the reward from the lender.  
 
In contrast to Maksimovic (1988), Damania (1997) argued that debt can facilitate 
tacit collusion. His model can be viewed as an infinitely repeated version of 
Brander and Lewis’s (1986) one-shot game model with stochastic demand 
uncertainty. Two firms choose their debt levels prior to their output decisions. 
Then, given their debt levels, they compete over their output levels infinitely. 
Shareholders optimise their payoffs over non-bankrupt states, whereas debt 
holders are the residual claimants in bankrupt states. Increases in debt induce 
firms to optimise over smaller non-bankrupt states and the neglect of the bankrupt 
states results in a rise in output levels in non-collusive periods. A grim-trigger 
strategy is played. When a firm reneges on the agreement, the game reverts to 
non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the very next period and every 
period thereafter. Damania (1997) showed that because of the limited liability 
effect of debt, shareholders ignore the low states of demand, in which debt holders 
optimise their payoffs. Such neglect leads to an increase in output in the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, and thereby reduces payoffs caused by defection. Debt makes 
defection less desirable, and facilitates tacit collusion. 
 
In addition to Damania’s (1997) argument that debt can sustain collusion in the 
product market, Poitevin (1989a) argued that a common lender can reduce 
aggressiveness of competition, and facilitate more collusive behaviour. His model 
showed that when both firms in a duopoly borrow from the same lender, their 
given interest rates are taken into consideration by their common lender. This is 
because an increase in a firm’s interest rate raises its own output and reduces its 
rival’s output. In order to soften product market competition, i.e. encourage more 
collusive behaviour, the common lender can reduce the interest rate, in order to 
induce firms to restrict their output levels. Similarly, Spagnolo (2004) 
theoretically showed that the collusion effect can be transferred from 
concentrated/collusive credit markets or large banking groups, to firms in the 
product market. The collusive creditors can implicitly force firms to commit to 
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prudent strategies that reduce the potential conflict between shareholders and debt 
holders, and dampen the limited liability effect of debt. For example, a firm 
should hire a manager with a valuable reputation or with conservative incentive. 
Commitment can be made effective across firms in the product market, by the use 
of renegotiation-proof debt covenants or by having a representative from the 
collusive lender participate in the firms’ boards. Both collusive credit markets and 
prudent managers, make collusion more sustainable in the product market.  
 
Clayton (1999) modelled the interaction of debt, investment, and product market 
decision and suggested that when firms compete in imperfect competition, debt 
and investment give them a strategic advantage. Increasing investment reduces the 
marginal cost of production and that induces a firm to produce more in the product 
market. Similarly, increasing debt leads the firm to optimise its profits over only 
high realisations of demand by producing more output. Debt and investment may 
be substitutes or complements to one another. When firms compete in Cournot 
competition, debt induces firms to increase production, which thereby reduces the 
marginal cost of production and firms thus want to produce and invest more. 
However, an increase in debt also raises the probability of bankruptcy, and 
shareholders who would receive nothing if the firms go bankrupt, will invest less 
when debt increases. Debt and investment are substitutes when the latter effect 
dominates. Clayton (1999) showed that debt and investment are substitutes in 
Bertrand Competition. Debt induces firms to increase the price level, and a 
consequence of these higher prices and debt overhang, is lower investment and 
weaker product market competition.  
 
As argued by Brander and Lewis (1986), because of product market uncertainty, 
the limited liability effect of debt commits firms to aggressive product market 
behaviour. The following papers have considered changes in the limited liability 
effect of debt, when uncertainty can be resolved. Hughes et al. (1998) analysed a 
model, in which resolving product market uncertainty can change the strategic 
incentives of the debt issue. Prior to the financial decision, firms may resolve 
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uncertainty by acquiring and sharing some information. They argued that 
information sharing is more important to firms, when facing demand uncertainty 
rather than cost uncertainty and by sharing information, firms can completely 
eliminate the former, but not the latter. The implication of the model is that the 
limited liability effect of debt may be eliminated when the uncertainty is resolved. 
A similar idea is found in Dasgupta and Shin (1999), who suggested that the 
possibility of sharing information through a trade association can resolve demand 
uncertainty. A firm with information would benefit from conveying its 
information on future market demand to a less-informed, leveraged rival. If the 
better informed firm conveys the information, the less-informed rival will reduce 
its output when demand is low, and thereby soften product market competition. 
Furthermore, Berlin and Butler (1996) argued that a firm can use public debt to 
commit itself to disclosing information. The firm’s private information becomes 
known to its rivals and this public debt does not have the confidentiality effect that 
is associated with private debt.  
 
Another perspective was presented by Chowdhury (2006), who tested the 
implication of Brander and Lewis’s (1986) model for the situation where debt and 
a state of uncertainty are endogenous. To this end, the former was assumed to be 
used for financing production, whereas for the latter it was taken that a firm is 
foresighted, and thus knows the exact state in which it earns just enough to repay 
its debt. Chowdhury (2006) showed that when either debt or uncertainty is 
endogenous and when both are endogenous, debt leads to a decrease in output, 
which contradicts the main findings of Brander and Lewis (1986). Chowdhury 
(2006) argued that when debt and a state of uncertainty are endogenous, a firm 
does not only choose an output level which maximises the payoff in good states, 
but it also selects one that minimises the payoff in bad states.  
 
Dastinar (2003) proposed that firms set up their capacity level, and then obtain 
debt to finance the set-up in the first period. It is assumed that firms can produce 
output up to their capacity levels with zero cost. In the second stage, they 
simultaneously produce their output, given the capacity level and financial 
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contract chosen in the first period. Dastinar (2003) found that although debt 
increases output levels in the second stage, taking on debt actually reduces returns 
to the original shareholders. The argument is that debt has a direct effect and an 
indirect effect on shareholder value. On the one hand, the direct effect causes 
shareholder value to decrease as debt increases and on the other hand, debt 
commits a firm, in a Cournot model, to producing large output, as this causes the 
rival to produce less. This indirect effect of debt increases shareholder value. In 
Dastinar (2003) the direct effect of debt dominates the indirect effect. The 
capacity constraint decision, which is made simultaneously with the financial 
decision, ‘kills’ the strategic benefit of debt (the limited liability effect) that 
occurs in Brander and Lewis (1986). Therefore, firms are completely equity-
financed in equilibrium.  
 
Glazer (1994) extended Brander and Lewis’s (1986) short-term debt model, by 
analysing the effects of long-term debt on the product market decisions in a 
Cournot competition model with homogenous products. Glazer (1994) showed 
that when a firm selects its output level in every period, the accumulated profits 
strongly affect its product market decision. When profits are high in the given 
period, the firm has an incentive to become less aggressive in the following 
periods, that is to say, long-term debt can induce collusive behaviour over some 
periods of time. In Glazer’s (1994) model, firms simultaneously select long-term 
debt then compete over two periods of product market. The selected long-term 
debt induces a firm to be less aggressive, by producing less output in the first 
period. Given that quantity is a strategic substitute, the rival increases its output 
and profits. The firm does not deviate from the more collusive output market, 
because such deviation will lower the rival’s profits and these low profits will 
force the rival to become aggressive in the second period, which will reduce the 
firm’s second period profits. However, when the maturity date of long-term debt 
is close (firms compete in the second period), the firm increases its output in order 
to gain high profits. In the symmetric equilibrium, both firms reduce their 
quantities in the first period (more collusive behaviour), but increase their outputs 
in the second (more aggressive product market strategy). The model shows firms 
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behave with different strategies, according to whether the maturity date of debt is 
near or far away.  
 
Breuer and Kleefisch (2002) extended Glazer’s (1994) work to analyse the effect 
of financial innovations on product market competition. In their two-period model 
implicit collusion is impossible when firms are allowed to borrow short-term debt 
at the interim period. In Breuer and Kleefisch (2002), prior to the output stage, 
firms simultaneously select long-term debt. First period profits are realised, but it 
is assumed that they are insufficient to settle all of the outstanding debt. The 
model then assumes that firms are allowed to borrow further short-term debt, prior 
to the second output stage. The second-period profits are realised subject to some 
product market uncertainty. Long-term debt holders are paid before short-term 
debt holders are paid. Solving the model by using backward induction, Breuer and 
Kleefisch (2002) showed that firms compete aggressively in the second period. 
Unlike Glazer’s model (1994), in which firms soften product market competition, 
i.e. demonstrate collusive behaviour in the first period, Breuer and Kleefisch 
(2002) showed that the interim short-term debt induces firms to increase their 
output. The model shows that firms, when faced with additional financial 
opportunities, find implicit collusive behaviour impossible.  
 
Dasgupta and Titman (1998) analysed the effect of long-term debt on the pricing 
decision, by using a model with differentiated products. They argued that long-
term debt induces a firm to discount its future cashflow heavily. This intuition is 
based on Myers’s (1977) debt overhang problem and Klemperer’s (1987) 
switching cost model. Dasgupta and Titman (1998) found that in Bertrand 
competition, leverage induces a firm to increase its prices in the product market. 
Its rival responds to an increase in prices by raising its own prices, if it too is also 
highly leveraged. They did not examine specifically the effect of product 
differentiation, but merely found that long-term debt induces more collusive 
behaviour in the product market.   
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Baldauf et al. (2000) studied the effect of long-term debt on pricing policy for a 
new product, within a framework of a two-period Bertrand competition model 
with differentiated products. Their model assumes that demand uncertainty only 
prevails in the second period. Given this, they showed that debt induces a firm to 
increase its prices in the second period, because the firm has an incentive to adopt 
a pricing strategy that maximises its shareholder value. In the first period, the firm 
decreases its prices in order to increase its sale.   
 
b) The Long-Purse (Deep-Pockets) Argument of Predation  
 
According to the limited liability approach, firms strategically use debt either to 
commit to aggressive product market behaviour under Cournot competition 
(Brander and Lewis, 1986), or to soften Bertrand price competition (Showalter, 
1995). In contrast to the limited liability effect approach, the long-purse argument 
suggests that a leveraged firm is often adversely affected by aggressive action 
from a non-leveraged or less-leveraged rival. The long-purse argument started 
with Telser (1966), who suggested that a firm with ‘deep-pockets’, that is one 
having a greater access to capital, is able to engage in a predatory product market 
strategy and sustain any consequent losses until it successfully drives its more 
financially vulnerable rivals out of the market, or prevents them from entering it. 
The deep-pockets argument is closely related to other predation models, which 
first date back to McGee (1958), and were subsequently extended by Kreps and 
Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and Saloner (1987).2   
 
In Telser (1966) a financially constrained entrant is vulnerable to an incumbent’s 
intention to drive the entrant firm out of business. The incumbent, with deep-
pockets, is able to sustain losses until it succeeds in eliminating its competitor, i.e. 
the entrant, under the assumption that the entrant typically has a more vulnerable 
                                                
2
 A general description of different types of the predation model is offered in Klevorick (1993). 
Other forms of the predation model are found in: Kreps and Wilson (1982), and Milgrom and 
Robert’s (1982b) reputation model, Milgrom and Robert’s (1982a) limit-pricing model, and 
Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1986) signal-jamming model. Saloner (1987) analysed a model in which 
an output decision for a takeover commitment can prevent entry from other firms.  
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financial structure than the incumbent. After entry, the incumbent engages in 
costly predatory activities, in order to exhaust the entrant financially. However, as 
argued by Telser (1966) himself, the predation action cannot happen when 
financial markets are perfect, as the entrant can always secure financing, so long 
as its entry is profitable.  
 
Although the above argument is persuasive, one might query why some firms are 
more financially constrained than others. In response to this, Poitevin (1989) 
provided a formal representation of Telser’s (1966) argument, in which the 
entrant’s and the incumbent’s financial structures arise endogenously. In his 
signalling model, the incumbent’s cost is known with certainty, whereas the 
entrant’s cost is unknown to the financial market. The entrant has to incur some 
entry cost, which can only be externally financed. Because information is 
asymmetric, in equilibrium, the low-cost entrant uses debt to separate itself from 
the high-cost entrant. Although this invites predation from the incumbent, debt is 
necessary for the low cost entrant firm to signal its type to investors. Later, 
Gottesman (2004) showed that with the use of noncallable convertible debt, the 
low-cost entrant can signal its quality to the financial market, as well as prevent 
predation action from the incumbent.  
 
A similar argument, based on the adverse selection problem, was presented by 
Gertner et al. (1988), who argued that when a firm reveals its information to the 
capital market, its rival in the product market also observes the information. The 
rival then conditions its product market strategy based on this information, and by 
doing so, affects the firm’s profits. Given that the firm’s profits are endogenously 
determined, its incentives to reveal information to the capital market are affected 
by product market competition. That is, the structure of the product market 
determines the character of capital market equilibrium.  
 
Based on the moral hazard problem in financial contracting, Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990) presented a model in which financial constraints emerge 
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endogenously, as a way of mitigating incentive problems. In their two-period 
model, financial constraints occur because second-period financing is contingent 
upon first-period profits. The second-period contingency provides a rival with an 
opportunity to drive down the high debt firm’s profits, with the expectation that 
investors might not extend second-period financing to the leveraged firm. The 
central argument of their model is that the agency problem in financial contracting 
can give rise to rational predation. The financial contract that minimises the 
agency problem also maximises rivals’ incentive to be predatory. This suggests 
that there is a trade-off between deterring predation and mitigating the incentive 
problem, that is to say, reducing the sensitivity of the refinancing decisions 
discourages predation, but exacerbates the incentive problem. Depending on the 
importance of the incentive problem, relative to the predation threat, the 
equilibrium optimal contract may or may not deter predation. The reliance on 
external financing exposes the firm to cutthroat competition and this may force it 
to rely more on internal sources of capital, rather than on external ones. 
Nevertheless, this reduces the extent to which outside investors monitor the firm 
and increases the possibility of managerial slack. Hence, external financing comes 
with costs and benefits: on the one hand, it disciplines management, but on the 
other it makes the firm more vulnerable in its product market. Their model 
suggests that an important determinant of product market success is the degree to 
which firms can finance investment with internal funds.  
 
Following Bolton and Scharfstein’s (1990) work that posited that the capital 
market cannot fully observe a firm’s ex-post profits, Fernandez-Ruiz (2004) used 
a similar idea to develop a model examining the predatory action of an incumbent, 
when an entrant’s ex-ante prospect of a project is not observable by the capital 
market. In order to mitigate the ex-ante asymmetric information, the entrant may 
optimally condition its own survival on future assessments by the capital market. 
This induces the incumbent’s response to adversely affect the capital market’s 
assessments, making exit of the entrant more likely.   
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Kanatas and Qi (2001) examined the incentive of a firm and its rival to manipulate 
the firm’s information given to investors, by distorting output in the product 
market. They argued that although short-term debt mitigates the moral hazard 
problem occurring in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), it may induce the firm to 
manipulate information flow to the credit market, when it needs to be re-financed 
some time in the future. The incentive problem occurs, because investors assess 
the firm’s expected future profits on its current costs and similarly assess these for 
the rival. The current costs are reflected in the level of current profits. This gives 
an incentive to the firm and its rival to adjust output in the product market, in 
order to manipulate information to the credit market. Short-term debt induces 
predatory action from its rival, whereas long-term debt can be used to mitigate the 
rival’s predation. However, long-term debt may not eliminate the continuation of 
the insider moral hazard problem. A firm’s manager has an incentive to shirk his 
duties or to overinvest.   
 
Some theoretical papers have provided analysis of the relationship between capital 
structure and the entry decision and can be considered in relation to the argument 
discussed above. For example, Lambrecht (2001) investigated the impact of debt 
financing on the entry decision and suggested that in the presence of bankruptcy 
costs and the absence of taxes, an entrant’s need to borrow money tends to delay 
their entry. On the other hand, however, an incumbent’s leverage tends to induce 
earlier entry. Once entry occurs, the more leveraged firm is then vulnerable to the 
predatory action of its rival. Cestone and White (2003) argued that an incumbent 
firm can prevent entry of potential rivals, by increasing the investor’s stake in the 
incumbent firm, and showed that by issuing equity to the investor, its stake in the 
firm becomes more sensitive to the incumbent’s performance. Thus, the investors 
will have less incentive to fund other potential rivals and entry is prevented.  
 
From another perspective, Showalter (1999b) suggested that debt can be used to 
deter the entry of a potential rival. Based on the findings in his earlier paper, he 
argued that with cost uncertainty, an incumbent firm can strategically use debt to 
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commit to low prices, and thereby deter a potential rival’s entry. Under demand 
uncertainty, deterrence is impossible, that is, the incumbent will instead use debt 
to soften post-entry product market competition. In addition to Showalter (1999b), 
Tarzijan (2007) suggested that an incumbent firm can strategically use debt to 
deter entry in Cournot competition with demand uncertainty. A rational entrant 
would prefer to enter the market in which an incumbent produces low output. 
Because of the limited liability effect of debt, the incumbent strategically uses 
debt to commit to producing more output, thus making the market less attractive 
to the entrant. This is similar to McAndrews and Nakamura’s (1992) argument 
that an incumbent’s debt can deter the entry of potential rivals and debt commits 
the former to be more aggressive in post-entry product market competition. 
However, Tarzijan (2007) argued further that since the leveraged incumbent’s 
profits are less than the non-leveraged incumbent’s, using debt as a strategic tool 
is costly. The incumbent will be willing to use debt for strategic reasons when 
entry can definitely be prevented, however, when there is more than one 
alternative market available to enter, the incumbent’s incentive to borrow will fall.   
 
Another theoretical perspective that suggests how a firm’s capital structure 
changes its product market behaviour was given by Chevalier and Scharfstein 
(1996), who developed a model which examines changes in the pricing decision 
of a liquidity constrained firm, during the business cycle. The exogenous changes 
in economic conditions during the business cycle, consequently lead to changes in 
the firm’s financial condition. This eliminates the possibility that changes in debt 
levels are affected by a firm’s product market decision. Chevalier and Scharfstein 
(1996) showed that capital-market imperfections induce the liquidity constrained 
firm to increase its markups (prices) during recessions, but to decrease them 
during booms. Because of its inability to obtain external funds (owing to the 
imperfect capital market), the liquidity constrained firm increases its markups to 
gain short-run profit during times of recession. Given that prices are strategic 
complements, cash rich (unconstrained) rivals react to the liquidity constrained 
firm’s increased prices, by increasing their prices (markups). Chevalier and 
Scharfstein (1996) then empirically analysed the effects of the capital market 
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imperfection on markups, by using data from the supermarket industry. The 
results support their theoretical argument that markups of a leveraged firm are 
countercyclical.  
 
In summary, the limited liability approach, reviewed in section 2.2.2a, suggests 
that a firm strategically uses debt to gain advantage in the product market. The 
deep-pockets argument of the predation model, reviewed in section 2.2.2b, 
suggests that a highly levered firm behaves passively in the product market, and is 
subject to aggressive behaviour by its less leveraged competitor.  
 
c) Debt and Product Market Competition with Differentiated Products 
 
In the previous sub-section, the chapter reviewed the relationship between capital 
structure and product market competition, within a framework of firms with 
homogenous products.  This view of the relationship is well established in the 
literature. It was not, however, until the last decade that researchers considered the 
relationship using a model of firms with differentiated products. Indeed, this 
thesis contributes to this ‘differentiated products’ argument of the capital structure 
and product market competition research area. Existing models in this research 
area show that the relationship between debt and product market competition is 
affected by the degree of product differentiation. For example, Wanzenried (2003) 
and Haan and Toolsema (2008) suggested that the degree of product 
substitutability can affect a firm’s use of debt in the product market. The effect of 
product differentiation on leverage was theoretically analysed in Fairchild (2004a 
and b), whilst Lyandres (2006) examined how debt is affected by the extent of 
competitive interaction among firms.  
 
Wanzenried (2003) considered a two-stage differentiated products Cournot 
competition model with demand uncertainty. The model analyses how the 
substitutability of products and the volatility of demand affect the strategic use of 
short-term debt. Wanzenried (2003) found that short-term debt induces a firm to 
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become more aggressive in the product market by increasing its output, which is 
consistent with Brander and Lewis (1986). When firms’ products are substitutes or 
complements, debt holding leads to lower profits in the former case, and higher in 
the latter. Debt level depends on the product substitutability and demand 
uncertainty. Wanzenried (2003) showed that there is a U-shaped relationship 
between debt and product substitutability, and debt is increasing with demand 
volatility. Haan and Toolsema (2008) re-examined Wanzenried’s (2003) and 
pointed out that when solving for output level, Wanzenried (2003) had made a 
mistake, by taking the critical demand state at which the firm earns just enough 
returns to pay debt holders, as given. They argued that the correct way of solving 
for output level is to take the debt level, rather than the critical demand state, as 
given, because the critical demand state is a function of the output levels that 
firms will set. As a result, Haan and Toolsema (2008) found that debt is not 
increasing with demand volatility, as argued by Wanzenried (2003), but it is in 
fact decreasing with demand volatility. However, they also found that debt 
induces a firm to increase its output. Profits for leveraged firms are higher with 
complementary products, but lower with substitute products.    
 
Fairchild (2004a) introduced the concepts of potential product market 
competition, capital structure, and actual product market competition.3 In order to 
do so, he employed a Bertrand competition model with differentiated products to 
analyse the effect of the degree of product differentiation on long-term debt. The 
degree of product differentiation represents the potential product market 
competition. With the use of a numeric example, Fairchild (2004a) showed that 
when product differentiation is high, both firms choose the all-equity financial 
contract in equilibrium. As product differentiation reduces, firms increase their 
level of debt to soften Bertrand price competition.  
                                                
3
 To be discussed in more detail at the beginning of chapter 3.  
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The model also shows that at a rather low level of product differentiation, firms 
slightly reduce their debt levels to avoid predation actions, such as price reduction 
by their rivals.4 In his subsequent paper, Fairchild (2004b) also showed that when 
product differentiation is high, all-equity is the equilibrium financial contract. As 
product differentiation decreases, firms increase their debt levels to soften the 
actual price competition. Fairchild (2004b) argued that this is due to the 
dominating effect of limited liability over the predation effect. Furthermore, the 
model shows that once the rivals reach a certain low degree of product 
differentiation, the predation effect becomes dominating and this is shown by a 
reduction in the firm’s level of debt. The decision is made to avoid any potential 
predation threats, such as price-cutting by the rival. 
 
Lyandres (2006) theoretically examined the extent of competitive interaction, 
capital structure, and product strategies. Lyandres (2006) showed that when the 
competitive interaction between firms is high, they will increase their debt level 
and increase output in strategic substitutes and prices in strategic complement 
competition. His argument supports the view of Brander and Lewis (1986) and 
Showalter (1995). 
 
Arping and Loranth (2006) examined the trade-off between the benefits of debt, in 
terms of managerial discipline and the cost imposed on the customers, who are 
adversely affected by the potential loss of suppliers for their durable products.  
The model relates the costs and benefits to the product differentiation. That is to 
say, if the product is unique, then customer viability is of utmost concern and the 
firm can mitigate this by reducing its product’s uniqueness. However, by reducing 
product differentiation, the firm is faced with more intense price competition. The 
firm thus faces another trade-off between softening price competition and a 
reduction in the cost of customer ownership.  
 
                                                
4
 Note that the ‘predation’ effect refers to the idea that at low degrees of product differentiation, if 
a firm sets a high debt level, another firm can ‘undercut’ by setting lower prices, in order to ‘steal’ 
market share. Therefore, both firms reduce debt levels in equilibrium to avoid the potential 
predation action.  
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d) The Relationship between Capital Structure and Product Market 
Structure: Linear or Non-Linear? 
 
Another important product market factor, which according to Istaitieh and 
Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) has not received much attention, is market structure. 
The following arguments have postulated a linear relationship between market 
structure and capital structure. Krishnaswamy et al. (1992) suggested that 
conditions of market structure, such as: the number and relative size of buyers and 
sellers, demand conditions for products, and costs and production conditions, can 
affect a firm’s capital structure. These market conditions can be described, in 
theory, in terms of: monopoly, oligopoly, and perfect competition. Firms in the 
same industry, with similar market structure conditions, would be expected to 
have similar financial policies. Krishnaswamy et al. (1992) argued that the effect 
on the output production depends on the conditions of market structure. They 
argued that such an effect would be significant for an industry with a small 
number of firms and with a high level of influence from rivals on price and 
quantity. In other words, the limited liability effect is more pronounced in a highly 
concentrated industry. Accordingly, one would expect the effect to be high in a 
firm with greater monopoly power, and similarly, one would observe that the 
effect is more pronounced in an oligopoly than in perfect competition. 
 
Using the agency cost argument proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Rathinasamy et al. (2000) argued that the risk-shifting hypothesis, referring to the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and debt holders, can also explain the 
relationship between market structure and capital structure. A manager, acting on 
behalf of shareholders, has an incentive to invest in risky projects, because any 
loss is borne by the firm’s debt holders. Even with debt covenants, debt holders 
may still find it difficult to monitor and assess risky projects. In terms of product 
market competition, the manager might borrow more to pursue a high-risk policy 
through aggressive output production. Rathinasamy et al. (2000) suggested that 
the risk-shifting hypothesis, similar to that of limited liability, is more pronounced 
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in a highly concentrated industry. These theories thus suggest that, a firm in a 
highly concentrated industry would have more incentive to become highly 
leveraged than a firm in a less concentrated industry, because the strategic benefit 
of debt is more pronounced in the former.  
 
In contrast, however, one might expect a firm in a concentrated industry to have 
low leverage. According to the deep-pockets argument, debt increases the 
probability of bankruptcy and the financial distress costs and these are particularly 
high to those firms who are unable to service debt. The implication of the deep-
pockets model is that in a highly concentrated industry, where the competition 
among rivals is intense, a low leverage firm with high reserve funds (deep 
pockets) would have an incentive to engage in predatory practices. For example, 
by increasing its output or reducing price level, could financially exhaust its high 
leveraged rivals and drive them out of the market. Low debt is a strategic 
mechanism to signal the firm’s solvency and its strong position in the industry, 
thereby deterring any potential predatory actions.  
 
Myers (1977) presented a model in which debt causes under investment. Firms 
reject those profitable, low risk investment projects that have the possibility of 
passing on benefits from the debt holders to shareholders. Moreover, internal 
financing is cheaper than external debt due to asymmetric information. A higher 
level of debt causes higher output to cost more for a levered firm. In a competitive 
market, unleveraged or low leveraged rival firms will strengthen competition by 
increasing their output and lowering price. If the leveraged firms continue 
borrowing to match the competition, they may be confronted with financial 
distress and bankruptcy. This effect is more pronounced in a competitive market 
than in an oligopolistic or a monopoly market. Therefore, the pecking order and 
the asymmetric information theories predict a negative relationship between 
capital structure and market structure. 
 
Another argument that might suggest a negative relationship between market 
structure and leverage is that of Nickell et al. (1997). They argued that debt and 
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competition have impact on a firm’s level of productivity. However, these two 
factors are substitutes one for another. A firm facing intense competition, i.e. in a 
highly concentrated industry, does not require a high level of debt to act as a 
disciplinary mechanism to encourage its manager to commit to high productivity 
activities.  
 
Contrary to the above arguments, Pandey (2004) empirically found that the 
relationship between capital structure and market structure may be non-linear. His 
argument suggested that the non-linear relationship exists, owing to the opposing 
effects between the limited liability effect and the predation effect. A similar 
suggestion of the non-monotonic relationship between capital structure and 
market structure is found in Lyandres (2006). He argued that an oligopolistic firm, 
whose strategic interaction with rivals is high, will use debt strategically more 
often than a firm in perfect competition. There is no strategic benefit in holding 
debt, if a firm is a monopolist in the product market and there are no rivals that 
can affect the firm’s value.5 This implies that the relationship between market 
structure and capital structure may exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
 
In summary, the theoretical research has debated the relationship between product 
market structure and debt, suggesting, on the one hand, that the relationship is 
linearly positive, whereas on the other hand, others have argued that there is a 
linearly negative relationship. In addition, the possibility that a non-linear 
relationship can also exist has provided a natural basis for empirical analysis. The 
next sub-section explores the empirical evidence on capital structure and product 
market competition.  
                                                
5
 Lyandres (2006) merely suggested this and his theoretical and empirical analysis did not 
specifically examine the relationship between market structure and capital structure.   
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e) Empirical Evidence 
 
Early empirical evidence in this research area has devoted attention to analysing 
how debt influences firms’ strategic interaction in the product market and has 
provided, on the one hand, some evidence supporting the limited liability effect 
argument, which states that debt softens product market competition. On the other 
hand, it has been proposed that a firm’s debt induces an aggressive response from 
its less leveraged rivals in the product market, which lends support to the 
predation argument. This series of empirical evidence is led by Chevalier (1995a), 
who conducted an event-study analysis of the response in firms’ returns, when 
their rival undertook leveraged buyouts in the U.S supermarket industry. Using 
seemingly unrelated regression estimation, Chevalier (1995a) found that the 
discounted present value of the expected future profits of a supermarket chain 
rises, when a rival supermarket announces its leveraged buyout decision. In 
addition, Chevalier (1995a) found that new supermarket chains are more likely to 
enter, and the existing rivals expand the market, if a large share of the incumbents 
in that local market undertook leverage buyouts. This suggests that leveraged 
buyouts (debt) soften product market competition. In a subsequent paper, 
Chevalier (1995b) examined changes in prices of supermarkets in the local 
market, when one of the firms undertook leveraged buyouts. The results showed 
that a firm that undertook leverage would face price-cutting from its low 
leveraged rivals, and eventually would exit the local market. This supports the 
predation argument that a highly leveraged firm is subject to predation action of 
less leveraged rivals. On the contrary, a price increase was found in a local 
market, in which rivals were also highly leveraged, when the firm undertook 
leveraged buyouts. This supports the limited liability effect, suggested by 
Showalter (1995), that debt softens product market behaviour. 
 
Phillips (1995) investigated the effects of a firm’s recapitalisation decision on its 
own and its rivals’ output and the product pricing decision in four concentrated 
industries the: fibreglass, tractor trailer, polyethylene, and gypsum industries. 
Using individual firm product sales and cost data, Phillips (1995) found that 
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market shares of the fibreglass, the tractor, and the polyethylene industries, 
decreased after a firm in these industries recapitalised. The results showed that 
whilst the average industry debt was negatively related to output, it was positively 
related to prices in these three industries. This suggests that debt commits firms in 
these industries to behaving less aggressively in the product market. By contrast, 
the results for the gypsum industry showed that the averaged industry debt ratio 
was negatively related to the industry’s product prices, but was positively related 
to the industry output. Thus it would appear that debt commits firms in the 
gypsum industry to behave more aggressively in the product market. 
 
Kovenock and Phillips (1997) employed plant-level data, obtained from the 
Longitudinal Research Database at the Bureau of the Census, to examine product 
market behaviour following financial recapitalisation. Their results suggest that in 
a concentrated market, a firm tends to close its plant after recapitalisation, whereas 
its less leveraged rivals increase their investment and remain in the market. This 
supports the deep-pockets argument of the predation model. 
 
Grullon et al. (2002) commented on these studies by Chevalier (1995a and b) and 
Phillips (1995). They stated that if the greater use of debt by a firm is, indeed, 
associated with it being a less aggressive competitor, whilst its rivals are more 
aggressive, the question remains: why is there is this effect of debt? A common 
element of the above research, is that the firms studied increased their leverage 
significantly, implying that they become financially constrained after leveraged 
buyouts or recapitalisation. As a result, these firms may not have been able to 
support further debt, and their insiders may have been unwilling or incapable of 
providing equity financing or obtaining it from outsiders. Consequently, drawing 
on the above studies, this would suggest that increased leverage acts to soften a 
firm’s intensity of competition, because of the financial constraints it imposes. A 
second issue involving the evidence from such research on leveraged buyouts, is 
that these extreme changes in ownership structure may be motivated by 
managerial incentive conflicts. In this case, at least some of the observed product 
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market actions that have been related to increased financial leverage may, in fact, 
be due to the mitigation of managerial agency problems. Grullon et al. (2002) 
argued that the evidence from leveraged buyout data is consistent with the 
suggestion that a firm’s use of leverage motivates it to be less aggressive in the 
product market, but they also argued that further work is needed to better 
understand this effect and to distinguish between alternative interpretations. 
 
Khanna and Tice (2000) examined whether market-specific and incumbent 
characteristics affect how incumbent firms respond to new entrants in the discount 
department store industry. In particular, the study examined the response of the 
incumbent firms to the entry of Wal-Mart, during the period 1975-1996. The 
results show that incumbent firms with higher levels of debt respond to Wal-
Mart’s entry with a low level of investment, whereas the more profitable 
incumbent firms respond more aggressively by increasing their investment. This 
result is consistent with the deep pockets argument of the predation model, in that 
a firm with deep-pockets acts aggressively in the product market, in order to 
prevent potential entry. 
 
Erol (2003, 2005) used industry level data of Turkish manufacturing industries, 
from 1989-1999, to examine the effect of debt on pricing decision. The results 
show that short-term debt has a positive effect on pricing, which supports the 
argument proposed by Showalter (1995). Erol (2003, 2005) also found that long-
term debt has a negative effect on pricing and this is somewhat inconsistent with 
Glazer (1994), who posited that long-term debt induces more collusive behaviour.  
 
Few studies have examined the effect of capital structure on non-price product 
market competition. Grullon et al. (2002) studied the effect of leverage on 
advertising expenditures. Both instrumental variables and reverse causality 
approaches were adopted, in order to address the endogeneity problem between 
capital structure and product market competition. They showed that firms that 
increased leverage, compete less aggressively than their rivals whose leverage was 
 49 
decreased as a result of new funding. Moreover, the rivals of the sample firms 
react to their changes in capital structure, by increasing their advertising 
expenditure (competing more aggressively), if they are less leveraged than the 
sample firms. Grullon et al. (2002) argued that those firms that reduce their use of 
debt, as the result of the new funding, increase their advertising competition more 
than those that increase leverage. They also found that the reaction of the rivals is 
influenced by capital structure. Rivals behave more aggressively, relative to their 
peers, if they are less leveraged than the firm that initiated the advertising 
competition. Their result supports the predation model that states that less 
leveraged firms are more aggressive than those that increase their debt. Similarly, 
Schargrodsky (2002) used unbalanced panel data on the U.S. newspaper industry, 
to explore the effect of capital structure on advertising prices. Schargrodsky 
(2002) found that debt ratios have a non-significant effect on advertising prices for 
monopolies, but this effect is significant and positive for oligopolies. His 
empirical findings are consistent with the limited liability effect of debt argument, 
which posits that firms engaging in strategic interaction can use leverage to gain 
advantage in the product market.  
 
Hellmann and Puri (2000) used a unique hand collected dataset, to examine the 
relationship between the venture capital and product market strategy of high-
technology firms in Silicon Valley. The firms were classified into two groups: the 
innovator and the imitator and the results show that the innovators are more likely 
to be financed by venture capital than the imitators. The study also found that the 
presence of venture capital is associated with the shorter time taken by the 
innovators introduce their products to the market, suggesting that venture capital 
influences firms bringing their products to the market. The effect is insignificant 
for the imitators. The effect is particularly important to the innovators, whose fast 
introduction of their products is valuable. The results of the study suggest that 
venture capital affects a firm’s strategy in the product market and induces the 
innovative firm to be tough in product market competition.  
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Clayton and Ravid (2002) examined how capital structure affects the bidding 
behaviour of firms in auctions. The study used the data of 150 company-bid pairs, 
from 1994 to1995, obtained from the FCC (Federal Communication Commission) 
Spectrum Auctions website. The results of the ordinary least squares regressions 
show that debt-equity ratio, measured in terms of book and market value, is 
negatively related to high bid per capital. The higher debt level of the bidding firm 
tends to lead to lower bids, which suggests that debt softens the bidding 
competition in auctions.  
 
Lord and Farr (2003) used data on the U.S. integrated mill steel industry, from 
1947 to 1980, to test whether debt can be used as a publicly observable collusion 
device. Prior to the collapse of the collusive basing point pricing system in 1959, 
subtle forms of tacit collusion were not necessary. The results show that after the 
collapse of the system, debt is used as a collusive device, and there exists a ceiling 
on the level of debt each firm can issue. Moreover, firms increase their debts in 
response to the increased price elasticity of demand. The results also show that 
colluding firms can increase their debt levels above the ceiling, when convertible 
debt is included in their capital structure. The results support Maksimovic (1988) 
who suggested that debt is positively related to the price elasticity of demand, and 
that convertible security increases the upper bound level of debt, within which 
collusion is sustainable.  
 
Some empirical studies have addressed the issue of whether debt toughens or 
softens product market competition. They have examined how the effect of debt 
on product market competition differs under types of competition, i.e. strategic 
complements versus strategic substitutes, and under types of product market 
uncertainty, i.e. demand or cost uncertainty. Showalter (1999b) used a simple 
cross-sectional linear regression to analyse the effects of demand and cost 
uncertainty on debt, by using data on 1641 manufacturing firms. The study 
hypothesised that the positive coefficient of demand uncertainty supports both 
price and quantity competition. If the negative (positive) coefficient of cost 
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uncertainty is found, then the results support price (quantity) competition. The 
results reported a statistically significant relationship between uncertainty and 
debt. Whilst demand uncertainty has a positive effect on debt, cost uncertainty has 
a negative effect. This implies that the sample of manufacturing firms strategically 
use debt, when competing in prices. These results support his earlier theoretical 
argument (Showalter, 1995) that in Bertrand competition firms increase debt, as 
demand uncertainty becomes important, but reduce debt as cost becomes more 
uncertain.  
 
In addition, Erol (2004) employed 15 Turkish manufacturing industries at the two-
digit level, from 1990 to 2000, to test whether demand and cost conditions in the 
product market lead to high short-term or long-term debt. The results of the panel 
data estimation (the fixed effects estimation), showed that both short-term and 
long-term debt ratios respond positively to changes in demand, using the proxy of 
the rate of change in real sales. However, short-term and long-term debt ratios 
respond differently to changes in cost, as measured by the cost of the goods sold 
divided by net nominal sales. That is to say, short-term debt responds negatively, 
whereas long-term debt responds positively. Furthermore, Erol (2004) suggested 
that short-term debt is expected to motivate price competition, whereas long-term 
debt is expected to motivate output competition, in the Turkish manufacturing 
sector. 
 
de Jong et al. (2007) tested the theoretical predictions of Brander and Lewis 
(1986) and Showalter (1995). Firstly, their study used Sundaram et al.’s (1996) 
competitive strategy measure (CSM) to categorise sample firms into a Bertrand 
sample group and a Cournot sample group; subsequently they examined what 
impact demand and cost uncertainty have on these two groups. The findings show 
that higher demand and cost uncertainty induce Cournot firms to increase debt 
levels, which is consistent with Brander and Lewis (1986). For Bertrand firms, the 
results show that demand uncertainty increases the use of debt, but there is no 
evidence supporting the role of cost uncertainty among these firms, which 
supports the argument put forth in Showalter (1995).  
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Lyandres (2006) empirically examined the effect of strategic interaction among 
firms on leverage, by using a large sample of U.S. manufacturing industries. The 
number of firms in an industry and Sundaram et al.’s (1996) competitive strategy 
measure (CSM) were used as proxies for the extent of strategic interaction. The 
results show a negative relationship between the number of firms and leverage, 
and a positive effect between CSM and leverage. This suggests that the higher the 
strategic interaction among firms, the higher is the debt level. As seen earlier, 
Lyandres (2006) also showed, theoretically, that firms with high strategic 
interaction employ more debt to toughen product market competition. 
 
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2002) used a sample of 235 entrepreneurial start-
ups, to examine the impact of: competition, debt, and financial market 
characteristics, on the post-entry exit decision. The results show that the extent of 
competitive interactions, as measured by the Competitive Strategy Measure, has 
an effect on the exit decision. The likelihood of exit increases when competitive 
interactions are strategic complements, but decreases when they are strategic 
substitutes. In addition, a highly leveraged entrepreneur is subject to an 
incumbent’s predatory action, which results in the former’s poor performance. In 
turn, this affects the perception of the entrepreneur’s creditors, regarding the 
quality of the entrepreneur, and thereby increases the likelihood of exit.  
 
An innovative approach is found in Oechssler and Schuhmacher (2004), who 
conducted an experiment to test whether the limited liability effect of debt has an 
effect on a firm’s own behaviour, on its rival’s, and whether firms select debt 
strategically. They argued that data limitation often hinders an empirical study 
from testing the hypotheses, regarding: the limited liability effect of debt, the type 
of product market competition, i.e. Cournot and Bertrand, and the type of 
uncertainty, i.e. demand and cost. Their experiment featured three scenarios: 
Cournot competition, Bertrand competition with demand uncertainty, and 
Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty. They found that the majority of 
players choose to increase their output as their debt levels increase and an increase 
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in the opponent’s debt does not yield a significant decrease in a player’s own 
output. This suggests that in Cournot competition, the limited liability effect 
seems to have a significant effect on players, when they consider their own debt 
levels, but they tend to ignore the effect of their opponents’ debt. The limited 
liability effect of debt, in Cournot competition, is not as pronounced as predicted 
in Brander and Lewis (1986). In Bertrand competition experiments, the majority 
of players choose high debt with demand uncertainty and low debt with cost 
uncertainty, plus there is a general tendency towards higher and more collusive 
prices. This is consistent with the argument proposed by Showalter (1995).  
 
Some studies have argued that when a foresighted firm makes its financial 
decision, it anticipates the product market decision, as a consequence of the 
financial choice. This implies that product market competition also affects the 
financial decision. Hence, the relationship between capital structure and product 
market competition has a two directional effect. This endogeneity issue was 
addressed in a few empirical studies. For example, Opler and Titman (1994), 
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and Zingales (1998) have taken advantage of 
using an exogenous event that causes changes in a firm’s debt, to observe the 
effect of this event on changes in the firm’s performance in the product market. 
Others have used an instrumental variables approach to mitigate the reverse 
causality issue, see for example, Grullon et al. (2002) and Schargrodsky (2002).   
 
Opler and Titman (1994) employed firm level data from COMPUSTAT, to 
observe the relationship between financial distress (debt) and a firm’s 
performance during industry downturn. The aim of the study was to test whether 
highly leveraged firms are more likely to experience performance losses during 
industry downturn, than other firms. They found that highly leveraged firms, in 
concentrated industries, experience large decreases in sales and the market value 
of equity: the loss is competitor driven. This finding supports the deep-pockets 
argument, that there are gains for unleveraged firms which take advantage of their 
high-leveraged counterparts. Such an effect is more pronounced in concentrated 
markets, because there are greater gains to be earned and therefore, the conclusion 
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is reached that a firm operating in a concentrated market should have low levels of 
debt.  
 
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995) used data from 20 manufacturing industries with 
two-digit SIC code level. The study examined whether markups are 
countercyclical in industries with a greater proportion of liquidity constrained 
firms. The results show that industry markups are more countercyclical in more 
concentrated industries and when controlled for industry concentration, markups 
are more countercyclical in industries dominated by small firms. This suggests 
that by increasing price levels, liquidity constrained firms soften product market 
competition during an economic downturn. Similarly, Chevalier and Scharfstein 
(1996) also found that markups of a liquidity constrained firm are countercyclical, 
according to data from the supermarket industry.  
 
Zingales (1998) empirically examined the effects of leverage on the survival of 
trucking firms, during the eight years following the start of the Cartel 
deregulation. He argued that deregulation is the exogenous shock that drives the 
firm’s leverage away from the desired level. That is to say, it sharply increases 
leverage above the desired level, because of the decrease in firm value. Also, as 
deregulation makes predation more possible, it is likely that the target leverage 
level decreases at the same time that a firm’s real leverage increases dramatically. 
Thus, these results show that leverage has a negative impact on firm survival. The 
effect is particularly pronounced in an industry segment that remains imperfectly 
competitive, even after deregulation. Moreover, Zingales (1998) found that debt 
decreases the ability of firms to invest, which eventually leads them to exit the 
industry.  
 
Khanna and Tice (2005) used market-level data of discount department stores to 
examine pricing and exit decisions across the business cycle. They found that high 
debt and low efficient firms increase their prices during non-recession years. 
During recession years, cities with a mix of high debt and low debt firms show a 
reduction in prices and the high debt firms are more likely to exit. This suggests 
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that low debt firms engage in predatory pricing to induce the exit of the high debt 
firms.  
 
Campello (2003) employed two-digit SIC level data from manufacturing 
industries, to examine the effects of capital structure on business performance, by 
using aggregate demand shock as a surrogate for demand uncertainty. The results 
of the industry-level data show that markups are countercyclical in industries in 
which firms use external finance (debt). This is consistent with Chevalier and 
Scharfstein’s (1996) theory that markups are cyclical. The results prove robust 
when controlling for industry characteristics, such as: market concentration, 
industry capacity utilisation, and product demand cyclicality. The results of firm-
level data suggest that a highly leveraged firm experiences loss of sales growth, 
when its rivals in the industry are low leveraged, but this is not found in an 
industry with highly leveraged rivals.  
 
Borenstein and Rose (1995) examined the effect of bankruptcy announcements on  
pricing behaviour in the U.S. airline industry. Using data from the seven Chapter 
11 bankruptcy filings by large U.S. air carriers, between 1989 and 1992, they 
found that air carriers that face financial distress reduce their prices prior to filing 
for bankruptcy, but they do not decrease prices any further after that. Their non-
bankrupt rivals do not respond by cutting their prices, but maintain or increase 
their price levels. 
 
Some empirical evidence on the relationship between capital structure and market 
structure is now presented. Krishnaswamy et al. (1992) used the simplified 
definition of the Lerner index, the ratio of the difference between sales and 
operating expenses to sales, as the market structure proxy. They found a positive 
relationship between the Lerner index and the debt to total assets ratio, using U.S. 
data. Similarly, in their study of 49 countries, Rathinasamy et al. (2000) found 
some evidence that supports a positive relationship between capital structure, 
measured by total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio, and Tobin’s q. Their results 
are consistent with the limited liability effect and the risk-shifting hypothesis. 
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Contrary to these studies, Schargrodsky (2002) found a negative relationship 
between market structure and capital structure. The study, based on data from the 
U.S. newspaper industry, suggests that firms in oligopolistic competition use more 
debt than those in monopolistic competition. Moreover, the results show that a 
firm in oligopolistic competition has higher debt ratios than monopolies, after 
controlling for other determinants of leverage.  
 
The studies reviewed above have, so far, shown a linear relationship between 
market structure and capital structure, although the type of the relationship 
remains inconclusive. Contrary to the above arguments, Pandey (2004) 
empirically argued that the relationship between capital structure and market 
structure can be non-monotonic. By using a sample of listed Malaysian 
companies, Pandey (2004) found a cubic relationship between debt and market 
power, as proxied by Tobin’s q. He argued that the cubic relationship exists, 
owing to the opposite effects, i.e. the limited liability effect and the predation 
effect. At low levels of market power, a firm obtains more debt to pursue the 
output maximisation strategy, to improve its profits and gain market power. The 
limited liability protects shareholders from any losses occurred, as a consequence 
of unfavourable market conditions. An increase in the profits of the leveraged firm 
attracts rivals into the market, which intensifies competition and the firm reduces 
its use of debt to reduce the probability of bankruptcy and avoid any predation 
threat from its less leveraged or low leveraged rivals. The predation effect induces 
the leveraged firm to reduce its use of debt at this intermediate level of market 
power. After consolidating its market position, i.e. at high levels of market power, 
the firm once again increases its use of debt to pursue an output maximisation 
strategy. Thus, the limited liability effect dominates the use of debt at high levels 
of market power. 
 
The existence of the non-monotonic relationship between capital structure and 
market structure is consistent with the theoretical argument suggested by Fairchild 
(2004b) and Lyandres (2006). However, the interpretation of the relationship and 
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the effect of market structure on capital structure, in these studies, are different to 
that of Pandey (2004). As reviewed earlier, Lyandres (2006) argued that debt is 
strategically used when firms compete in oligopolistic competition and debt does 
not have any strategic use for a firm in perfect competition and monopoly. 
Therefore, the relationship between capital structure and market structure exhibits 
an inverted U-shaped. Fairchild (2004b) also suggested an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between capital structure and market power. His interpretation of 
market power is that a firm with high market power has low strategic interaction 
with its rivals, whereas a firm with low market power would engage more 
intensely in the product market. As the level of market power reduces or 
equivalently, as the level of strategic interaction increases, a firm strategically 
uses debt to soften product market competition. As the firm reaches a certain 
degree of extremely low market power, it reduces its debt level in order to avoid a 
possible predation threat imposed by its less leveraged rival. 
 
2.3 Summary  
 
Ever since the proposition of Miller and Modigliani (1958), alternative theories of 
capital structure, such as: the static trade-off model; the agency costs argument; 
and the asymmetric information model, have offered explanations for a firm’s 
optimal capital structure. These theories of capital structure have examined how 
costs and benefits of debt (and of equity) can affect a firm’s financial decision, 
under the more realistic assumption of the imperfect capital market.  
 
Growing research interest in the field of capital structure and product market has 
emerged to offer another explanation of capital structure. The central argument, 
here, is that a firm should take non-financial stakeholders in the product market 
into consideration, when deciding on its capital structure. In general, there are two 
arguments that offer an explanation on the interaction between capital structure 
and the product market.  
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Firstly, under the stakeholder theory of capital structure, Titman (1984) explained 
how the perceptions of non-financial stakeholders, such as: customers, suppliers, 
and employees, matter to a firm’s financial decision, because they have a direct or 
an indirect interest on the firm’s long-term viability. These non-financial 
stakeholders may demand compensation for any losses they will have to bear, if 
the firm goes bankrupt, which imposes financial distress costs on the firm whose 
financial decision introduces the possibility of bankruptcy. Furthermore, the 
stakeholder theory of capital structure suggests that debt can be used as a 
bargaining device in the product market.  
 
The second argument focuses on the relationship between capital structure and 
product market competition, concentrating on the strategic interactions of firms in 
the product market. One aspect of this, based on the imperfect capital market 
assumption, suggests that a highly leveraged firm is often subjected to predatory 
action by its cash rich rivals. This was discussed in this chapter as the deep-
pockets argument of the predation model (Telser 1966). Alternatively, there is the 
proposition that firms in an imperfect product market use debt to gain strategic 
advantage. This is known as the limited liability effect of debt, which has been 
rigorously developed since the pioneering work by Brander and Lewis (1986).  
 
Early theoretical models in the capital structure and product market competition 
research have employed a framework of homogenous products. The effect of 
capital structure on product market competition still remains somewhat 
inconclusive. Whether debt induces firms to behave more or less aggressively in 
the product market depends on: types of competition, types of product market 
uncertainty, and types of debt. More recent theoretical models have analysed 
whether other factors of the product market, such as product substitutability or 
product differentiation, may have an effect on capital structure, and whether their 
interaction can alter a firm’s behaviour in product market competition. These 
works have shown that increasing product substitutability induces a firm to 
borrow more short-term debt, and this in turn induces it to be more aggressive in 
Cournot competition (Wanzenried, 2003; and Haan and Toolsema, 2008).  
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Fairchild (2004b) found that although long-term debt commits firms to soften 
product market competition, in Bertrand competition, they may find it optimal to 
use long-term debt over certain degrees of product differentiation. At some 
degrees of product differentiation, Fairchild (2004b) demonstrated that the 
predation effect dominates the limited liability effect, which tempts firms not to 
use long-term debt excessively. This implies the existence of a non-monotonic 
relationship between capital structure and market power.  
 
The limited liability effect and deep-pockets arguments of the predation model 
have been used to explain the relationship between market structure and capital 
structure. The existing empirical evidence suggests an ambiguous relationship, 
with some research suggesting a linearly positive relationship and other studies 
implying a linearly negative one. A third possibility is that there is a non-
monotonic relationship (Pandey, 2004 and Lyandres, 2006).  
 
Following on from this literature chapter, the next chapter presents the 
development of the theoretical models, for this study, that examine the 
relationship between product differentiation, capital structure and product market 
competition. 
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Chapter 3  
 Theoretical Models 
 
As discussed in the literature review chapter (chapter 2), much attention has been 
given to the research into the relationship between capital structure and product 
market competition, both theoretically and empirically.  In terms of the theoretical 
work, the research began with the pioneering paper of Brander and Lewis (1986), 
who introduced the limited liability effect of debt within a framework of a 
Cournot competition model with homogenous products. Brander and Lewis 
(1986) showed that the limited liability effect of debt and some exogenous product 
market uncertainty, strategically commit a firm to a certain product market 
strategy that maximises its shareholder value, whilst ignoring the payoffs to debt 
holders. In their model, the leveraged firm expands its production beyond the 
output level of an unleveraged firm (standard Cournot output level), to gain higher 
profits at the expense of its rival. Because the firm and its rival simultaneously 
make their decisions, both of them select debt and increase their output and their 
profits are consequently reduced. The output equilibrium is considered to be a 
prisoner’s dilemma and both firms would be better off if debt was restricted. 
Subsequent theoretical models used Brander and Lewis (1986) as a platform for 
the development of their models.  
 
Most early works also employed a homogenous products model to further 
examine the limited liability effect of debt, as suggested in Brander and Lewis 
(1986) and these models can be considered as variants of the latter model. For 
example, Maksimovic (1988) examined the effects of debt on the possibility of 
collusion in the product market. In general, they argued that debt reduces a firm’s 
incentive to collude in Cournot competition with repeated games. Glazer (1994) 
studied the effects of long-term debt on product market competition, using a 
Cournot model and discovered that firms behave strategically differently, 
depending on how far away the maturity date of debt is. Showalter (1995) 
considered a model of Bertrand competition and the effect of demand and cost 
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uncertainty and found that increasing debt is strategically used to soften price 
competition, when demand is uncertain. However, in the case of cost uncertainty, 
debt has no strategic benefits.  
 
Recently, there has been growing attention paid to examining the relationship 
between capital structure and product market competition, within a framework of 
differentiated and/or heterogeneous, rather than homogenous products. Dasgupta 
and Titman (1998) were perhaps among the pioneers in this research area, though 
their model did not specifically examine the effect of product differentiation on 
debt, as seen in subsequent papers. Wanzenried (2003) and Haan and Toolsema 
(2008) studied how debt can be influenced by products’ substitutability. Lyandres 
(2006) examined the relationship between the extent of competitive interaction 
among firms, capital structure, and product market competition. Another 
theoretical attempt is found in Fairchild’s (2004a and b), model which used an 
innovative approach to examine the causality between capital structure and 
product market competition. He argued that the exogenous degree of product 
differentiation can represent the intensity of the potential product market 
competition. When product differentiation is high, firms face low intensity of 
competition, because they are viewed as having local monopoly in their own 
product markets. As product differentiation increases, firms engage in more 
intense competition amongst each other, and that affects their strategic use of debt 
in the product market. This in turn influences how firms make their decisions in 
Bertrand competition.  
 
The research into capital structure and product market competition has extensively 
departed from Brander and Lewis (1986). The table below briefly outlines what 
has been covered so far, in terms of theoretical research and shows what the thesis 
aims to contribute to the research area.  
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Author (s) Competition Product Debt 
  Cournot  Bertrand  Homogenous Differentiated ST LT 
Brander & Lewis (1986) *  *  *  
Showalter (1995)  * *  *  
Dasgupta & Titman (1998)  *  *  * 
Fairchild (2004a and b)  *  *  * 
Wanzenried (2003)  *  * *  
Haan &Toolsema (2008)  *  * *  
This thesis **  **    **   ** 
 
** Note that this thesis considers Cournot competition in a non-location framework, and then 
Bertrand competition within a framework of a location model.   
 
This chapter seeks to augment the research area of capital structure and product 
market competition, by developing theoretical models to analyse the effect of 
market power on capital structure, and how this in turn affects firms’ strategies in 
product market competition.  
 
 
 
 
Specifically, the theoretical models examine the effect of product differentiation, 
which is a proxy for market power, on long-term debt, and how this affects 
Cournot competition in the non-spatial model, and Bertrand competition in the 
spatial model. 
 
 
 
 
The novelty of the models being developed here is that long-term debt is not 
exogenously given, but is determined by the degree of firms’ market power. Thus, 
the models in this thesis examine the relationship between market power and 
capital structure. As reviewed in the literature review chapter (chapter 2), the 
relationship between capital structure and market power exists, mainly because of 
the limited liability effect or the predation effect. The effect of market power on 
Market 
Power 
Product Market 
Competition 
Capital 
Structure 
Product 
Differentiation 
Cournot / Bertrand 
Competition 
Long-term 
Debt 
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capital structure has also been empirically addressed in Pandey (2004). However, 
his notion of market power is the operational term for market structure. In his 
study, high market power generally refers to a firm in monopoly or oligopolistic 
competition. The notion of market power in this thesis is taken from the one 
defined by Fairchild (2004a and b), that is, when a firm has high market power, it 
is assumed to engage in a less intense potential product market competition, 
owing to its highly differentiated product. When firms’ products are highly 
differentiated, they are considered to have high market power or local monopoly 
in their own product market. At low levels of market power, firms face high 
intensity of potential product market competition from one another. 
 
The thesis will employ two types of model to examine the relationship: a non-
spatial model and a spatial (location) model. Firstly, as shown in the table above, 
the thesis will employ a non-spatial Cournot competition model, with 
differentiated products, to investigate the effect of product differentiation on long-
term debt. The exogenous degree of product differentiation measures a firm’s 
market power or the intensity of the potential product competition. The exogenous 
degree of product differentiation affects firms’ financial decisions, and the 
combined effect between these two, in turn, influences firms’ product market 
decisions in the actual product market competition. Secondly, the thesis will 
employ a location model, in which two firms compete in Bertrand price 
competition, and incorporate customer preferences. The spatial model studies the 
impact of market power (represented by the per unit transportation costs) on long-
term debt, and how their relationship, in turn, affects the actual product market 
competition. In both models, two firms simultaneously make their financial 
decisions before their product market decisions. The game theoretic approach is 
thus employed to solve for Nash equilibriums in financial choice and the product 
market outcome. The equilibriums are derived by using backward induction; the 
product market equilibrium for a given financial choice is solved prior to the 
financial choice equilibrium.  
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This chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.1, a brief review of Fairchild 
(2004a and b) is provided, to understand the background to the models developed 
in this thesis. This is followed by a presentation of a non-location Cournot 
competition in section 3.2, which, in 3.2.1, includes the model with a one-shot 
game, which examines the relationship between the degree of product 
differentiation, financial decisions, and product market decisions. This model is 
then extended to incorporate sustainability of collusion and firm myopia, within 
an infinitely repeated game (section 3.2.2). In section 3.3, the development of the 
second model concerns a capital structure-product market competition relation, 
within a location model framework. The study will consider three variants of this 
spatial capital-product market model: horizontally differentiated with linear 
transportation costs in section 3.3.1, quadratic transportation costs in section 3.3.2, 
and vertically differentiated in section 3.3.3. It should be noted that models in this 
chapter are abstracted from other theories of capital structure. Factors affecting 
capital structure in: the static trade-off theory, the signalling hypothesis, and the 
agency costs problem, are not taken into consideration. The models mainly focus 
on the strategic use of debt in the product market and the effects of market power. 
In section 3.4 the chapter concludes with a brief summary. 
 
3.1 Review of Fairchild (2004a and b) 
 
In order to address the causality issue between capital structure and product 
market competition, Fairchild (2004a and b) developed an approach to 
theoretically analyse the effect of a firm’s exogenous degree of product 
differentiation on capital structure, by using a Bertrand competition model with 
differentiated products. The degree of product differentiation represents potential 
product competition among firms. The effect on capital structure, in turn, 
influences the firm and its rival in product market competition (actual 
competition). The degree of product differentiation measures each firm’s market 
power or potential product market competition. When firms’ products are highly 
differentiated, the rivals are at their highest market power position. They do not 
engage in intense product competition, as each of them has local monopoly in 
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their ‘own’ product market. On the other hand, firms engage in more intense 
product competition when their products become less differentiated.  
 
The intuition of Fairchild (2004a and b) is based on Dasgupta and Titman (1998), 
whose argument is a combination of Klemperer’s (1987) view that a firm’s pricing 
decision can be considered as a discounted cash flow problem, and of Myers’s 
(1977) debt overhang problem. Klemperer (1987) suggested that a firm’s pricing 
decision depends on a trade-off between today’s and future profits. An incentive 
to increase or decrease today’s price is determined, in part, by its discount rates, as 
increasing today’s price can increase today’s profits, at the expense of less future 
market share and future profits. With higher discount rates, the firm has more 
incentive to increase today’s price for higher today’s profits. This insight is 
combined with Myers’s (1977) observation that long-term debt increases the rate 
at which a firm discounts its future cash flows. The outcome of the combined 
arguments proposes that long-term debt softens price competition, by inducing the 
rivals to discount the future cashflow more heavily. Consequently, firms focus on 
short-term pricing decisions and short-term profits (Dasgupta and Titman, 1998).  
 
Taking it as given that long-term debt induces firms to become more short-termist, 
Fairchild (2004a and b) examined how the exogenous degree of product 
differentiation affects the firms’ choice of debt, which in turn affects Bertrand 
price competition and actual firm values. That is, debt increases prices in product 
market competition. He suggested that the potential product market competition 
(market power) can be considered as a substitute for debt. When the level of 
potential product competition (market power) is low (high), firms are able to keep 
their prices and firm value high with relatively low levels of debt. However, when 
market power reduces (or equivalently, when potential product market 
competition increases), the price levels fall. Firms would be expected to increase 
their debt levels, in order to keep their price levels high so as to soften the actual 
price competition.  
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With the use of a numeric example, Fairchild (2004a) derived symmetric 
equilibrium financial contracts for all levels of market power. When the rivals 
have local monopoly (highest market power or lowest potential product 
competition), both firms choose the all-equity financial contract in equilibrium. As 
market power reduces (potential product competition increases), firms increase 
their level of debt, to soften Bertrand price competition. However, the effect of 
debt to soften price competition is not sufficient to prevent prices and firm values 
from falling, and this is due to the softening effect of debt being outweighed by 
intense competition. The model also shows that at a rather low degree of market 
power (intense potential product competition), firms slightly reduce their debt 
levels. The intuition behind this is that when product differentiation is low, a firm 
reduces its debt to avoid the predatory action of price reduction by its rival. 
 
Based on the analysis of his previous paper, Fairchild (2004b) subsequently 
formally derived equilibrium prices, debt level, and firm values. He developed a 
Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products, in which firms compete in 
price levels for two periods. Customers, who buy from one firm in the first period, 
are assumed to buy from the same firm in the second period. Upon deciding how 
much to charge their customers in the first period, firms face a trade-off between 
profits in two periods. The higher the first period price, the higher are the first 
period profits, however, this trades off with the lower second period profits, 
because of the lower market share. In addition, firms face actual Bertrand price 
competition from each other. In summary, there are two forces driving prices 
down, which are Bertrand price competition and the firms’ desire for a long-term 
market share. Fairchild (2004b) showed that increasing long-term debt softens 
price competition, by inducing firms to focus on short-term pricing and profits. 
Because firms are less interested in their future market share, they compete less 
aggressively in short-term prices. The results show that when each rival has local 
monopoly power, all-equity is the equilibrium financial contract. As product 
differentiation decreases (market power decreases), firms increase their debt levels 
to soften the actual price competition. This shows that the limited liability effect 
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of debt dominates the predation effect.6 Furthermore, the model shows that once 
the rivals reach a certain low degree of market power (firms’ products become 
less differentiated), the predation effect becomes dominant and this is shown by a 
reduction in the firm’s level of debt. The decision is made to avoid any potential 
predation threat, such as price cutting from its rival. However, both firms make 
their decisions simultaneously and therefore they reduce their debt levels at low 
levels of product differentiation, to avoid predation threats from each other. 
Fairchild (2004b) theoretically showed that there exists a non-linear relationship 
between the exogenous degree of product differentiation (market power) and debt 
and this is consistent with the empirical study of Pandey (2004). 
 
The chapter now proceeds to develop theoretical models to examine the 
relationship between capital structure and product market competition.  
 
3.2 Non-Spatial Model 
 
3.2.1 Cournot Competition with Product Market Competition (One-Shot 
Game) 
 
Suppose there are two firms selling similar but differentiated products, for 
example, both of them are T-shirt producers.7 When their products are highly 
differentiated, such as one of them sells only white T-shirts, whereas the other 
sells only black T-shirts, each firm is viewed as having local monopoly power in 
its own product market. That is to say, one firm has the white T-shirt market, 
whilst the other has the black T-shirt market. As their products become less 
differentiated, such that their T-shirts become more similar in terms of colour 
shade, for instance, the white T-shirt is more greyish, whereas the black one is 
lightened, firms engage in more intense potential competition with each other in 
                                                
6
 It should be noted that the predation effect does not imply the strategic bankruptcy effect, as 
reviewed in the literature chapter. In his model, the predation effect suggests that a firm does not 
wish to be exposed to a possible predatory action from its rival, whose impact is more pronounced 
when the firm is leveraged. As a result, the firm avoids the predation action by restricting its use of 
debt. This interpretation of ‘the predation effect’ is used throughout the thesis, unless specified 
otherwise.   
7
 The example of the T-shirt producers is taken from Fairchild (2008).  
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the product market. In a standard Cournot competition model with differentiated 
products, the quantity produced and profits decline as firms’ products become less 
differentiated. That is, the actual product competition is softened.  
 
This section employs a Cournot competition model, with differentiated products, 
to examine whether long-term debt has any strategic use, by committing a firm to 
a product market decision that increases its profits, as its product becomes less 
differentiated to that of its rival’s. Recall that the limited liability effect of short-
term debt induces a firm to increase its output in Cournot competition model. This 
section will examine whether long-term debt has the same strategic benefit on a 
firm’s product market decision, as it faces more intense potential product 
competition (product differentiation decreases). 
 
There are three periods in this one-shot game: date 0, date 1, and date 2. Prior to 
the product market competition occurring in date 1 and date 2, firms must obtain 
some financial funds for strategic purposes in date 0. For simplicity, the model 
assumes that firms have the choice of finance from the following options. Firms 
can select a long-term debt, which matures at the end of the second period of the 
product market competition, i.e. at date 2. Alternatively, they can choose not to 
obtain any external borrowing (zero-debt), that is, firms are considered to be all-
equity financed. The chosen financial contracts are observable so there is no 
asymmetric information. The firm’s financial structures have an effect on its 
competing strategy, as well as its rival’s. Given the firm’s and its rival’s selected 
financial contracts, firms then simultaneously decide how much output they will 
produce in date 1. Following Fairchild (2004b) and Dasgupta and Titman (1998), 
the model assumes that customers who buy from a firm in date 1 tend to buy from 
the same firm in date 2. Because of this customer stickiness, firms have local 
monopoly in date 2, and can charge their customers the date 2 reservation price. In 
sum, firms choose their financial contracts once, and these contracts affect the 
production outputs over the next two periods. The date 2 firms’ market shares are 
anticipated when firms select their date 0 financial structure. 
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At the end of each product market competition period: date 1 and date 2, profits 
are realised and paid out to investors. Given that the date 2 reservation price is 
known to both firms, date 2 profits are realised with certainty.8 If the all-equity 
(zero-debt) contract is selected in date 0, both date 1 and date 2 profits are given 
to shareholders as dividends. If the long-term debt contract is chosen, only date 1 
profits are paid to shareholders, whilst debt holders receive date 2 profits.  
 
For simplicity, the production costs are normalised to zero. The model assumes 
that both firms are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate is zero. Each firm is faced 
with a profit maximising problem: they select their financial structures, which 
maximise their total value or the net present value. The equilibrium concept is a 
sequentially rational Nash equilibrium in financial contracts and output levels. 
The output decisions are correctly anticipated by firms, when selecting their 
financial contracts in the previous date.  
 
The timeline of the model is summarised as follows. 
 
Date 0: each firm simultaneously chooses its financial structure to maximise its 
expected total firm value. In other words, firms maximise their expected net 
present value (NPV).  
 
Firms then compete over two periods, dates 1 and 2.  
 
Date 1: firms observe each other’s financial structure, and simultaneously set their 
levels of output to maximise expected returns to shareholders.  
 
                                                
8
 In an earlier version of this model, it is assumed that the product market uncertainty was the   
date 2 reservation price, which was unknown in date 0 and date 1. This uncertainty was resolved in 
date 2 in that it was either zero or p2, with equal probability. The expected date 2 reservation was 
therefore
2
2p
. However, the implication of the model is not changed, even when the date 2 
reservation price is known with certainty. For simplicity, the model assumes no uncertainty in the 
date 2 reservation price.  
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If the long-term debt contract was selected in date 0, the manager whose goal is to 
maximise return to the existing shareholders (assume that there is no principal-
agent problem), will no longer have an incentive to consider the fortunes of debt 
holders, when choosing the levels of output. Note that if the all-equity contract 
was chosen, maximising shareholder value, at this stage, is equivalent to 
maximising the expected NPV. The date 1 profits are realised and are paid out as 
dividends to the shareholders.  
 
Date 2: firms charge customers their reservation price, 2p . The date 2 profits are 
realised and given to shareholders as dividends, if the all-equity financial contract 
was selected. Otherwise, they will be paid to debt holders.  
 
As per Shy (1995), the inverse demand functions of Cournot duopoly competition 
with differentiated products can be expressed as; 
 
(1a) jii qqp γβα −−=   
(1b) ijj qqp γβα −−=       
 
where  pi and pj are firm i’s and j’s  price levels, 
  qi and qj are their respective quantity levels,  
           α is the size of the market, and α is assumed to be greater than 2p . 
           β measures the sensitivity of own demand. For simplicity, βi = βj = β > 0,   
           γ measures the exogenous degree of product differentiation.  
 
When γ  = 0, each firm has local monopoly power (maximum product 
differentiation or market power). The rival’s output levels do not affect the firm’s 
price levels and its output demand. As γ → β, firms’ products become more 
substitutable, hence they engage in more intense potential product competition. 
When γ  = β, their products are most substitutable for one another. The rival’s 
quantity has effects on the firm’s prices and demand, as much as the firm’s 
quantity does. The model in this section considers only the case where γ represents 
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the degree of substitutability between the firms’ products. Unlike Wanzenried 
(2003) and Haan and Toolsema (2008), cases where firms’ products are 
complements, γ < 0, are not taken into consideration. In other words, the model 
examines only 0 ≤ γ  ≤ β.9 
 
Let iS  and jS  be firm i and j’s financial choice, respectively. Each firm is 
allowed to choose, either an ‘all-equity’ structure; ,
,
ES ji =  or a ‘long-term debt’ 
structure DS ji =, , with date 2 repayment value =jiS , 2, pqD ji= .  
 
In summary,  }.,{, DESS ji ∈  Note that by assuming that long-term debt 
is 2, pqD ji= , this means that debt holders have all of the date 2 profits.  
 
Let 1ipi  and 
2
ipi  be firm si'  expected date 1 and 2 profits, respectively, where; 
 
,
1
iii pq=pi  
.2
2 pqii =pi  
 
Similarly for firm j,  
  
,
1
jjj pq=pi  
 .2
2 pq jj =pi  
                                                
9 Recall that Wanzenried (2003) and Haan and Toolsema (2008) developed one-period models, 
thus effectively they only consider short-term debt, whereas the model in this thesis focuses on 
long-term debt.  
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Because firms are risk-neutral with no principal-agent problem, and the risk-free 
rate is zero, the expected total value of each firm can be written as the sum of the 
expected two periods’ profits, V
 
 = 
21 pipi +  . 
 
(2a) ).( 2ppqV iii +=        
(2b) ).( 2ppqV jjj +=         
 
Note that the firms’ choice of output, qi,j, affects the date 1 price. The firms then 
retain qi,j for the second period. The date 2 price (the reservation price), 2p  is 
given. In contrast with a Bertrand competition model, for example, Fairchild 
(2004a and b), firms select their date 1 price levels, given their financial contracts. 
The price levels then affect their output, q. 
 
The non-location Cournot game is solved by using backward induction. 
 
Solving for date 1 quantity decisions for given debt levels 
 
The equilibrium quantities ),,( jii SSq  and ),( ijj SSq are solved by taking the   
date 0 financial contracts, ji SS , , as given. Each firm’s expected total firm value    
(Vi and Vj) is obtained by substituting the inverted demand functions (1a) and (1b) 
into the expected firm value equation (2a) and (2b), respectively: 
 
(3a) 22 pqqqqqV ijiiii +−−= γβα     
(3b) 22 pqqqqqV jjijjj +−−= γβα      
 
Both firms select the quantities that maximise their expected values of equity, 
given their date 0 financial structures. If both firms choose all-equity at date 0, the 
equilibrium quantities are obtained by differentiating the expected total value of 
firm, with respect to its own quantity, 0/ =∂∂ ii qV  for firm i, and 0/ =∂∂ jj qV  
for firm j. Both firms are symmetric, and therefore ** ji qq =  in equilibrium. Note 
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that the expected total value of the firms, Vi and Vj, is equivalent to the expected 
equity value, when the rivals select the all-equity financial contract.  
 
Recall the expected repayment values or the expected values of date 2 long-term 
debt, 2pqD i=  for firm i and 2pqD j=  for firm j, the rivals’ expected date 1 
equity values, when the firms select long-term debt contracts, can be expressed as 
iΠ  and jΠ  for firm i and firm j, respectively;   
 
(4a) DVii −=Π  
             jiii qqqq γβα −−= 2      
(4b) DV jj −=Π  
              jijj qqqq γβα −−= 2   
 
The equilibrium quantities are solved by differentiating the expected equity value, 
with respect to own quantity, 0/ =∂∏∂ ii q  for firm i and 0/ =∂∏∂ jj q for firm 
j, and it is recognised that ** ji qq =  in equilibrium. If firm i  chooses the all-
equity contract, whilst firm j selects the long-term debt contract at date 0, the 
equilibrium quantities are solved by 0/ =∂∂ ii qV  for firm i, and 0/ =∂∏∂ jj q  
for firm j.  
 
Throughout the subsequent analysis, equilibrium quantities are denoted as 
),(* jii SSq and ),(* ijj SSq , and equilibrium values are denoted as 
),(* jii SSV and ),(* ijj SSV . That is, the first term in brackets always refers to the 
firm’s own financial contract, whilst the second refers to the rival’s.  
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Lemma 1 The equilibrium quantities for each combination of },{, DESS ji ∈  are 
as follows:  
),(*),(* EEqEEq ji = = )2(
2
γβ
α
+
+ p
 
),(*),(* DDqDDq ji = = )2( γβ
α
+
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When γ = 0, ).,(*),(*),(*),(* EDqDDqDEqEEq iiii =>=  
When 0 < γ ≤ β , ).,(*),(*),(*),(* EDqDDqEEqDEq iiii >>>  
 
Therefore; 
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Lemma 1 shows that when each firm has local monopoly power (lowest potential 
product market competition or highest product differentiation), γ = 0, its 
equilibrium quantity, is independent of the rival’s financial choice; 
),(*),(* DEqEEq ii =  and ).,(*),(* EDqDDq ii =  Changes in the other firm’s 
financial structure do not affect the firm’s own quantity level, and vice-versa.  
 
As the degree of market power reduces (equivalently potential product 
competition intensifies), such that 0 < γ ≤ β, the rival’s financial choice has an 
effect on the firm’s quantity level. As shown in lemma 1, when firm i chooses the 
all-equity financial contract, its quantity level is higher when firm j selects long-
term debt than when firm j selects the all-equity contract, ),(*),(* EEqDEq ii > . 
Similarly, if firm i’s financial contract is long-term debt, it produces more output 
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when firm j also selects the long-term debt contract, ),(*),(* EDqDDq ii > . 
Figure 3.1 below graphically illustrates this. 
 
Figure 3.1: The Equilibrium Quantity Levels given the Firm’s and its Rival’s 
Selected Financial Contracts.  
 
 
 
As shown in figure 3.1, for all levels of market power (note that when gamma is 
low (high), market power is high (low)), a leveraged firm has an incentive to 
reduce its output, regardless of its rival’s financial choice: ),(*),(* EEqEDq ii <  
and ).,(*),(* DEqDDq ii <  Recall the strategic use of debt model in Brander and 
Lewis (1986), short-term debt commits a firm in Cournot competition to 
becoming more aggressive in the product market, by increasing its level of output. 
On the contrary, this model shows that long-term debt induces a firm to reduce its 
output, thereby softening the actual product market competition. This is consistent 
with Fairchild’s (2004b) model. Long-term debt causes a firm in Bertrand 
competition to become short-termist, by increasing its price level for high short-
term profits. The short-termist effect of long-term debt is particularly pronounced 
at low levels of market power (high gamma or low levels of product 
differentiation). Firms facing intense potential product competition, heavily 
discount their future cashflow for short-term profits.  
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Solving for the date 0 equilibrium financial contracts  
 
In order to solve for the equilibrium date 0 financial contracts, the equilibrium 
quantities, *iq  and *jq  in lemma 1 are substituted into the inverse demand 
functions, (1a) and (1b), to obtain the equilibrium prices. The equilibrium 
quantities and prices are then substituted into the expected firm value equations 
(2a) and (2b), to obtain the firm values ),( jii SSV  and ),( ijj SSV , for each 
combination of financial choices: Vi (E, E), Vi (D, D), Vi (E, D), and Vi (D, E). 
Finally, the date 0 equilibrium financial contracts are obtained by solving the 
Nash equilibrium of the firm values, in the normal form game. 
 
Lemma 2 The firm values for given },{, DESS ji ∈  are; 
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When γ = 0, ),,(),(),(),( EDVDDVEEVDEV iiii =>=  
          γ ∈(0, γc], ),,(),(),(),( EDVDDVEEVDEV iiii >>>  
          γ ∈(γc, β], ),,(),(),(),( EDVEEVDDVDEV iiii >>>  
          where γc = .2 β
α
P
 
 
Lemma 2 demonstrates that when each firm has local monopoly power (γ = 0),    
the value of the firm, given its selected financial contract, is not affected by its 
rival’s financial contract: ),(),( EEVDEV ii = and ).,(),( EDVDDV ii =  However, 
the firm value when the all-equity contract is chosen is greater than when the 
long-term debt contract is chosen, regardless of the rival’s financial contract 
[ ),(),( EDVEEV ii > and ),(),( DDVDEV ii > ]. As the degree of market power 
(potential product competition) decreases (increases), 0 < γ ≤ β, the firm value is 
affected by its own financial contract, as well as its rival’s. If the firm chooses the 
all-equity contract, its firm value is higher when its rival selects the long-term debt 
contract, than when the rival chooses the all-equity contract: ).,(),( EEVDEV ii >  
Similarly, if the long-term debt contract is chosen, the firm value is higher when 
its rival also chooses the long-term debt contract: ).,(),( EDVDDV ii >  
 
The Nash equilibria of the normal form game are solved for all levels of market 
power. 
 
∀ γ ∈  [0, β]  Equity Long-term debt 
  - + -  
Equity Vi (E, E)  Vj (E, E)  Vi (E, D)  Vj (D, E)  
  
 +   
Long-term debt Vi (D, E) Vj (E, D)  Vi (D, D) Vj (D, D)  
 
The table above shows that each firm’s dominant strategy is to choose the all-
equity financial contract at all levels of market power. A critical value of market 
power, γc, is defined, such that ),(),( EEVDDV ii =  at γc = .2 βα
P
 Note the contrast 
to Fairchild’s (2004b) Bertrand competition model that showed an increasing of 
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debt at low levels of market power, as a commitment to increasing prices.        
This model shows that even when the products become less differentiated, in 
equilibrium, both firms select the all-equity financial contract, which consequently 
commits them to higher output levels.  
 
Therefore, the model states the following. 
 
Proposition 1 
Each firm’s dominant strategy is the all-equity financial contract, therefore each is     
Si,j = {E, E} for all levels of market power. 
 
a) At γ ∈[0, γc], the firm’s equilibrium firm value is greater than that when 
they both choose long-term debt. That is, ).,(),(* DDVEEV ii >  
b) When the level of market power is beyond the critical value, γ ≥  γc, this 
represents a prisoner’s dilemma.  Each firm would be better off if they 
both chose long-term debt, since, ).,(),(* DDVEEV ii <  
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the above arguments. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Firm Values given the All-Equity and Long-term Debt 
Financial Contracts 
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Figure 3.2 compares the firm values when both firms choose the all-equity 
(equilibrium) financial contracts, ),(* EEVi , with the firm values if they had 
selected long-term debt contract, ),,( DDVi  over the degrees of market power,       
0 ≤ γ ≤ β. When the degree of market power is at its maximum, γ = 0, the all-
equity contract yields higher profits, than the long-term debt contract, 
).,(),( DDVEEV ii >  At this low level of potential product market competition, 
wherein each firm has its local monopoly power, long-term debt has no strategic 
use. This is consistent with Fairchild (2004b) and Lyandres (2006), who showed 
that when the extent of competitive interaction among firms is low, a firm does 
not need debt for strategic purposes, in the absence of the other benefits of debt.  
 
As their products become less differentiated, firms face more intense potential 
product market competition from one another. The firm value of selecting both 
financial contracts reduce, as firms engage more in the potential product market 
competition (their products become less differentiated). However, as shown in 
figure 3.2, firm values when the all-equity contract is selected, decrease much 
more than when the long-term debt contract is chosen. This is illustrated by the 
steeper line of V (E, E). At the critical degree of market power, ,2 β
α
γ pc =  both 
lines intersect, demonstrating that the firm values, when both firms select the all-
equity contract, are equal to when the long-term debt contracts are selected. 
Beyond the critical degree of market power, βγβ
α
≤≤2
p
, choosing the long-
term debt contracts would yield higher firm values. Therefore, the firms now face 
a prisoner’s dilemma. Even though the intensity of potential product competition 
causes firm value to fall, both firms could still be better off if they were leveraged 
beyond the critical degree of potential product competition.  
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Proposition 1 has proved Dasgupta and Titman’s (1998) statement10 that ‘with 
quantity competition, firms will be all-equity financed in the absence of other 
benefits associated with debt’ (page 714). Thus, the result of this first model of 
this thesis is consistent with their statement. It can also be compared with long-
term debt in Fairchild’s (2004b) Bertrand competition model. His model shows a 
non-monotonic relationship between debt and market power. Fairchild (2004b) 
argued that long-term debt has a strategic use at some levels of market power, 
where the limited liability effect of debt dominates the predation effect. In this 
non-spatial Cournot competition model, it shows that in equilibrium, firms do not 
strategically use debt at any degree of market power or product differentiation. 
One explanation for this, is that long-term debt causes the firm to become more 
short-termist, which is shown by the reduction in output (or conversely an 
increase in prices). Recall that shareholders of the leveraged firm are paid out of 
only date 1 profits. The date 2 profits are not relevant to them, because these are 
paid to debt holders. Therefore, the firm’s manager, who acts in the shareholders’ 
interest, decreases its output or increases its prices, to gain high short-term profits. 
Unfortunately, long-term debt in the non-spatial model does not have a strategic 
use as a commitment device to increase output, unlike short-term debt, which was 
suggested as a feasible mechanism by Brander and Lewis (1986). The limited 
liability effect of debt seems to be outweighed by the short-termist effect of long-
term debt, in this Cournot model with differentiated products.  
 
In addition, the model shows that the effect of market power plays an important 
role in determining the financial choice. Although the results show that firm value 
falls, as the levels of market power decreases, the leveraged firm’s value is 
decreasing at a slower rate. Moreover, beyond the critical degree of market power, 
firms could be better off, if they both selected long-term debt. This naturally leads 
the model to consider the possibility of collusion in firms’ financial decisions, in 
the next sub-section.  
                                                
10
 Dasgupta and Titman (1998) merely stated this without proof. 
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3.2.2 Cournot Competition with Collusion (Infinitely Repeated Game) 
 
It is well established in the supergame literature that when firms interact over 
indefinite periods of time, then at least some degree of tacit collusion is rendered 
individually rational. Collusion in the output market occurs through output levels 
restrictions, and is supported by threats of reversion to the non-cooperative 
Cournot equilibrium. A firm will have an incentive to abide by the agreement, as 
long as the one period gains from defection are less than the expected payoffs the 
firm would be receiving in the punishment periods.  
 
In the capital structure-product market relationship, the argument over whether 
debt facilitates tacit collusion remains inconclusive. On the one hand, there is an 
argument suggesting that debt induces a firm to deviate from the tacit collusion 
agreement. This argument has been led by Maksimovic (1988), who is one of the 
pioneering authors to explore the relationship between capital structure and the 
sustainability of collusion among firms. Based on Brander and Lewis’s (1986) 
limited liability effect model, he showed that in an infinitely repeated duopoly 
game with stationary demand, debt commits a firm to increasing its output, 
thereby raising profits of the non-cooperative Cournot output. Therefore, debt 
raises the relative payoffs from defection, restricting the firms’ ability to sustain 
tacit collusion. Maksimovic (1988) argued that debt encourages firms to deviate 
from the collusion agreement. Similarly, Stenbacka (1994) showed that debt 
reduces a firm’s ability to sustain collusion in Bertrand competition. This is 
because debt increases the number of high demand states, in which a firm has an 
incentive to deviate from the collusive price agreement.  
 
On the other hand, Damania (1997) argued that debt can be used as a device for 
facilitating tacit collusion in Cournot competition. His model can be viewed as an 
infinitely repeated version of Brander and Lewis’s (1986) one-shot game model 
with stochastic demand uncertainty. Two firms choose their debt levels, prior to 
their output decisions and then given their debt levels they compete over their 
output levels, infinitely. Shareholders optimise their payoffs over non-bankrupt 
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states, whereas debt holders are the residual claimants in bankrupt states. 
Increases in debt induce firms to optimise over smaller non-bankrupt states. The 
neglect of the bankrupt states results in a rise in output levels in non-collusive 
periods. Damania (1997) showed that because of the limited liability effect of 
debt, shareholders ignore the low states of demand, in which debt holders optimise 
their payoffs. Such neglect leads to an increase in output in the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium, and thereby reduces the payoffs from defecting. Debt makes 
defection less desirable, and therefore facilitates tacit collusion. 
 
Recall the Cournot model with differentiated products in the previous sub-section, 
lemma 1 shows that long-term debt induces a firm to become more collusive in 
the product market, as shown by a reduction in output. The model argues that the 
output reduction is caused by the short-termist effect of long-term debt. Lemma 2 
shows that firms select the all-equity contract in equilibrium, for every degree of 
market power. In proposition 1, the model demonstrates that when the degree of 
product differentiation (or market power) is beyond the critical value (γc < γ ),    
the equilibrium is a prisoner’s dilemma. Although the model shows that firms 
cannot prevent their firm values from falling, as the potential product market 
intensifies, firm values, when selecting the all-equity contract, decrease at a faster 
rate. Selecting the all-equity financial contracts commits them to produce much 
more than they should. Beyond the critical level of potential product market 
competition, firm values, when selecting the all-equity contract, are actually lower 
than when they select the long-term debt contract: ),(),( DDVEEV ii < at γc < γ. 
This suggests that both firms could be better off, if the long-term debt contract 
was selected at the degrees of market power beyond the critical level, γc.  
 
This section extends the one-shot game non-spatial Cournot competition, by 
incorporating an infinitely repeated game. The non-spatial model will consider the 
possibility of collusion over the financial contract. Specifically, the model will 
consider how the exogenous degree of market power and firm myopia affect the 
sustainability of collusion over the financial contract.  
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In this section, the repeated game consists of infinite repetition of the one-shot 
game already analysed in section 3.2.1. That is, infinite repetition of the 
following: 
 
Date 0: both firms make an implicit agreement to select the long-term debt 
contract.  
 
Date 1: given their long-term debt contract, firms are bound with this collusive 
agreement to produce at ).,(
,
DDq ji  
Date 2: the model also assumes customer stickiness, which allows firms to charge 
their customers the expected reservation price, 2p , in date 2. Profits are realised, 
and payoffs are distributed to debt holders. 
  
Firms then move back to date 0 to re-select their financial contracts, and the game 
is repeated infinitely.  
 
Recall the results in lemma 2 that, when ),(),(),( EEVDDVDEV iii >> , a firm 
will always have an incentive to renege on the agreement, by selecting the all-
equity contract. The model employs the standard grim-trigger strategy. Both firms 
agree to issue long-term debt and maintain their output levels, until one of them 
deviates. If a firm reneges on the agreement, by selecting the all-equity contract in 
date 0, its rival will punish the firm by issuing all-equity in the very next period 
and the periods thereafter. The game is reverted to non-cooperative (non-
collusive) Cournot-Nash equilibrium, like in the previous one-shot game model. 
The infinitely repeated game model maintains the assumption of the one-shot 
game, that firms are risk-neutral, and the market discount rate is zero. In addition, 
the model defines a firm’s subjective discount rate as r ≥ 0, which represents firm 
myopia, and this is not necessarily market-derived. For simplicity, the model 
assumes that both firms have the same subjective discount rate, r. That is, it is 
assumed that they have the same myopia, and they discount their future values at 
the same rate. 
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The output level, ),,(
,
DDq ji can be sustained by the standard grim-trigger 
strategy, if short-run gains from deviating are not larger than discounted losses 
from the punishment phase.  
 
That is, if ,)],(),([),(),(
r
EEVDDVDDVDEV iiii
−
≤−  then collusion is 
sustainable.  
 
Lemma 4  
Let the critical discount rate, ,),(),(
),(),(
DDVDEV
EEVDDV
r
ii
ii
c
−
−
= such that  
,crr ≤ collusion is sustainable.  
When the product competition is at its critical value, γ = ,2 β
α
γ pc =  rc = 0.  
When the product competition is at its maximum, γ = β,  rc .4 2
2
p
p
+
−
=
α
α
 
 
Proposition 2 
Firms have incentives to sustain collusion, when the discount rate is below the 
critical discount rate,  .crr ≤  Figure 3.3 depicts the main analysis of the model, 
which is the relationship between the degrees of market power, firm myopia 
(represented by the discount rate), and sustainability of collusion. When the 
discount rate is below the critical discount rate, ,crr ≤ collusion is sustainable. In 
other words, collusion is sustainable in the region below the curve, and is not 
sustainable in the region above it.  
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Figure 3.3: The relationship between degrees of market power and the 
critical discount rates 
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As the degree of market power reduces (or equivalently, product differentiation 
decreases), the critical discount rate increases. It is more beneficial for both firms 
to collude, as the potential product market competition intensifies, as shown by 
the increase in the collusion region under the critical discount rate line. Although 
the potential product market competition reduces the payoffs from 
defecting, ),( EEVi , as well as the payoffs from colluding, ),,( DDVi the latter 
declines less than the former. This makes collusion more attractive and beneficial 
to both rivals. 
 
The findings of the non-spatial model show that debt encourages collusive 
behaviour, when product market competition is intense. The model contributes to 
the theoretical work of Maksimovic (1988), Stenbacka (1994), and Damania 
(1997) who examined capital structure and collusion in the product market. In 
particular, the model is consistent with Damania (1997), who showed that debt 
can facilitate collusive behaviour. However, the interpretation is somewhat 
different, in the sense that debt in Damania (1997) makes defection become less 
attractive, thereby promoting collusion in output, whereas in the model in this 
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section firms’ collusion, in selecting the long-term debt contract, restricts the level 
of output in the product market. Although the non-spatial model does not examine 
the role of lenders, one might observe that firms’ incentives to collude in capital 
structure, with no intention of deviation, can be made credible, if both firms 
borrow from a common lender. This is consistent with the research that suggests 
collusive behaviour in the product market can be transferred from collusion or 
concentration in the capital market.  
 
3.3 Spatial Model 
 
3.3.1 Linear Transportation costs 
 
Thus far, this chapter has focused on the relationship between capital structure and 
product market within a framework of the non-spatial model. This section changes 
the approach and considers the relationship by using a framework of a spatial 
model. The advantage of the spatial model is that it allows for analysis of the 
interaction between customer preferences and the firm’s product market behaviour 
and debt choices. Customer preferences are represented by the transportation 
costs, both types (linear and quadratic) and level (t). Because this section adopts a 
spatial approach, it is more natural to consider Bertrand price competition than 
Cournot quantity competition.   
 
Suppose there are two firms, },,{ BAi ∈  selling products that are identical in all 
respects, except for one characteristic, which is the location where they are sold. 
Firms must locate somewhere in the unit interval, 0-1. The location of the firm can 
be considered as how much its product is differentiated from its rival’s. Recall the 
example of the T-shirt producers in the non-spatial model. If firm A is the white 
T-shirt producer and firm B is the black T-shirt producer, then they would want to 
locate their shops as far away from each other as possible. Firm A would want to 
locate at point 0, whereas firm B would want to locate at point 1. As their products 
become less differentiated, that is to say, as the white T-shirt is darkened and 
black T-shirt is lightened, firms would want to locate closer to each other by 
 87 
moving towards the centre of the line. In the standard location model with linear 
transportation costs, it is shown that if both firms are located too closely, they start 
undercutting each other’s prices, resulting in a process of price cuts that does not 
converge to equilibrium. Firms would be better off, if they did not locate close to 
each other. (Shy, 1995).  
 
For simplicity, the model assumes that firm A is located at point a  units of 
distance from 0, whereas firm B is located at point b  units of distance from 1, 
with .ba =  In other words, the firms are symmetrically located, as illustrated 
below. In sum, the firms’ locations are assumed to be exogenously given.  
 
The attention now moves to the demand side of the market, that is the customers. 
Suppose that there is a continuum of customers locating uniformly across the unit 
interval. Let X  denote the marginal customer, who is indifferent to buying from 
firm A  or firm .B  Customers, who are located to the left of consumer X , strictly 
prefer to buy from firm A , whereas all customers located to the right, strictly 
prefer to buy from firm .B  These customers must travel to a firm to buy its 
product, and for them, this incurs some travelling costs. Therefore, each 
customer’s utility from buying one unit of product can be expressed as his 
reservation utility,U , minus the price of  unit, t, times the distance travelled. For 
example, the customer X has to pay the transportation cost of t (X-a) for buying a 
product from firm A or t (1-b-X) for buying it from firm B.  
   0 Firm A 
       x 
 
Firm B 
  1 
 X-a  1-b-X 
a b 
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The interpretation of the transportation cost per unit, in this spatial model, draws 
on a statement made by Hotelling (1929) and cited in Shy (1995):  
  
 ‘These particular merchants would do well, instead of organising 
 improvement clubs and booster associations to better the roads,  
 to make transportation as difficult as possible’. (page 151) 
 
The spatial model uses the above statement to put forward the proposition that a 
firm has high market power, when a customer has to pay more transportation costs 
to buy its product. Thus, the degree of market power is represented by the 
transportation cost per unit, in this non-spatial model. The higher the 
transportation cost per unit, t, the higher the market power for a firm. One might 
observe some similarity between the notion of market power in the non-spatial 
and the spatial models. In the former, a firm has more market power when its 
product is least substitutable with its rival’s product. In the latter, the more the 
product is perceived to be different by customers, the higher market power the 
firm has. Product differentiation in the non-spatial model comes from the supply 
side of the market, that is to say, from the firms, whereas in the spatial model, 
product differentiation comes from the demand side of the market, namely the 
customers. Thus, one may also view a firm with a high transportation cost per 
unit, as a firm engaged in less intense potential product market competition, owing 
to its high product differentiation.  
 
The objective of the spatial model is to examine how the exogenous degree of 
market power determines the level of long-term debt, and how the firms’ financial 
structures affect their pricing strategy given their fixed location. The timeline of 
the game is the same as for the non-spatial model. Firms simultaneously make 
their financial decisions, prior to the competition and they then compete in prices 
over two periods of product market competition. Once again, the model assumes 
‘customer stickiness’. When deciding upon their date 1 price levels, each firm 
faces the following trade-off: short-term high profit and long-term customer base. 
If they charge high prices in date 1, they will earn high date 1 profits, at the 
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expense of their low date 2 market share and low date 2 profits. This implies that, 
apart from the potential product competition, another force that may drive the 
price level down is the firm’s desire for a large long-term market share. The 
difference in the spatial model is that the date 2 reservation prices are assumed to 
be unknown. The timeline of the spatial model is as follows: 
 
Date 0: firms simultaneously select long-term debt levels, dA and dB, to maximise 
their expected total firm values.  
 
The rivals compete over two periods, date 1 and date 2. 
 
Date 1: given its own and the rival’s date 0 financial structure, the firms 
simultaneously set their levels of prices to maximise expected return to 
shareholders.  
 
Because in date 1 debt has already been lent to each firm, its manager, whose goal 
is to maximise its shareholders’ value (assume that there is no principal-agent 
problem), will no longer have an incentive to consider the fortunes of debt 
holders, when choosing date 1 prices. That is, the firm ignores the states, in which 
debt holders optimise their payoffs. 
 
Date 2: given customer stickiness, firms charge their customers at the reservation 
price, which is assumed to be unknown in date 0 and date 1, but is then resolved 
in date 2.  
 
The unknown reservation price represents the product market uncertainty in the 
spatial model. The operating profits are earned, and debt holders are paid their 
payoffs.  
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For simplicity, the model assumes that both firms charge the same reservation 
price, Pr, and this is drawn from a uniform distribution, Pr ~ ).,0( RU  Given that 
the probability density function is 
R
f 1(Pr) = , the date 0 expectation of the 
reservation value is therefore given by; 
 
(Pr)E  = ∫
R
d
R0
Pr,Pr  
           = ,
2
Pr1
0
2 R
R 




 
             = .
2
R
 
 
The model assumes that the firms are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate is zero. 
The product costs are normalised to zero. Let Vi denote the date 0 expected firm 
values of firm A and firm B, where i = A and B, such that:  
 
(1a) AAA XEpV (Pr))( +=   
  = ,
2 AAA
XRXp +  
(1b) BBB XEpV (Pr))( +=   
             = BBB X
RXp
2
+ , 
 
where pA and pB are the respective date 1 price of firm A and B, 
          XA and XB are the firm A and B demand levels, respectively, 
          
2
R is the expected date 2 reservation price.  
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If firm A  and firm B  choose respective date 0 debt levels Ad  and ,Bd  then the 
low demand states in date 2 become irrelevant to their shareholders. Equity values 
are expressed as; 
 
(2a) ∫+=∏
R
d
AAAA
A
d
R
XXp PrPr   
               = 


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
−
+
R
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(2b) ∫+=∏
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Recall consumer sX '  utility functions from buying from firm A  or firm B  can 
be mathematically expressed as: 
 
),( aXtpUU AA −−−=       
).1( XbtpUU BB −−−−=       
 
Since consumer X  is indifferent to buying from firm A  or firm ,B  each firm’s 
demand function is derived by equating consumer sX '  utilities; .BA UU =  
 
Therefore, the demand functions of firm A  and firm B are: 
(3a) ,
2
1
2
+
−
=
t
pp
X ABA             
(3b) .1 AB XX −=  
             
2
1
2
+
−
=
t
pp BA
              
 
The game is solved by backward induction.  
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Solving for date 1 equilibrium prices given debt levels  
 
Date 1 equilibrium prices are solved by taking date 0 debt levels, Ad  and Bd , as 
given. Firms simultaneously choose their date 1 prices to maximise their equity 
values, (2a) and (2b), given their expectation of their rival’s pricing decision. The 
demand functions, (3a) and (3b), are substituted into the expected equity value 
equations, (2a) and (2b). The equilibrium prices *Ap  and *Bp   are then obtained 
by solving for the first-order conditions, ,0/ =∂∏∂ AA p  and ,0/ =∂∏∂ BB p  
respectively.  
 
Lemma 1 The date 1 equilibrium prices are: 
.
6
2
2
*
22
R
ddR
tp ABA
+
+−=  
.
6
2
2
*
22
R
ddR
tp BAB
+
+−=  
 
The result in lemma 1 shows that increasing debt raises the level of the firms’ 
prices and this suggests that debt softens the price competition. This finding 
supports the theoretical argument of Showalter (1995) and Fairchild (2004b), that 
the limited liability effect of debt induces more collusive behaviour in Bertrand 
competition. Moreover, lemma 1 shows that it is not only the firm’s own long-
term debt that has an effect on its prices, but also its rival’s long-term debt has an 
impact on the firm’s prices. However, the softening effect of the firm’s long-term 
debt has a more pronounced effect than the rival’s long-term debt.  
 
Solving for date 0 equilibrium debt levels  
 
The date 1 equilibrium prices, *Ap  and *Bp , from lemma 1, and the demand 
functions, (3a) and (3b), are substituted into the firm value functions, (1a) and 
(2b). The equilibrium debt levels are then solved by ,0/ =∂∂ AA dV  and 
.0/ =∂∂ BB dV   
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The model obtains the following. 
 
Proposition 1  
The date 0 equilibrium debt levels are .2** Rtdd BA ==  
 
Given the date 0 equilibrium debt level, the date 1 equilibrium prices from lemma 
1 can be expressed as  .
2
2** Rtpp BA −==   
 
The equilibrium date 0 firm values are .** tVV BA ==  
 
Recall that the transportation cost per unit represents the degree of market power. 
The higher the degree of market power, the less intense is the potential product 
market competition. Proposition 1 suggests that the date 0 equilibrium debt level 
is increasing monotonically with market power. This can also be inversely 
interpreted as that the equilibrium debt level is decreasing with the potential 
product market competition or the level of transportation cost, t. Although lemma 
1 shows that the limited liability effect of long-term debt induces collusive 
behaviour in the actual product market competition, proposition 1 shows that the 
predation effect dominates the use of long-term debt in the equilibrium. Firms 
reduce their debt levels, as potential product market competition increases. 
Proposition 1 also shows that the equilibrium prices and the equilibrium firm 
values are unambiguously increasing with the degrees of market power 
(decreasing with the potential product market competition). 
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3.3.2 Quadratic Transportation Costs 
 
The model maintains the same timeline and the assumptions used above in the 
case of linear transportation cost.  
 
Customer sX '  utility functions from buying from firm A  or firm B  are now 
expressed as: 
 
,)( 2aXtPUU AA −−−=       
2)1( XbtPUU BB −−−−=   
 
Since the marginal consumer X is indifferent to buying from firm A  or firm B , 
the demand functions are derived by equating consumer X’s utility functions; 
BA UU = . 
 
Therefore, the demand functions of firm A  and firm B are: 
(4a) ,
2
1
)1(2 +−−
−
=
bat
pp
X ABA             
(4b) BX  2
1
)1(2 +−−
−
=
bat
pp BA
. 
 
The game is solved by using exactly the same process as before, that is to say by 
using backward induction to derive the equilibrium date 0 debt levels and date 1 
equilibrium prices. Note that firms set their date 0 debt levels to maximise firm 
value, whilst they set their date 1 prices to maximise equity value, given their 
expectation of their rivals’ debt and pricing decisions. 
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Solving for date 1 equilibrium prices, given debt levels  
 
The demand functions, (4a) and (4b), are substituted into the expected equity 
value equations, (2a) and (2b). The equilibrium prices *Ap  and *Bp   are then 
obtained by solving ,0/ =∂∏∂ AA p  and ,0/ =∂∏∂ BB p respectively.  
 
Lemma 2 The date 1 equilibrium prices are: 
.
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The results in lemma 2 offer similar suggestions to those in lemma 1: increasing 
debt softens the actual price competition. 
 
Solving for date 0 equilibrium debt levels  
 
The date 1 equilibrium prices, *Ap  and *Bp , from lemma 2, and the demand 
functions, (4a) and (4b), are substituted into the firm value functions, (1a) and 
(2b). The equilibrium debt levels are then solved by ,0/ =∂∂ AA dV  and 
.0/ =∂∂ BB dV  
 
The model obtains the following. 
 
Proposition 2 
The date 0 equilibrium debt levels are )1(2** baRtdd BA −−== . 
 
Given the date 0 equilibrium debt level, the date 1 equilibrium prices from lemma 
2 can be expressed as .
2
)1(2** RbatPP BA −−−==   
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The equilibrium date 0 firm values are ).1(** batVV BA −−==   
 
Proposition 2 shows that the results obtained in the quadratic transportation cost 
are similar to those in the case of the linear transportation cost. The date 0 
equilibrium debt levels, the date 1 equilibrium prices, and firm values are 
unambiguously increasing in market power, which is represented by the 
transportation cost per unit. However, one can observe a difference in the results 
of the quadratic transportation case, which is the effect of firm location on the 
equilibrium debt, prices, and firm value. Proposition 2 demonstrates that the 
equilibrium prices and firm value, do not only depend on transportation cost per 
unit (or market power), but also on firm location. When each firm locates furthest 
away from each other, that is firm A locates at a and firm B locates at b, where a = 
b = 0, the equilibrium prices and firm values are equal to those of the linear 
transportation cost case. Proposition 2 also demonstrates that as firms locate closer 
to one another, a = b < 1, their prices and firm values decrease, ceteris paribus.  
 
The equilibrium prices and firm values are not only affected by the degree of 
market power, t, but they are also affected by where firms are located. A 
comparison of firm values and equilibrium prices, in the two transportation cost 
cases, shows that although firm values and prices unambiguously increase in 
market power in both cases, firm location has a dampening effect on the increase 
in firm values and prices, in the case of the quadratic transportation cost. 
Moreover, product differentiation from the supply side of the market (firm 
location) affects prices and firm values in the quadratic transportation cost case.  
 
The following diagram is used to illustrate the argument of the effect of firm 
location on the date 0 equilibrium debt and its comparison with the case of linear 
transportation cost.  
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Figure 3.4: The Effect of Transportation Costs on Debt 
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Figure 3.4 compares the rate of an increase of long-term debt for the two 
transportation cost cases. The steeper line represents the effect of transportation 
cost on debt in the linear case, whereas the flatter line represents the effect of 
transportation cost on debt in the quadratic case. As demonstrated in propositions 
1 and 2, long-term debt is increasing with market power (the transportation cost 
per unit), in both cases. Alternatively, this can be interpreted as long-term debt is 
decreasing with potential product market competition, t. A decrease in long-term 
debt is caused by the predation effect. Because of the higher effect of potential 
product competition when firms locate closer to each other, firms in the quadratic 
transportation cost case decrease long-term debt more sharply than firms in the 
case of linear transportation cost. A firm decreases its debt excessively, in order to 
avoid the predation threat from its rival, as a result of more intense potential 
product market competition from the supply side of the market (firms are located 
closer to one another) and from the demand side of the market (a decrease in the 
level of the transportation cost per unit). This is consistent with Dasgupta and 
Titman’s (1998) suggestion that when competition becomes more intense or when 
demand is elastic (decreasing in the transportation cost per unit), a firm should 
have less debt.   
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3.3.3 Vertically Differentiated 
 
Finally, the chapter examines a case of vertical differentiation, in which firms 
invest in product enhancement. This case allows for a consideration of a further 
factor in the financial contract and product market competition relationship, that 
is, the effect on investment of product enhancement.  
 
Firm A  and firm B  are exogenously located, as before. That is, the model still 
assumes that their products are not highly differentiated, and that gives them some 
potential product market competition. However, each firm can choose to invest an 
amount },0{ ii cC ∈  to enhance the quality features of their products and 
enhancement in product quality reflects firms being vertically differentiated. 
Noticeably, vertical differentiation can occur only when one of the firms invests in 
product enhancement.  The model assumes the same timeline as before, but with 
an additional date -1, in which firms, simultaneously, decide whether to invest in 
product enhancement. Each firm makes this decision to maximise its firm value, 
given its expectation of its rival’s investment choice.  
 
The marginal consumer sX '  utility from buying from firm A  or from B are: 
 
),( aXtPUU AAA −−−∆+=    
 ),1( XbtPUU BBB −−−−∆+=      
 
where i∆  represents the consumer’s enhanced utility from buying from firm .i  
When ,0=iC  ,0=∆ i and when ,ii cC =  .ii δ=∆  
 
The demand functions of firm A and firm B are obtained by equating the utility 
functions, BA UU = . 
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The demand functions when both firms invest are: 
(5a) ,
2
1
2
+
∆−∆+−
=
t
PP
X BAABA    
(5b) .
2
1
2
+
∆−∆+−
=
t
PPX ABBAB   
 
The game is once again solved by backward induction.  
     
Solving for date 1 equilibrium prices given debt levels 
 
Both firms choose date 1 prices to maximise the equity values, (2a) and (2b) and 
the demand functions, (5a) and (5b) are substituted into the equity values, (2a) and 
(2b). The equilibrium prices are then obtained by solving 0/ =∂∏∂ AA P  and 
.0/ =∂∏∂ BB P  
 
Lemma 3  
The equilibrium date 1 prices when both invest in product-enhancement are:  
.
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Lemma 3 shows that an increase in debt leads to a higher price level. The results 
are consistent with the horizontal differentiation cases and with most previous 
work that has posited that debt softens prices in Bertrand competition (for 
example, Showalter, 1995; and Fairchild, 2004b). 
 
Solving for date 0 equilibrium debt levels 
 
The rivals choose debt to maximise the firm values, (1a) and (1b), given the     
date -1 utility enhancing investment, Ci. The date 1 equilibrium prices from 
lemma 3 are substituted into the demand functions, (5a) and (5b), and into the firm 
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value functions, (1a) and (1b). Then ,0/ =∂∂ AA dV  and 0/ =∂∂ BB dV  are solved 
to obtain the equilibrium debt levels, given the date -1 utility enhancing 
investment.  
 
Lemma 4 
a) If both firms invest in utility enhancement ( ),cCC BA ==  or neither firm 
invests in utility enhancement ( ),0== BA CC  the equilibrium debt levels are 
.2** Rtdd BA ==  
b) If only firm A invests in utility enhancement ( ),0, === BA CcC  the 
equilibrium debt levels are ,
5
22* RRtd A δ+=  and .5
22* RRtdB δ−=  
 
Lemma 4 a) shows that when both firms make an identical decision, either 
investing in utility enhancement or not investing, the equilibrium debt is the same 
as in the horizontal differentiation case. Debt is increasing with the degree of 
market power. Only when one of them invests in product enhancement, are their 
debt levels asymmetric and the firm that invests in product enhancement is more 
leveraged than the one that does not.  
 
Solving for the date -1 investment decision 
 
Each firm makes its investment decision to maximise its total firm value, given its 
expectation of the other firm’s investment decision. The date 0 equilibrium debt 
levels from lemma 4 are substituted into the equilibrium prices from lemma 3, and 
the equilibrium prices are then substituted into the demand functions, (5a) and 
(5b). Finally, the equilibrium quantities and prices are substituted into the firm 
values, (1a) and (1b) and the following are obtained. 
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If both firms invest in product-enhancement at date -1, the firm values are given 
by: 
(6a) .ctVV BA −==        
 
If neither firm invests, the firm values are given by: 
(6b) .tVV BA ==         
 
If only firm A  invests, then:  
(6c) ,
5
2
25
2
c
t
tVA −++=
δδ
      
(6d) .
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25
2 δδ
−+=
t
tVB        
 
Using equations (6a) – (6d), the Nash equilibria of the product enhancement game 
are derived as follows: 
 
Proposition 3 
a) If ,
255
2 2
t
c
δδ
−≤  both firms invest in utility enhancement ( ).cCC BA ==  
The equilibrium debt levels are .2** Rtdd BA ==  
The equilibrium firm values are .ctVV BA −==  
b) If ,
255
2
255
2 22
t
c
t
δδδδ
+≤<−  only one firm invests in utility enhancement   
( ).0, == BA CcC  
The equilibrium debt levels are ,
5
22* RRtd A δ+=  and .5
22* RRtd B δ−=  
The equilibrium firm values are ,
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tVB  
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c) If ,
255
2
255
2 22
c
tt
<+<−
δδδδ
 neither firm invests in utility enhancement.  
The equilibrium debt levels are .2** Rtdd BA ==   
The equilibrium firm values are .tVV BA ==  
 
The equilibrium of this vertically differentiated game is affected by the product 
enhancement investment costs. When investment costs are very low (proposition 
3a) or very high (proposition 3c), the rivals make the same investment decision, 
and the debt level is identical and symmetric in both cases. Note that the 
equilibrium in the proposition 3a represents a prisoner’s dilemma. Both firms 
would prefer it if neither invests in product enhancement, as they would then 
achieve VA = VB = t. However, neither can commit not to invest, so they both 
invest, and VA = VB = t – c. When investment costs are at a medium level 
(proposition 3b), only one firm invests, with asymmetric equilibrium debt levels. 
The firm that invests in quality is able to set a higher debt level, than the firm that 
does not invest. The intuition is that, by investing in quality, the firm attracts more 
customers, and is able to charge a higher price. Therefore, this firm can set a 
higher debt level to further soften price competition, without fear of predation.  
 
The implication of the vertically differentiated model is somewhat different from 
the implication of the stakeholder theory of capital structure. Recall that under the 
non-financial stakeholders’ perception argument, Maksimovic and Titman (1991) 
argued that a firm with the need to maintain its reputation for being a high quality 
producer may be expected to be less indebted. This is because customers cannot 
distinguish the product until after consumption and therefore, they may be 
reluctant to buy products from a highly leveraged firm. On the contrary, the 
vertically differentiated model shows that a firm, whose high quality product is a 
result of its enhancement investment, can strategically obtain more debt to 
increase its price level. The vertically differentiated model can also be compared 
with Ross’s (1997) signalling model, in which a high ability manager uses debt to 
separate himself from a low ability manager and to signal the quality of the 
company to the capital market. In the vertically differentiated model, product 
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enhancement differentiates the type of firms, which allows the high quality firm to 
further gain strategic advantage in the product market.   
 
Moreover, one can note that the results of other models in this chapter suggest 
symmetric decisions and equilibriums. In the vertically differentiated model, there 
is a possibility of obtaining asymmetric equilibrium.     
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has developed theoretical models to analyse the impacts of the degree 
of market power, which is represented by product differentiation, on long-term 
debt, and how firms’ financial structures affect their competitive strategies in 
actual product market competition. With this goal, two differentiated products 
models have been considered. In the non-spatial model, the exogenous degree of 
market power is represented by the degree of product differentiation, and by the 
transportation cost per unit in the spatial model with product market competition. 
Both models support prior studies that have stated that long-term debt induces 
firms to be less competitive: reducing output levels in the non-spatial Cournot 
model, and increasing price levels in the spatial model.  
 
Initially, a non-spatial Cournot one-shot game model was introduced to show that 
the effects of market power or product differentiation outweigh the strategic 
benefit of debt. For every degree of market power, both firms simultaneously 
choose the all-equity financial contracts in equilibrium. Subsequently, the model 
has shown that for certain degrees of market power the all-equity financial 
equilibrium is a prisoner’s dilemma. The model was then extended to an infinitely 
repeated game to examine the relationship between the degrees of market power, 
firm myopia (represented by the critical discount rate), and the sustainability of 
collusion. In general, it is more beneficial for firms to collude as the degree of 
market power reduces. The sustainability of collusion depends on the critical 
discount rate which is decreasing with market power. 
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In the spatial model, firms are assumed to be located not far from each other. The 
exogenously given locations imply that firms face some potential product market 
competition from one another. The model has shown that long-term debt 
facilitates collusive behaviour in the product market and in addition, that the debt 
level is determined by market power. In both the linear and quadratic 
transportation cost cases, long-term debt is increasing with market power, 
measured by the transportation cost per unit. However, long-term debt in the latter 
case does not excessively increase, as in the former. The model has demonstrated 
that the predation effect dominates the use of long-term debt, in both the linear 
and quadratic transportation cost cases. For the vertical differentiation case, firms 
have a choice of whether to invest in product quality enhancement, prior to the 
financial decision. The model has shown that a firm that invests in product 
enhancement is able to obtain more debt and soften the actual price competition 
further, without fear of predation.   
 
Finally, this researcher notes that all of the models in the chapter have 
demonstrated that the type of competition in the product market (spatial versus 
non-spatial; Cournot competition versus Bertrand competition) affects the 
relationship between market power, represented by product differentiation, and 
long-term debt. Following Fairchild (2004b), who expounded that there is a non-
monotonic relationship under Bertrand competition, this chapter’s analysis has 
revealed that, under non-spatial Cournot competition, the equilibrium level is zero 
debt (all-equity), for any degree of market power or product differentiation. In the 
case of the spatial model, the relationship between market power or product 
differentiation and debt is positive. Alternatively, it can be interpreted that the 
relationship between potential product market competition and debt is negative, 
owing to the dominance of the predation effect. It is therefore worth testing this 
relationship empirically and this is the subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Study 
 
In chapter 3, theoretical models were developed to demonstrate that the 
relationship between market power/product differentiation and long-term debt is 
complex and may be linearly positive, negative, or non-monotonic, depending on 
the type of competition, i.e. spatial or non-spatial, Bertrand or Cournot 
competition. In this chapter, an empirical examination of this relationship is 
carried out. As existing research has focused on developed countries, a major 
contribution of this thesis is to study the relationship in the Southeast Asian tiger 
economy countries of: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. This 
work can therefore be considered as complementing Pandey’s (2004) analysis of 
capital structure and market power in Malaysia.  
 
Prior empirical research in capital structure has shown that a firm’s choice of debt 
depends on some firm-characteristic factors, which are theoretically based on: the 
trade-off model, the agency costs framework, and the pecking order/asymmetric 
information theory. Most early empirical evidence in the field has mainly been 
derived from data from the U.S. (for example, Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; and Barclay et al., 1995). From the mid 1990s, a series of 
empirical evidence of other, single, developed countries and international studies 
started to emerge, including, for example: Rajan and Zingales’s (1995) study of 
G-7 countries, the international comparison of Wald (1999), and Bevan and 
Danbolt’s (2002) empirical study, carried out in the U.K.. In general, empirical 
evidence of developing countries has just begun to appear over the last decade 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Pandey, 2001; and Booth et al., 2001). 
As this work is still considered to be at an early stage of development, it provides 
some promising avenues for exploration.  
 
The theoretical models in the previous chapter (chapter 3) showed that a firm’s 
financial decision can be influenced by its characteristics in the product market, 
represented by the exogenous degree of market power/product differentiation. 
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Given the levels of market power, the firm’s chosen financial selection, in turn, 
affects its real decision, as well as its rival’s decision in the product market. In this 
chapter, this interrelation will be empirically examined. This study, however, is 
not able to empirically examine the effect of capital structure on the firm’s 
decision in the actual product market competition, such as prices or output 
decision, owing to the lack of pricing and quantity data. Nevertheless, the 
empirical evidence of such a relationship has already been studied in much 
existing work. For example: Chevalier (1995b) studied the effect of debt on the 
pricing decision in the supermarket industry; Phillips (1995) examined the output 
decision following recapitalisation; and Grullon et al. (2002) investigated the 
effect of leverage on advertising competition. Given the considerable amount of 
existing empirical evidence of the capital structure and actual product market 
competition relationship, this study empirically examines the potential effects of 
market power on capital structure. That is to say, it only focuses on the first part of 
the interrelationship, as set out below.  
 
 
 
 
 
Even with such limitations, this researcher strongly believes that this study is 
contributing to the ongoing research into capital structure and the product market, 
which appears to be somewhat lacking, when it comes to evidence of the effects 
of market power on capital structure.   
 
Although the theoretical models developed in the previous chapter mainly 
examined the potential effect of market power on long-term debt, the empirical 
study in this chapter will also investigate any impact market power may have on 
total and short-term debt. This is in order to address the importance of recognising 
variations in the effect a determinant may have on different attributes of debt. In 
order to do so, the study utilises firm-level data for four developing countries in 
the Southeast Asian region, namely: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Market 
Power 
Product Market 
Competition 
Capital 
Structure 
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Thailand.11 The selection of the sample countries is based on an observation that 
there is still a lack of evidence regarding countries from this region. Moreover, 
this researcher hopes to contribute to the ongoing debate on whether the firm-
specific factors, that are well known to influence capital structure in developed 
countries, can also be applied to capital structure decisions in developing 
countries.  
 
The empirical work in this chapter is divided into two studies: the static model and 
the dynamic panel model. In the static model, the linear effect of market power 
and other firm-specific determinants of capital structure are investigated. The 
static model also considers the possibility of a non-linear relationship between 
market power and debt, as empirically demonstrated by Pandey (2004) and 
theoretically developed in Fairchild (2004b). In addition, it investigates the 
industry effect on leverage. The dynamic panel model examines speeds of 
adjustment of three types of debt. In order to carry out these empirical 
investigations, the statistical software package, STATA (version 9) is used for 
investigating the static model, whereas the dynamic panel model employs EViews 
(version 6.0).  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. The theoretical framework, given in section 
4.1, briefly reviews proxies of capital structure as used in previous empirical 
studies. This also includes a short discussion on market power and a review of the 
firm-specific determinants of capital structure, their proxies, and their expected 
relationships with debt. The chapter then proceeds to describe variables and 
estimation methods employed in the study in section 4.2, followed by a 
presentation of the results and analysis in section 4.3. To conclude, section 4.4 
briefly summarises the chapter.  
                                                
11
 An earlier version of this empirical study used only Thailand as the case study. The paper was 
co-authored with Dr. R. Fairchild, and Prof. R. Rathinasamy. It was accepted and presented at the 
European Applied Business Research (EABR) Conference organised by the Clute Institute of 
Academic Research in June 2007.    
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4.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
4.1.1 Measures of Leverage  
 
One obstacle that a researcher may have to encounter in an empirical study, is 
selecting a proxy for each variable that is included in the investigation. There are 
some appropriate and widely-used proxies for capital structure. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) suggested that the choice of proxy depends on the objective of 
each particular study. For example, the debt-to value ratio is possibly more 
appropriate for the agency-related problem, because it concerns how a firm has 
been financed in the past. A proxy like ‘interest coverage’ is probably more 
appropriate in studies concerning transferring control, when firms are financially 
distressed.  
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) identified strengths and weaknesses of some proxies. 
For instance, the ratio of ‘total liabilities-to-total assets’ simply suggests what is 
left to a firm’s shareholders in the case of liquidation and the proxy does not 
indicate whether the firm is at risk of default in the near future. This ratio may 
overstate the amount of leverage, because it includes non-financial items, such as 
accounts payable. To counter this problem, an alternative measure, which 
excludes accounts payable, such as ‘total debt-to-total assets’, might be more 
appropriate. This proxy is one of the most commonly used, especially in empirical 
studies using data from developing countries, because, as suggested by Pandey 
(2004), in many developing countries firms use both short-term and long-term 
debt to finance their assets. It is also common for firms in these countries to 
substitute short-term for long-term debt, and roll over short-term debt. Therefore, 
it is more appropriate to use total debt, especially in studies of developing 
countries. However, Titman and Wessels (1988) argued that debt should not be 
combined as total amount of debt, because different types of debt have different 
implications. For example in their study, asset collateral (tangibility) is positively 
related to long-term debt, whereas it is negatively related to short-term debt. 
Furthermore, total assets can be affected by non-debt liabilities, such as the 
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amount of gross trade credit. In order to avoid this gross trade credit effect, some 
studies have replaced total assets with net assets, where the latter is defined as 
total assets less accounts payable and other liabilities. Net assets, themselves, can 
be influenced by assets held against pension liabilities (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Alternative measures of leverage used in capital structure studies include: ‘long-
term debt to book value of debt plus market equity’ (Bradley et al., 1984), 
‘average total debt obligations over the relevant time range to average total asset’ 
(Showalter, 1999), and ‘total debt-to-capitalisation’ (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).   
 
Another issue often mentioned in empirical studies of capital structure, is the 
question of using the book value or market value of debt to obtain the most 
accurate measure of leverage. As many studies may have encountered, the 
problem of using market value of debt, as a proxy, lies with the insufficiency of 
data. To alleviate this problem, some studies have alternatively used market 
leverage, defined as the ratio of book value of total debt to total liabilities and 
market value of equity. Based on Bowman’s (1980) findings of high cross-
sectional correlation between market value and book value, Titman and Wessels 
(1988) argued that the problem of misspecification of using book value measures 
is trivial. Moreover, the differences between market and book value of debt should 
not be correlated with other determinants of capital structure, thus, using the book 
value of debt will not give unbiased results. A justification of using book value of 
debt has also been presented by Song and Philippatos (2003), who argued that the 
main cost of borrowing is the expected cost of financial distress in the event of 
bankruptcy. This financial distress affects the weighted average cost of capital and 
optimal capital structure and in such a situation, the value of the distressed firm is 
closer to its book value. Once debt has been issued, changes in the market value of 
debt do not have any effect on the tax-shield effects of debt. Furthermore, 
managers often set their level of leverage, in terms of a randomly selected target 
ratio, measured at book value (Song and Philippatos, 2003). 
 
In sum, each proxy has its own advantages as well as limitations. Therefore, one 
should bear in mind any linked caveat when selecting the proxy, and particularly 
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when analysing the results. Nevertheless, sometimes it can be argued that the 
choice of the proxy does not depend on the objective of the study, but instead it 
depends on the availability of the data.  
 
4.1.2 Market Power  
 
The term ‘market power’ has long appeared in the study of the relationship 
between market structure and returns to shareholders. ‘Market power’ is 
frequently used as an operational term for market structure (Sullivan, 1974 and 
1977). High seller concentration, high market share, and entry barriers are often 
associated with high market power. Studies of capital structure and product 
market structure, such as Krishnaswamy et al. (1992) and Rathinasamy et al. 
(2000), have suggested that market structure can be expressed in terms of a firm’s 
control over its price or quantity, which is also known, in operational terms, as: 
monopoly, oligopoly, or perfect competition. A monopoly firm has more control 
over its product market strategy, than a firm in perfect competition. 
 
As reviewed in chapter 2, the relationship between capital structure and product 
market structure can be theoretically described by the existing arguments on 
capital structure and product market competition. Krishnaswamy et al. (1992) and 
Rathinasamy et al. (2000) suggested that the limited liability effect is more 
pronounced in a highly concentrated market. This implies that a high market 
power firm would find it more strategically advantageous to employ more debt, in 
order to commit to a product market strategy that increases its shareholders’ 
payoff. Accordingly, this approach predicts a positive relationship between capital 
structure and product market structure. On the other hand, a firm with ‘deep-
pockets’ can engage in predatory action, in order to drive its highly leveraged rival 
out of the market. Hence, the predation model suggests a negative relationship. 
 
Empirical evidence of the relationship between capital structure and product 
market structure (or market power in the operational meaning) is considerably 
limited, and hence, remains inconclusive. Krishnaswamy et al. (1992) found a 
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linearly positive relationship between the Lerner index and debt among U.S. 
firms. Using a large data set of 49 countries, for the period of 1987 to 1991, 
Rathinasamy et al. (2000) found that Tobin’s q has a significant and positive 
effect on total and long-term debt. Firms with higher monopoly power use more 
total debt and long-term debt in their capital structure, thus the study concluded 
that these results support the limited liability and the risk-shifting hypothesis. In 
addition, Rathinasamy et al. (2000) investigated the impact of Tobin’s q on 
leverage across a sample of 19 industries, and similarly found a positive 
relationship between Tobin’s q and total and long-term debt. Their results show 
that a high market power firm (either a monopoly or an oligopoly firm) uses more 
debt, owing to the limited liability effect. On the contrary, Lovisuth (2003) found 
a negative relationship between the q ratio and debt, in a sample taken from the 
U.K. retailing industry. The results are generally consistent with the predation 
effect.    
 
Whilst the above studies have observed a linear relationship between market 
power and capital structure, Pandey (2004) proposed the possibility of a non-
linear cubic relationship, having used a sample of listed firms in Malaysia. Total 
debt to total assets ratio is used as the proxy for capital structure and the 
simplified q ratio is the measure of market power. Pandey (2004) suggested that 
non-linearity exists, owing to the opposite impacts of the limited liability effect on 
the one hand, and the deep purse argument on the other. His argument is 
illustrated in the following diagram below.  
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Figure 4.1: Pandey’s Illustration of the Non-Monotonic Relationship12 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
An oligopolistic firm strategically increases or decreases its levels of debt at 
different levels of market power. Because of the limited liability, shareholders are 
protected if adverse market conditions occur, therefore, a firm tends to employ 
high debt, in order to commit itself to producing high output and earning high 
profits at a low level of market power. This high profitability, however, attracts 
other low leveraged or unleveraged firms into the market. As a high debt level 
increases the probability of bankruptcy and financial distress to the high-leveraged 
firm occurring, the low or unleveraged rivals will adopt aggressive product 
strategies, either by reducing prices or increasing output, in order to drive the 
high-leveraged firm out of the market. At this intensified competition stage, the 
high-leveraged firm responds to this predation threat by reducing its debt level and 
increasing its production through improved asset utilisation. After consolidating 
its market position, once again, the firm increases its level of debt to expand its 
production. In sum, at low and high levels of market power, debt is strategically 
used to establish the market position of the firm. At the intermediate level of 
market power, where competition is intensified, the firm reduces its debt to avoid 
predation threats.  
                                                
12
 This diagram is taken from Pandey (2004).  
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
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Based on Pandey’s (2004) findings, Fairchild (2004b) theoretically examined the 
possibility of a non-linear relationship between market power and debt. Using a 
numerical example, Fairchild (2004b) also observed a non-linear (inverted U-
shaped) relationship, owing to the limited liability and the predation effects. 
However, Fairchild’s (2004b) findings and interpretations are somewhat different 
from those of Pandey’s (2004). The following diagram illustrates his argument.  
 
Figure 4.2: Fairchild’s Illustration of the Non-Monotonic Relationship13 
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In Fairchild’s (2004b) model, market power is the inverse measure of potential 
product market competition, which is represented by product differentiation. 
When product differentiation is high, firms are considered to have high market 
power in their own product markets, and thus the competitive interaction with 
each other is low. Fairchild (2004b) argued that debt has no strategic use at this 
high level of market power, because there is no competitive interaction among 
firms and hence, zero debt is observed at this level of market power (or, low level 
of product competition). As product differentiation diminishes (or equivalently, as 
their levels of market power decline), each firm engages in more intense 
competitive interaction. Fairchild (2004b) showed that firms increase their debt 
levels, in order to soften potential product market competition, that is, the limited 
                                                
13
 The diagram is adapted from Fairchild (2004b). 
 114 
liability effect dominates the use of debt. As firms reach a certain level of product 
competition, the predation effect becomes dominant at these high levels of product 
competition (or at low levels of market power).  A firm with low debt can steal 
market share, by setting a lower price than a firm with high debt, and therefore, in 
equilibrium firms reduce their use of debt at this high level of product competition 
(or low level of market power). Accordingly, Fairchild (2004b) argued that the 
relationship between capital structure and market power is positive, owing to the 
predation effect,14 whilst the limited liability effect predicts the negative 
relationship.  
 
Another non-monotonic argument for product market structure and capital 
structure relationship is found in Lyandres (2006), who also suggested that the 
relationship takes an inverted U-shaped. However, his interpretation of the 
inverted U-shaped relationship is different from that of Fairchild (2004b). 
According to Lyandres (2006), at low levels of strategic interaction,15 a firm does 
not need any debt for strategic purposes, because its action in the product market 
does not have any effect on its rivals. At intermediate levels of strategic 
interaction, oligopolistic firms have an incentive to use debt for strategic benefits 
in the product market. This can be interpreted as the limited liability effect 
dominating the use of debt only for the intermediate level of market power.  
 
In summary, the relationship between market power and capital structure remains 
complex, and this provides an issue for this chapter to explore. In general, prior 
studies appear to have reached the same conclusion that the linear relationship 
between capital structure and market power is mainly caused by, either the limited 
liability effect or the predation effect. A non-monotonic relationship is plausible, 
although contradicting conclusions do exist. On the one hand, there is the 
suggestion led by Pandey (2004) that high debt is strategically used at low and 
                                                
14
 Note that the ‘predation effect’ refers to the idea that at low degrees of product differentiation, if 
a firm sets a high debt level, the other firm can undercut by setting lower prices, in order to steal 
market share. Therefore, both firms reduce debt levels in equilibrium, to avoid the potential 
predation. 
15
 In terms of market structure, Lyandres (2006) argued that this refers to a firm in perfect 
competition and monopolistic competition. 
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high levels of market power, because of the limited liability effect. At the 
intermediate level of market power, the predation effect dominates and firms 
reduce their debt levels, in order to avoid predation threats. On the other hand, 
Fairchild (2004b) and Lyandres (2006) have argued that debt has no strategic use 
when a firm has high market power. Lyandres (2006) referred to a firm with high 
market power as a monopoly. Fairchild (2004b) interpreted a firm with high 
market power as being one with low competitive interaction with its rivals. At a 
low level of market power, where product competition intensifies, firms decrease 
debt levels to avoid predation. At the intermediate level of market power, the 
limited liability effect dominates, causing firms to use high levels of debt to soften 
price competition.   
 
Although the use of Tobin’s q as a market power proxy has concerned some 
researchers, Lindenberg and Ross (1981) argued that it is a theoretically sound 
proxy and in practice, one of the most powerful indicators of market power. The 
theoretical definition of Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
replacement cost of assets.  When Tobin’s q is higher than one, firms are expected 
to command some competitive advantage over their rivals. In a competitive 
market in which firms do not have much market power, Tobin’s q equals one. The 
difficulty in using this formula lies with the limited availability and the accuracy 
of data on replacement cost of assets, particularly those of intangible assets. In 
response to this complication, Chung and Pruitt (1994) developed a much more 
simple formula for approximating Tobin’s q. They showed that their simplified q 
ratio is a theoretically and practically sound version of Lindenberg and Ross’s 
(1981) q ratio. Moreover, DaDalt et al. (2003) showed that the variations in results 
from using this simplified q ratio and the computationally costly algorithm 
version, such as the one used by Lindenberg and Ross (1981), are almost trivial, in 
an economic sense. Another benefit of using the simplified version of the q ratio, 
is that it requires only basic financial and accounting information. Chung and 
Pruitt (1994) defined the simplified q ratio, as the ratio of the sum of market value 
of equity and liquidating value of the firm’s preferred stock, plus long-term debt 
and net current assets to the book value of total assets. Rathinasamy et al. (2000) 
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and Pandey (2004) have used this simplified q ratio in their studies. Moreover, it 
is noted that the former referred to the q ratio as market structure, whereas the 
latter specified it as the proxy for market power.  
 
Other proxies of market structure, found in the industrial organisation literature, 
are: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the concentration ratio, and the Lerner 
index. Use of these proxies should be treated with caution, because their 
interpretation can be contradictory. For example, Lyandres (2006) argued that a 
high value of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index may be due to a low number of 
firms operating in the product market, thus suggesting high competitive 
interaction among rivals. However, a high Herfindahl-Hirschman index may be 
due to the high variation in the size of firms. That is to say, the larger the 
difference in sizes, the smaller is the expected impact that a firm may have on its 
counterparts.   
 
High market concentration is often associated with monopolistic and oligopolistic 
product market structure. However, as argued by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and 
Hirschey (1985), market power may or may not be evident in highly concentrated 
markets. Using Tobin’s q as the market power proxy, Lindenberg and Ross (1981) 
did not find any significant relationship between Tobin’s q and the concentration 
ratio. This suggests that a firm in a concentrated industry may not be endowed 
with high market power, and similarly, a high market power firm may be found in 
either a concentrated or an unconcentrated industry. In sum, market structure can 
be operationally expressed in terms of market power, but the term ‘market power’ 
does not necessarily imply a concentrated market structure. 
 
As shown in the theoretical models given in chapter 3, the degrees of product 
differentiation are used as the measure of market power. Fairchild (2004b) argued 
that when the product differentiation is zero, each firm has local monopoly power. 
The firm has high market power owing to its highly differentiated product. At 
high levels of market power, a firm’s interaction with its rival is low, whereas at 
low levels of market power, the firm engages in highly competitive interaction 
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with its rivals. A firm may have monopoly power, without necessary being in a 
concentrated market. This empirical study follows Fairchild (2004b)’s 
interpretation of market power, and uses his definition throughout the chapter.  
 
4.1.3 Firm-Specific Determinants of Capital Structure 
 
This sub-section briefly reviews existing empirical work, regarding the effects of a 
firm’s characteristics on capital structure. The variables included here are the 
proxies that appear most commonly in the research on capital structure. They 
empirically show how: the trade-off theory, the agency problems, and the pecking 
order theory, explain variations of capital structure. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that the nature of the relationship between a variable and debt can differ, 
depending on the level of maturity of the debt.  
 
Profitability 
According to Myers’s (1984) pecking order theory, a firm subject to information 
asymmetry depends on internally generated funds for its expansion, because 
external financing involves higher costs. Assuming the pool of retained earnings 
grows as the firm becomes more profitable, internal financing becomes more 
accessible and does not entail information costs as high as those of external 
financing. In addition, profitable firms prefer not to raise external equity, so as to 
avoid the potential dilution of ownership (Deesomsak et al., 2004). These 
arguments predict a negative relation between profitability and debt. On the 
contrary, Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) tax shield theory suggested that a firm 
with high profits would employ high debt, because of tax shield benefits (i.e. 
corporate tax reduction). Furthermore, Jensen’s (1986) free cashflow argument 
posited that a high profits firm will have high debt, to ensure that its managers pay 
out profits to the debt holders, rather than build up their personal empires. 
Accordingly, these arguments suggest a positive relation between debt and 
profitability.  
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In general, the existing empirical evidence supports the pecking order theory 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Thies and Klock, 1992; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Michaelas et al., 1999; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Nivorozhkin, 
2002; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; and Delcoure, 2007). Pandey (2004) offered an 
explanation of the possibility of a non-linear relationship between leverage and 
profitability, involving both the pecking order and the tax shield theories. By 
using data from Malaysian listed companies, he found that at lower levels of 
profitability, firms employ more internal funds, because external funds are 
expensive, and non-debt tax shields, such as depreciation, may be more than 
sufficient to take advantage of tax benefits. As the level of profitability increases, 
firms increase their use of debt, in order to capture high tax shield benefits. The 
argument thus gives rise to a U-shaped relationship, with firms possibly not 
having an incentive to increase nor decrease debt in the medium ranges of 
profitability. Thies and Klock (1992) also found the effect of profitability on debt 
to be non-linear. To sum up, profitability has been measured in different studies as 
follows: the ratio of operating income to total assets (Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
and Rajan and Zingales, 1995), the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets (Rathinasamy et al., 
2000; Song and Philippatos, 2004; and Deesomsak, et al., 2004), the ratio of 
average earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to average total assets 
(Showalter, 1999; Thies and Klock, 1992; and Pandey, 2004), and the return on 
assets ratio (ROA) (Wiwattanakantang, 1999). 
 
Tangibility 
Tangible fixed assets can be used as collateral, which protects debtholders from 
the asset substitution problem, caused by the shareholders-debt holders conflict 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Moreover, debt holders are more willing to supply 
loans, because tangible assets provide them with security in the event of financial 
distress. Tangible assets are the most widely accepted collateral for banking and 
raising secured debt (Song and Philippatos, 2004). The agency cost of debt 
suggests a positive relationship between tangibility and debt, which is supported 
by the empirical findings of: Titman and Wessels (1988); Rajan and Zingales 
 119 
(1995); Wiwattanakantang (1999); Pandey (2004); Song and Philippatos (2004); 
and Kim et al. (2006). Moreover, Bevan and Danbolt (2002) argued that the 
relationship can depend on the components of debt. From their U.K. study, 
tangibility is positively related with long-term debt, but is negatively related with 
short-term debt. Nivorozhkin (2002) found a positive relationship with total debt 
but a negative relationship with short-term debt; Pindado et al. (2006) found a 
significant and positive relationship with long-term debt; and Michaelas et al. 
(1999) and Delcoure (2007) found a positive relationship with all types of debt 
(total, short-term, and long-term). The most widely used proxy for tangibility is 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Nivorozhkin, 2002; Deesomsak et al., 2004; and Song 
and Philippatos, 2004). 
 
Size 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggested that larger firms are more diversified and 
less prone to bankruptcy, and are thus expected to incur lower costs in issuing 
debt, than smaller firms. Therefore, size can be interpreted as an inverse proxy for 
bankruptcy. This argument predicts a positive relationship between size and debt. 
Michaelas et al. (1999) argued that the agency conflict between shareholders and 
debt holders may be particularly severe for small firms. However, lenders can 
manage the risk of lending to smaller firms by restricting the maturing of debt. 
This argument suggests that smaller firms will have less long-term, but more 
short-term debt. In general, previous empirical studies have supported the 
argument that there is a positive relationship between debt and size (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Barclay and Smith, 1996; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Booth et al., 
2001; and Pandey, 2001, 2004). Proxies that are used for size are: the natural log 
of sales (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Nivorozhkin, 2002; and Pandey 2004), and the natural 
log of average total assets (Showalter, 1999; and Song and Philippatos, 2004).  
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Liquidity 
Liquidity is defined as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (the current 
ratio). According to the pecking order theory, a firm with high liquidity prefers 
retained earnings to external borrowings. In addition, the agency costs argument 
suggests that a firm’s manager could manipulate liquid assets in favour of 
shareholders, but against the debt holders’ interests. This increases the agency 
costs of debt, which encourages the firm to borrow less and accordingly, a 
negative relationship is predicted (Deesomsak et al., 2004).  
 
Risk or earning volatility 
Higher risk or earnings volatility implies an increase in the probability of financial 
distress, which prevents firms from fulfilling their debt commitments, that is, 
firms experiencing this situation have a low debt capacity and thus accordingly, a 
negative relationship between debt and earnings volatility is predicted (Fan et al., 
2001; Pandey, 2004; and Kim et al., 2006). Thies and Klock (1992) and Prasad et 
al. (2001) found a positive relationship for short-term debt but a negative 
relationship for long-term debt. Michaelas et al. (1999) found a positive 
relationship for all types of debt, whereas Delcoure (2007) found a negative one 
for all types of debt. Risk or earning volatility has been measured by: the standard 
deviation of the first differences in earnings, before interests and tax (EBIT), over 
the relevant time period, divided by average EBIT during the same period 
(Showalter, 1999 and Deesomsak et al., 2004); the standard deviation of the first 
differences in earning before interests and tax (EBIT), over the relevant time 
period, divided by total assets (Wald, 1999); the standard deviation of the return 
on assets (Booth et al., 2001); the standard deviation of net income (Song and 
Philippatos, 2004); and weekly share price data (Pandey, 2004).  
 
Growth and investment opportunities 
The relationship between debt and investment opportunity is ambiguous. 
According to Myers (1977), an immature firm with many intangible investment 
opportunities is more likely to suffer loss in value from the debt overhang (under 
investment) problem. Thus, this type of firm, whose growth depends on future 
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investment opportunities, should carry low levels of debt. A mature firm with few 
investment opportunities, and whose value reflects the cashflows from tangible 
assets in place, incurs lower expected costs associated with financial distress and 
such a company should have higher leverage ratios, than an immature firm. 
Similarly, Jensen’s (1986) free cashflow argument suggested that a mature firm 
with substantial free cashflow should employ more debt, in order to reduce the 
agency costs of equity. These theories help predict a negative relationship. 
However, Myers (1977) suggested that the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and debt holders can be mitigated, by increasing the use of short-
term debt. Therefore, a positive relationship between short-term debt and 
investment opportunities is predicted. According to the pecking order theory, the 
information costs associated with issuing debt are lower than those of equity and 
hence, a high growth firm will have high leverage ratios, whereas a firm with few 
investment opportunities will have low debt levels. This predicts a positive 
relationship. However, a negative relationship has been found in: Titman and 
Wessels (1988); Barclay et al. (1995); Barclay and Smith (1996); Rajan and 
Zingales (1995); Fan et al. (2003) and Deesomsak, et al. (2004). On the other 
hand, the following have found a positive relationship for all types of debt: Thies 
and Klock (1992); Michaelas et al. (1999); Booth et al. (2001); Pandey (2001); 
Delcoure (2007). Bevan and Danbolt (2002) found a positive relationship, 
regarding total and short-term debt, but a negative relationship regarding long-
term debt, whereas Pandey (2001) found no significant relationship, for all types 
of debt. In previous studies, growth has been measured as: one plus growth rate 
derived by regressing log of sales to time (Pandey, 2001); one plus annual change 
in assets (Pandey, 2004); and the market-to-book value ratio (Barclay et al., 1995; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; and Nivorozhkin, 2002).  
 
Non-debt tax shields 
According to tax-based theory, the benefit that comes from using debt financing is 
corporate tax deduction. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argued that non-debt tax 
shields are substitutes for debt’s interest tax shields. Given this argument, a 
negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt is expected. A firm 
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with large non-debt tax shields, such as: tax deductions for depreciation, 
investment tax credits and pension funds, generally uses less debt. In general, 
most empirical studies have found a negative relationship (Wiwattanakantang, 
1999; Suto, 2003; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Du and Dai, 2005; Pindado et al., 2006; 
and Kim et al., 2006). In contrast, Michaelas et al. (1999) found a negative 
relationship for long-term debt, but an insignificantly positive relationship for 
total and short-term debt. Delcoure (2007) found a positive relationship for all 
types of debt (i.e. total, short-term and long-term debt ratios). A possible 
explanation for the positive relationship is that non-debt tax shields may be 
viewed as the firm’s assets securability, with more securable assets leading to 
higher use of debt (Bradley et al, 1984). Proxies for non-debt tax shields include: 
the ratios of investment tax credits over total assets, the depreciation-to-total 
assets ratio (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Song and Philippatos, 2004; and 
Deesomsak et al., 2004), and the ratio of the observed federal income tax 
payments, operating income, interest payments and the corporate tax rate during 
the sample period, to total assets (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
4.2.1 Description of Data and Variables 
 
This study uses firm-level data obtained from the CEIC Asia database, available 
on http://www.securities.com. The CEIC Asia database provides financial 
information on listed and non-listed companies across the industry sectors of 
countries in Asia. The financial information comprises: profit and loss accounts, 
balance sheets, cashflow statements, and key financial ratios. The database 
provides data dating back ten years, or more, for a few companies, which provides 
a substantial numbers of observation for the study. The list of companies included 
in the CEIC Asia database is extensive, unfortunately however, it is often found 
that some financial items and values on financial statements are missing. For 
instance, there is no reporting for items, such as: interest expenditures, research 
and development expenses, depreciation and amortisation on every sample 
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company’s profit and loss accounts. Moreover, there is not much detail on what 
has been deducted from the ‘sales’ item, in order to derive the ‘earnings before 
tax’ item. The insufficiency of data, therefore, hinders this empirical study in its 
construction of some variables, such as the non-debt tax shields or the more 
conventional profitability proxies that other empirical studies have used, for 
example, the ratio of EBITDA to total assets and the ratio of EBIT to total assets. 
Despite these drawbacks, the CEIC Asia is one of most accessible databases for 
data on developing countries. Overall, the database has enough information for 
this study to calculate the many variables that are known to be relevant in an 
empirical study of capital structure.  
 
Four Southeast Asian countries, namely: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, are used as case-studies. The motivation for using these countries is the 
lack of empirical studies providing cross-country analysis, especially in the Asian 
emerging economy markets context. Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, these 
countries were dubbed the Southeast Asian tigers.16 They experienced high 
economic growth, owing to their substantially high export-driven trade strategy 
and high foreign direct investments. Financial liberalisation, during the early 
1990s, enabled firms to obtain loans from foreign investors. Their capital markets 
were less developed compared to those in developed countries, and were thus 
considered to be at an early stage of development. Hence, issuing equity and 
shares was not a major financing source for firms in these countries. Recently, 
bond markets have started to develop under the financial reforms carried out after 
the financial crisis. Moreover, most firms preferred borrowing from banks, in 
order to avoid the dilution of ownership. These factors have contributed to the fact 
that bank borrowing has always been a dominant source of financing in these 
countries. 
 
The obtained firm-level data comprise a complete data set of listed companies 
across the industry sectors: agriculture, service, IT, manufacturing, mining, real 
                                                
16
 Some studies consider Vietnam as one of the tigers, but it is excluded from the study, owing to 
its insufficient dataset. 
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estate, trade (wholesale and retail), transportation and warehouse, and 
construction. The sample covers the most recent ten year time period, that is 1997 
to 2006 and the data in 1996 was obtained to calculate the risk variable. The 
standard elimination process was employed, that is to say, companies in the 
financial and regulated utility sectors, and companies with the relevant data 
missing, were excluded. The final sample consists of 353 listed companies of 
which: 96 are from Indonesia, 84 are from Malaysia, 75 are from the Philippines, 
and 98 are from Thailand. This sample forms a balanced panel data set for each 
individual country. The use of panel data, not only improves the sample size of the 
observations, but also provides richer analysis than cross-sectional and time-series 
studies. Panel data also allows for the controlling of individual unobserved 
heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2005).  
 
Consistent with the theoretical models given in the previous chapter, the main 
purpose of this empirical study is to investigate the potential impact market power 
may have on long-term debt. Nonetheless, insights into any differences in the 
market power effect and the impacts of a firm’s characteristics have on short-term 
debt, are also potentially beneficial. There is the possibility that a firm may have 
different policies, regarding the maturity structure of debt. Total debt is also 
included in this study to investigate the effects of firm-specific variables on the 
total debt position of firms in the sample. Long-term debt is defined as the sum of 
borrowing repayable over one year, whereas short-term debt refers to the 
borrowing repayable within one year and total debt is defined as the sum of the 
previous two. All three types of debt are normalised by the book value of total 
assets, in order to construct three types of leverage ratios. The discussion 
regarding using book value, instead of the market value of debt, without any 
misspecification problems, has already been well explained in previous studies 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988, and Rajan and Zingales, 1995).17 As noted by Pandey 
(2004), firms in most developing countries, including the sample countries, often 
                                                
17
 Short-term and long-term leverage ratios measured at market value were previously included in 
this study. The results are very similar to those of book value, therefore, this study uses only the 
book value of leverage. 
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substitute short-term for long-term borrowings, and roll over short-term debts and 
this is certainly applicable to Indonesian firms, as noted by Nagano (2003). 
However, given the information on the CEIC Asia database, it is impossible to 
clarify whether the item ‘short-term borrowings’ is short-term debt or a current 
portion of long-term debt, due in that year. As a result, the short-term leverage 
ratios maybe overstated and this is a caveat to bear in mind.  
 
As suggested by Pandey (2004), price and quantity or segmental data are not 
usually available for developing countries, therefore it is difficult to construct 
proxies, such as: the Lerner index or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Given the 
availability of the data, the study will use the simplified q ratio, given by Chung 
and Pruitt (1994) as the market power proxy. The method was similarly employed 
by Rathinasamy et al. (2000) and Pandey (2004) and thus the results from this 
study can more easily be compared with these other studies.  
 
Thus, q ratio is defined as: 
 
Q = (market value of equity + liquidating value of preferred stock + net current    
 assets + long-term debt) /  book value of total assets.  
 
Other firm-specific variables: profitability, tangibility, size, liquidity, and risk, are 
included as control variables in this study. The choice of these is based on prior 
empirical studies and the availability of data. Interest expenses and depreciation 
items are not reported in the database, so therefore the study cannot construct the 
conventional profitability proxies, such as: the ratio of EBIT and EBITDA to total 
assets. The return on assets ratio is therefore used as the proxy for profitability, 
because it is the only variable which has complete data for every company. The 
ROA ratio is already provided by the database.  
 
It has been observed that a few studies of the determinants of capital structure 
have used Tobin’s q, as the proxy for investment opportunities (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Barclay et al., 1995; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; and Barclay and 
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Smith, 1996). Therefore this control variable, although it appears to be an 
important determinant of capital structure, will not be included in this research. 
This is to avoid the problem of misinterpretation of the proxy.  
 
As noted in Titman and Wessels (1988), selecting a proxy for a variable is always 
the predominant problem in an empirical study and this is certainly applies in this 
case. Moreover, the CEIC database does not provide data for depreciation values, 
which does not permit the study to include a non-debt tax shields variable. The 
control variables are defined by following methods employed in prior empirical 
studies. Table 4.1 summarises the definition of the dependent variables, the 
market power proxy, and other control variables for this work. 
 
Table 4.1: Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Long-term leverage Borrowings payable over one year / total assets 
Short-term leverage Borrowings payable within one year / total assets 
Total leverage Sum of long-term and short-term borrowings / total assets 
q ratio (Market value of equity + liquidating value of preferred stock  
 + net current assets + long-term debt) / total assets 
Profitability Return on assets ratio (ROA) 
Tangibility Fixed assets / total assets 
Size  Natural log of total assets 
Liquidity Current assets / current liabilities 
Risk Absolute annual change of retained earnings   
 
 
Figure 4.3 depicts the annual average total leverage ratios of the sample countries, 
from 1997 until 2006, whereas table 4.2 presents a summary of the descriptive 
statistics.  
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Figure 4.3: Total Leverage Ratios of Sample Countries: 1997-2006 
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The above diagram and the descriptive statistics in table 4.2, reveal that sample 
firms in Indonesia and Thailand were consistently more leveraged, than those in 
Malaysia and the Philippines. The leverage ratios of the two former countries 
were significantly high, particularly in 1997 and this observation reflects the fact 
that Indonesia and Thailand were most severely affected by the 1997 financial 
crisis. The large depreciation of the local currencies and a fall in equity value may 
have contributed to this high level of debt.  
 
As shown in table 4.2, the mean values of long-term debt are slightly higher than 
short-term debt for all the sample countries except Thailand. This is rather 
surprising, given that short-term borrowing is considered a dominant source of 
financing in developing countries. The mean values of the q ratio show that, on 
average, firms do not have any competitive advantage over their rivals. Less than 
25% of sample firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have high market 
power. This suggests that majority of sample firms engage in a competitive 
product market. The negative mean values of profitability, suggest that the sample 
firms in Indonesia and the Philippines experienced losses in their incomes. The 
collateral value of assets (tangibility) is similar across the sample countries, at 
approximately 40% of total assets. The mean values of the current ratio (liquidity) 
indicate sound liquidity of firms in the sample countries and their ability to pay 
debt obligations. The average of risk or the earning volatility of the sample 
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countries ranges from a low of 1.6 among Malaysian firms, to a high of 2.4 among 
Indonesian firms. For Thailand and the Philippines, the average values for this are 
1.8 and 1.7, respectively. These figures are more than their 75th percentile values, 
which suggests that about 25% of firms in each sample country have significantly 
high earnings volatility.  
 
Table 4.3 provides the correlation matrix for the different types of leverage and 
the independent variables. The matrix shows that the q ratio is negatively 
correlated with short-term and total leverage, but is positively correlated with 
long-term leverage. Profitability and liquidity are negatively correlated with all 
types of leverage, which appears to be consistent with Myers’s (1984) pecking 
order theory, that a firm with high retained earnings and profits tends to borrow 
less. Size is positively correlated with all types of leverage, suggesting that a 
larger firm is more able to raise capital, via borrowing, than a smaller firm. 
Earning volatility or risk is positively correlated with all types of leverage. While 
tangibility is positively correlated with total and long-term leverage, it is 
negatively correlated with short-term leverage. The significantly positive 
correlation of the q ratio with profitability and liquidity, suggests that a high 
market power firm tends to have high profits and more ability to meet its 
creditors’ demands. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of the Descriptive Statistics 
 
  LT lev. ST lev. Total lev.  q ratio Profitability Tangibility Size Liquidity Risk 
Indonesia          
  Mean 0.189 0.166 0.355 0.611 -0.012 0.409 26.805 1.545 2.379 
  Std. Dev. 0.241 0.251 0.313 0.942 0.193 0.216 1.81 1.313 4.96 
  Minimum 0 0 0 -5.062 -1.984 0.009 16.811 0.023 0.0002 
  Maximum 2.654 2.178 2.915 6.521 1.139 0.9657 31.567 9.245 49.114 
  25th Percentile 0.005 0 0.127 0.195 -0.055 0.230 25.863 0.662 0.314 
  Median 0.106 0.070 0.305 0.654 0.021 0.399 26.914 1.211 0.852 
  75th Percentile 0.309 0.223 0.503 1.069 0.079 0.582 27.885 2.04 2.19 
  Observations 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 
Malaysia          
  Mean 0.101 0.084 0.185 0.874 0.031 0.436 19.371 2.454 1.574 
  Std. Dev. 0.131 0.109 0.169 1.193 0.080 0.215 1.373 3.375 3.732 
  Minimum 0 0 0 -1.872 -0.711 0.004 14.920 0.023 0.002 
  Maximum 0.746 1.123 0.123 22.980 0.332 0.970 23.021 35.282 41.293 
  25th Percentile 0.001 0.003 0.036 0.411 0.006 0.296 18.338 0.98 0.212 
  Median 0.046 0.044 0.148 0.699 0.034 0.436 19.349 1.614 0.523 
  75th Percentile 0.166 0.122 0.302 1.078 0.072 0.561 20.18 2.68 1.155 
  Observations 840 840 840 840 840 840 840 840 840 
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Table 4.2: Summary of the Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
  LT lev. ST lev. Total lev.  q ratio Profitability Tangibility Size Liquidity Risk 
Philippines          
  Mean 0.100 0.094 0.194 0.608 -0.011 0.360 20.681 1.979 1.682 
  Std. Dev. 0.213 0.135 0.243 0.743 0.194 0.270 2.301 3.036 3.279 
  Minimum 0 0 0 -2.528 -3.310 0 8.357 0.01 0.001 
  Maximum 3.355 0.913 0.355 7.843 0.955 0.962 26.243 27.984 34.208 
  25th Percentile 0 0 0.018 0.213 -0.04 0.093 19.338 0.653 0.273 
  Median 0.025 0.048 0.113 0.506 0.011 0.374 20.962 1.175 0.625 
  75th Percentile 0.143 0.127 0.288 0.914 0.046 0.543 22.273 2.032 1.344 
  Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Thailand          
  Mean 0.129 0.145 0.274 0.802 0.051 0.462 21.505 1.894 1.798 
  Std. Dev. 0.185 0.178 0.244 0.666 0.090 0.221 1.349 1.860 6.076 
  Minimum 0 0 0 -1.679 -0.598 0.018 17.134 0 0 
  Maximum 1.128 1.051 1.136 4.290 0.448 0.957 25.292 16.291 120.596 
  25th Percentile 0 0.005 0.051 0.391 0.008 0.292 20.543 0.811 0.204 
  Median 0.041 0.073 0.228 0.711 0.054 0.443 21.55 1.244 0.547 
  75th Percentile 0.196 0.232 0.45 1.128 0.098 0.629 22.273 2.317 1.422 
  Observations 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 
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Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix (3530 Firms/Years Pooled Observations) 
 
  LT lev. ST lev. Total lev. q ratio Profitability Tangibility Size Liquidity Risk 
LT lev. 1         
ST lev. -0.095 1        
Total lev. 0.708 0.636 1       
q ratio 0.078 -0.389 -0.216 1      
Profitability -0.216 -0.25 -0.345 0.308 1     
Tangibility 0.282 -0.05 0.183 -0.073 -0.059 1    
Size 0.211 0.11 0.242 -0.013 0.009 0.002 1   
Liquidity -0.154 -0.278 -0.316 0.301 0.155 -0.173 -0.16 1  
Risk 0.052 0.107 0.116 -0.111 -0.153 0.024 0.039 -0.075 1 
 
The correlation coefficients are based on pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). 
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4.2.2 Estimation Strategy  
 
4.2.2.1 The Static Model 
 
The aim of this static model study is to examine the impact of market power on 
three types of leverage. Some firm-specific factors are also included as control 
variables. Accordingly, the empirical model is expressed as:  
 
(1) itleverage = ititk X εβ + ,  
 
with i = 1,…, Nth firm of each sample country; t = 1997,…, 2006. itleverage  is 
one of the three leverage ratios (long-term, short-term, total leverage) for the ith 
firm at time t. itX  is a 1 × k vector of independent variables that vary over 
individual and time, β is the k × 1 vector of coefficients on X. itε  = iv  + itu , 
where iv  is a firm-specific time-invariant effect and itu  is the disturbance term.  
 
The three leverage ratios are alternately regressed on the q ratio, profitability, 
tangibility, size, liquidity, and risk for each sample country. The equation (1) can 
be re-written as: 
 
(2) long-term leverageit = α0 + α1 (q ratioit) + α2 (profitabilityit) + α3 (tangibilityit)  
                                          +  α4 (sizeit) + α5 (liquidityit) + α6 (riskit) + itε . 
 
(3) short-term leverageit = δ0 + δ1 (q ratioit) + δ2 (profitabilityit) + δ3 (tangibilityit)   
                                          +  δ4 (sizeit) + δ5 (liquidityit) + δ6 (riskit) + itε . 
 
(4) total leverageit = µ0 + µ1 (q ratioit) + µ2 (profitabilityit) + µ3 (tangibilityit) +  
                                 µ4 (sizeit) + µ5 (liquidityit) + µ6 (riskit) + itε . 
 
Whilst the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is a common technique 
in the capital structure research, some studies have argued that this method may 
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have failed to account for time invariant firm-specific heterogeneity. Failure to 
control for heterogeneity will cause the parameter estimation to be biased and 
inconsistent, which may lead to inappropriate conclusions (Baltagi, 2005). To 
counter these limitations, one-way fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE) 
estimations are employed. Subsequently, the Hausman test is performed with the 
null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, the FE estimator is preferred. The two-way fixed effects estimation is 
also used, to estimate the equations (2), (3), and (4), to control for any firm-
specific heterogeneity as well as any time effect.  
 
The study also examines the possibility of a non-linear relationship between 
capital structure and market power, as suggested by Pandey (2004) and Fairchild 
(2004b). To address this non-linear relationship, q2 and q3 are incorporated into 
the equations (2)-(4). The equations (2)-(4) can be augmented as follows: 
 
(5) long-term leverageit = α0 + α1 (q ratioit) + α2 (q ratioit)2 +  α3 (q ratioit)3 +  
                                         α4 (profitabilityit) + α5 (tangibilityit) + α6 (sizeit) + 
                                          α7 (liquidityit) + α8 (riskit) + itε . 
 
(6) short-term leverageit = δ0 + δ1 (q ratioit) + δ2 (q ratioit)2 + δ3 (q ratioit)3 +   
                                           δ4 (profitabilityit) + δ5 (tangibilityit) + δ6 (sizeit) + 
                                          δ7 (liquidityit) + δ8 (riskit) + itε . 
 
(7) total leverageit = µ0 + µ1 (q ratioit) + µ2 (q ratioit)2 + µ3 (q ratioit)3 +   
                                 µ4 (profitabilityit) + µ5 (tangibilityit) + µ6 (sizeit) + 
                                 µ7 (liquidityit) + µ8 (riskit) + itε . 
 
Many studies have asserted the importance of industry effects. Myers (1977) 
suggested that debt ratios vary from industry to industry, but firms within the 
same industry could be expected to have similar debt ratios. He suggested that the 
agency conflict between shareholders and debt holders is more severe in a firm 
whose value depends on investment opportunities, rather than tangible assets. 
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However, previous evidence has suggested that short-term debt can mitigate the 
agency cost problem. This intuitively suggests that a firm in the manufacturing 
and trade sector would be expected to have more long-term debt, but less short-
term debt, than a firm in IT or the service sector. To account for this, equations 
(2), (3), and (4) are augmented to include nine industry dummies. Each represents 
an industry sector, these are: agriculture, IT, manufacturing, mining, trade, 
transportation, real estates, and service. They are re-written as follows: 
 
(8) long-term leverageit =  α0 (q ratioit) + α1 (profitabilityit) + α2 (tangibilityit)   
                                         + α3 (sizeit) + α4 (liquidityit) + α5 (riskit) + α6 (dagri) +  
                                          α7 (dIT) + α8 (dmanu) + α9 (dmining) + α10 (dtrade) +  
                                          α11 (dtransport) + α12 (drealestate) + α13 (dservice)  
                                          + itε . 
 
(9) short-term leverageit = δ0 (q ratioit) + δ1 (profitabilityit) + δ2 (tangibilityit)  
                                          + δ3 (sizeit) + δ4 (liquidityit) + δ5 (riskit) + δ6 (dagri) +  
                                          δ7 (dIT) + δ8 (dmanu) + δ9 (dmining) + δ10 (dtrade) +  
                                          δ11 (dtransport) + δ12 (drealestate) + δ13 (dservice)         
                                          +
 itε . 
 
(10) total leverageit = µ0 (q ratioit) + µ1 (profitabilityit) + µ2 (tangibilityit) +  
                                   µ3 (sizeit) + µ4 (liquidityit) + µ5 (riskit) + µ6 (dagri) +  
                                   µ7 (dIT) + µ8 (dmanu) + µ9 (dmining) + µ10 (dtrade) +  
                                   µ11 (dtransport) + µ12 (drealestate) + µ13 (dservice)+ itε . 
 
The LSDV (the least square dummy variable) is employed to estimate the 
equations (8), (9), and (10). The ‘without constant’ option of the LSDV available 
in STATA is used to estimate the equations.  
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4.2.2.2 The Dynamic Panel Model 
 
In the static model, it is assumed that the actual capital structure is instantaneously 
adjusted towards the target level. In this sub-section, the dynamic panel model is 
introduced to shed light on whether firms have a target capital structure and, if so, 
is there any heterogeneity of the adjustment speed of leverage types across the 
sample countries. A positive and below unity coefficient would suggest that a firm 
has a target debt level and revises its capital structure over time. In order to 
examine the above, a one-period lagged dependent variable is added to the 
estimation equation.  
 
This follows de Miguel and Pindado (2001) argument that the target leverage ratio 
of a firm is a function of market power and firm-specific factors, expressed as: 
 
(11) *itleverage = ititk X εβ +   
 
Equation (11) addresses the fact that a firm adjusts its level of optimal leverage, 
*
itleverage , rather than its observed debt, according to the levels of various capital 
structure determinants. Because of the existence of the adjustment costs, the firm 
does not fully adjust its debt level to the target level within that time period. 
Instead, the firm partially adjusts its debt level, as represented by the following 
equation: 
 
(12) itleverage  - 1−itleverage  = α ( *itleverage  - 1−itleverage ), 
  
where  itleverage  and 1−itleverage  are the actual debt levels in the current period 
and previous period, respectively. *itleverage  is the firm’s target debt level. The 
coefficient, α, represents the speed of adjustment of itleverage  towards its target 
level, *itleverage . The speed of adjustment is restricted by the boundary 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 
(de Miguel and Pindado, 2001; Song and Philippatos, 2003).  
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If α = 1, itleverage  = 
*
itleverage  and the firm adjusts its debt level to the target 
level within one period. If α = 0 then itleverage  = 1−itleverage , which implies that 
the actual debt level is not adjusted to the target level and debt remains at the level 
of the previous period. Alternatively, α can be interpreted as a measure of the 
adjustment cost. When the cost is zero (i.e.) α = 1, the firm can fully adjust its debt 
level, owing to the absence of the adjustment cost. On the contrary, the firm is not 
able to adjust its debt towards the target level when the adjustment cost is high, α 
= 0. For cases where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the firm adjusts its debt level in a way that is 
inversely proportional to the adjustment cost.  
 
Re-arranging equation (12) to find the actual debt level, 
 
(13) itleverage  = α *itleverage  + (1- α) 1−itleverage . 
 
Substituting *itleverage  from equation (11) into equation (13), 
 
(14) itleverage  = (1- α) 1−itleverage  + α ( itk Xβ ) + iv  + itu . 
 
In the static model, the study assumes that there is no endogeneity problem. 
However, as noted in many previous studies, such an assumption is somewhat 
naïve. The independent variables used could be determined simultaneously with 
the leverage ratio. To alleviate this problem, a two-step generalised method of 
moments (GMM) technique is followed. The lagged dependent variable and other 
independent variables are transformed, by using the first differences as proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991). As a result, these variables are used as instruments, 
which also allow for the consideration of possible measurement errors in the 
variables. The Sargan test is performed to test the validity of the instrument 
variables. The Sargan statistic is distributed as a χ2 (p-k), where p is the instrument 
rank and k is the number of estimated coefficients. P-values must be greater than 
0.05, in order to conclude that the instruments are valid. That is, one cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions. As noted in previous 
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empirical studies, the ordinary least squares estimation (OLS) would yield biased 
coefficients, because of the correlation of 1−itleverage  with iv . The first 
differences transformation described above also eliminates any time-invariant 
firm-specific effect, iv .  
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
 
4.3.1 The Static Model 
 
In general, the Hausman test has shown that the FE estimator is preferred to the 
RE estimator, as shown by the rejection of the null hypothesis. The results of the 
one-way fixed effect, the random effect, and the two-way fixed effects estimators 
yield similar results. Therefore, this researcher has decided to report and analyse 
only the results of the two-way fixed effects model.18 Table 4.4 reports the results 
of the linear regressions, i.e. equations (2)-(4), whereas table 4.5 presents the 
results of the non-linear equations (5)-(8). Column a, b, and c for each sample 
country provides the results for long-term, short-term, and total leverage, 
respectively. The results in table 4.6 are the estimations of the LSDV models for 
the industry effect. Panel A, B, and C, respectively, report the results for long-
term, short-term, and total leverage. The linear effects of market power will be 
discussed first. The non-linear effects of market power, the impacts of other firm-
specific factors, and the industry effect will then be sequentially analysed. 
 
4.3.1.1 The Linear and the Non-linear Effects of Market Power 
 
The positive coefficients of q ratio in table 4.4 reveal a positive relationship 
between market power and long-term debt. The adjusted t-statistics, suggest 
further, that the effect of market power is statistically significant in all the sample 
countries, with the exception of Malaysia. The results appear to suggest the 
presence of the predation effect on long-term leverage, which is particularly 
dominant at low levels of market power, or inversely interpreted, at high levels of 
                                                
18
 The results of the one-way FE and RE estimators are in the appendix. 
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competitive interaction. The diagrams in figure 4.4 illustrate the positive effect of 
market power (or the negative effect of competitive interaction) on long-term 
debt. 
 
Figure 4.4: The Effect of Market Power on Long-term Debt. 
 
 
 
When product competition is highly intensified, as reflected in low levels of 
market power, a firm avoids any possible predation threat from its rivals, by not 
using high amounts of long-term leverage. This result appears to be consistent 
with the spatial model developed in the previous chapter. Recall that in the spatial 
model, long-term debt is decreasing with potential product market competition. 
The predation effect dominates the use of long-term debt.  
 
Although the positive relationship between long-term debt and q ratio is consistent 
with Rathinasamy et al. (2000), the interpretation is different. Rathinasamy et al. 
(2000) argued that the positive effect of q ratio on long-term debt is due to the 
limited liability effect and a high market power firm uses more long-term debt to 
increase output. In this empirical study, market power is interpreted as the inverse 
measure of competitive interaction. The predation effect dominates the use of 
long-term debt, such that as market power decreases (or as competitive interaction 
increases), a firm reduces its long-term debt, in order to avoid any predation 
action from less-leveraged rivals.   
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The results in table 4.4 show that the negative coefficients of q ratio, in the short-
term leverage equation, are statistically significant for every sample country. This 
implies the presence of the limited liability effect. As illustrated in figure 4.5 
below, the negative effect of market power on short-term debt, can be interpreted 
as indicating that a firm strategically increases the use of short-term debt, as 
competitive interaction intensifies. This is consistent with prior studies of capital 
structure and product market competition, that posited that short-term debt 
commits a firm to adopt a product market strategy that increases shareholders’ 
payoffs, when the firm engages in product market competition with its rivals (for 
example, Brander and Lewis, 1986; Showalter, 1995). 
 
Figure 4.5: The Effect of Market Power on Short-term Debt. 
 
 
 
The t-statistics of total leverage are not found to be significant, except for that of 
Indonesia. This might suggest that whilst market power has an impact on the 
maturity of debt, it does not seem to influence a firm’s position of total debt.  
 
From the two-way fixed effects results of non-linear regressions in table 4.5, the 
coefficients of q ratio in the ‘a’ columns also show a positive correlation between 
market power and long-term debt. The predation effect dominates the use of long-
term debt. On the other hand, column ‘b’, for each of the sample countries, shows 
that short-term debt is decreasing with market power (or increasing with 
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competitive interaction), as shown by significantly the negative effects of q ratio 
on short-term leverage. The limited liability effect dominates the use of short-term 
debt. The results are consistent with those found for the linear models given in 
table 4.4. Table 4.5 reveals some non-linear effects of market power on leverage 
in all the sample countries, with the exception of the Philippines. In Indonesia, the 
non-linear effect is only present for long-term and short-term leverage. The 
positive coefficient of q ratio and the negative coefficient of q3 in column ‘a’, 
reveal an inverted U-shape relationship. This finding is consistent with Fairchild’s 
(2004b) inverted U-shape effect of product differentiation on long-term debt. As 
the product competition increases (market power declines), a firm increases its 
long-term debt to soften competition. However, as the product competition 
reaches a certain level of intensity (the market power of the firm diminishes 
substantially), the predation effect begins to dominate the limited liability of debt. 
Conversely, the result suggests a U-shape relationship between market power and 
short-term debt. The limited liability effect dominates the predation effect at low 
levels of market power (or high levels of competition intensity). A firm employs 
high short-term debt at low levels of market power, to soften competition.  
 
A cubic relationship between market power and long-term and short-term debt is 
found in Malaysia and Thailand. The positive coefficients of q and q3 and the 
negative coefficient of q2 for the long-term leverage equations, suggest that the 
predation effect dominates the limited liability at low and high market power 
levels, but the reverse is found for intermediate level of market power. The results 
for short-term leverage are consistent with the findings of Pandey (2004), which 
suggested that the limited liability effect dominates at low and high levels of 
market power, whereas the predation effect, on the other hand, is dominant for the 
intermediate level of market power.  
 
The study then uses the coefficients of q, q2, q3 from table 4.5 and the descriptive 
statistics of q ratio provided in table 4.2, to plot the relationship between market 
power and three types of leverage for every sample country. The following 
diagrams (figures 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9) do not appear to suggest that there is a 
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non-linear effect of market power (q ratio) on any type of leverage, as given by 
the regression results in table 4.5.  
 
Figures 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 show that over the ‘relevant’ ranges of the q ratio, the 
effect of market power on leverage in the sample countries is dominantly linear. 
The positive relationship between long-term leverage and q ratio is consistent with 
the domination of the predation effect, whereas the limited liability effect appears 
to be dominant for the use of short-term debt. Moreover, whilst market power has 
a positive effect on total leverage in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, it does not 
seem to have any effect on the total debt position in the Philippines. One might 
consider the presence of the non-linearity effect on total leverage in Thailand, 
which is exhibited in figure 4.9. However, the non-linearity occurs over 
significantly low levels of market power. The effect appears to be trivial, and one 
can conclude that the overall effect on total leverage in Thailand is linear and 
increasing with market power.  
 
These diagrams also suggest some substitutability between short-term and long-
term leverage. As the level of market power increases, a firm decreases its level of 
short-term debt, but on the other hand, includes more long-term debt in its capital 
structure. This result would appear to be consistent with the situation found in the 
sample countries, in that short-term borrowing is always considered a dominant 
source of financing. Long-term borrowing appears to be exclusively available to a 
firm with a high degree of dominance in the market position or with high market 
power. Such a firm is able to obtain long-term funding, because of its privileged 
connections with banks and other financial institutions. It can be observed that, 
occasionally, domestic banks are actually affiliated to these high market power 
firms, and this is certainly the case in Indonesia and Thailand (Nagano, 2003).  
 
A firm with low market power should not commit itself to long-term borrowing, 
as such a commitment can create some financial inflexibility, which may prevent 
it from being a competitive player in the product market. For example, several 
repayments of long-term debt might exhaust the firm’s retained earnings, which in 
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turn reduce its financial resources available for improving its market position, 
such as, R&D or advertising spending. The result supports the argument proposed 
by Myers (1977) that young firms with many potential growth opportunities, but 
low market power, should avoid using long-term debt in their capital structure. 
The finding is also consistent with Fairchild’s (2004b) Bertrand competition 
model that states that firms with low market power generally have low long-term 
debt to avoid the predation threat from their less leveraged rivals. However, the 
presence of high intensity competition (low levels of market power) can be 
softened by the strategic use of short-term debt. As the level of market power 
increases, the predation effect becomes less dominating, and the firm is more able 
to substitute long-term debt for short-term debt in its capital structure. An 
explanation for the increasing use of long-term debt, as market power increases, is 
that a firm selects long-term debt to avoid the dilution of ownership (Deesomsak 
et al., 2004). This is applicable to the study’s sample countries, in which firms 
with high market power generally have a concentrated ownership structure. 
Moreover, long-term debt can be used as a substitute for competition, in order to 
effectively discipline managers (Nickell et al, 1997). 
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Figure 4.6: The Non-Linear Effects of Market Power (Indonesia) 
 
 
a) Long-term Leverage 
 
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
-1.2 -1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
q ratio
LT
 
lev
er
a
ge
 
ra
tio
 
 
 
b) Short-term Leverage 
 
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
-1.2 -1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
q ratio
ST
 
le
v
er
a
ge
 
ra
tio
 
 
c) Total Leverage 
 
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
-1.2 -1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
q ratio
To
ta
l l
ev
er
a
ge
 
ra
tio
 
 
 144 
Figure 4.7: The Non-Linear Effects of Market Power (Malaysia) 
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Figure 4.8: The Non-Linear Effects of Market Power (The Philippines) 
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Figure 4.9: The Non-Linear Effects of Market Power (Thailand) 
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Table 4.4: Two-Way Fixed Effects Results (Linear Relationship) 
 
  Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
  a B C a B c a b c A b c 
  LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. 
Constant 0.347 0.752*** 1.10*** -0.921*** 0.044 -0.877*** -0.118 0.340*** 0.222 0.344 -0.370 -0.026 
  (1.13) (3.88) (3.50) (-4.38) (0.40) (-3.97) (-0.86) (3.28) (1.36) (1.18) (-1.31) (-0.07) 
q ratio 0.117*** -0.069*** 0.048** 0.007 -0.012** -0.005 0.084*** -0.052*** 0.032 0.073*** -0.091*** -0.018 
  (4.62) (-4.75) (1.99) (1.24) (-2.14) (-0.93) (3.24) (-4.66) (1.31) (4.20) (-6.46) (-1.27) 
Profitability -0.146** -0.178*** -0.324*** 0.009 -0.168** -0.159 -0.378*** 0.001 -0.378*** -0.302*** -0.271*** -0.573*** 
  (-2.44) (-.2.55) (-3.71) (0.10) (-2.13) (-1.12) (-2.64) (0.01) (-2.32) (-3.55) (-3.05) (-7.25) 
Tangibility 0.268*** -0.141** 0.127 0.138*** -0.060** 0.078 -0.040 0.002 -0.038 0.142** -0.030 0.112** 
  (3.79) (-2.05) (1.59) (3.14) (-2.09) (1.64) (-0.50) (0.07) (-0.42) (2.55) (-0.59) (2.18) 
Size -0.013 -0.014** -0.027** 0.051*** 0.004 0.055*** 0.008 -0.008 0.0003 -0.012 0.033** 0.020 
  (-1.13) (-2.18) (-2.30) (4.75) (0.78) (4.92) (1.27) (-1.58) (0.05) (-0.91) (2.43) (1.23) 
Liquidity 0.013 -0.049*** -0.035*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003* -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004 -0.012*** -0.016*** 
  (1.27) (-5.29) (-2.82) (-0.06) (-3.85) (-2.16) (-1.72) (-4.05) (-3.82) (-0.77) (-3.48) (-3.76) 
Risk -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.91) (-0.79) (-1.13) (0.04) (-0.54) (-0.27) (-1.57) (-0.65) (-1.77) (0.12) (0.65) (0.66) 
R2 0.2452 0.3085 0.1498 0.1013 0.0555 0.0910 0.3241 0.1545 0.2312 0.1391 0.3761 0.3629 
F test 9.08 11.95 7.05 2.89 2.93 3.39 1.18 6.15 2.38 7.23 11.51 19.29 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No.of Obs. 960 960 960 840 840 840 750 750 750 980 980 980 
 
The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. * denotes significant at the 10% level. ** denotes significant at the 5% level. 
 *** denotes significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 4.5: Two-Way Fixed Effects Results (Non-Linear Relationship) 
 
  Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
  A B c a B c a b c a b C 
  LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. 
Constant 0.595** 0.601*** 1.195*** -0.877*** 0.014 -0.863*** -0.167 0.361*** 0.194 0.165 -0.113 0.052 
  (2.22) (3.51) (4.63) (-4.45) (0.13) (-3.99) (-1.25) (3.66) (1.16) (0.63) (-0.50) (0.15) 
q ratio 0.192*** -0.121*** 0.071*** 0.114*** -0.082** 0.032 0.110*** -0.079*** 0.030 0.280*** -0.315*** -0.035 
  (9.04) (-6.00) (2.60) (6.50) (-2.48) (0.98) (5.26) (-4.35) (1.31) (9.65) (-13.92) (-1.09) 
q2 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.019*** 0.011** -0.008 0.002 0.008 0.011 -0.114*** 0.150*** 0.035** 
  (-1.37) (-0.36) (-1.22) (-4.53) (2.13) (-1.54) (0.23) (0.94) (0.80) (-5.81) (9.11) (1.98) 
q3 -0.005*** 0.004*** -0.001 0.001*** -0.0003** 0.0002* -0.002 0.0001 -0.002 0.011*** -0.02*** -0.009** 
  (-5.71) (3.38) (-0.78) (3.96) (-2.02) (1.67) (-1.14) (0.07) (-1.06) (2.80) (-6.13) (-2.53) 
Profitability -0.186*** -0.165*** -0.351*** -0.254*** 0.004 -0.249 -0.374*** 0.002 -0.372** -0.493*** -0.059 -0.552*** 
  (-3.23) (-2.69) (-4.05) (-2.60) (0.04) (-1.57) (-2.71) (0.07) (-2.34) (-6.65) (-1.32) (-6.69) 
Tangibility 0.196*** -0.099 0.097 0.148*** -0.065** 0.083* -0.022 -0.021 -0.043 0.158*** -0.052 0.107** 
  (3.19) (-1.56) (1.25) (3.56) (-2.19) (1.78) (-0.25) (-0.66) (-0.44) (3.56) (-1.51) (2.09) 
Size -0.022** -0.009 -0.030*** 0.045*** 0.008 0.053*** 0.010 -0.008* 0.002 -0.006 0.023** 0.017 
  (-2.10) (-1.38) (-2.73) (4.54) (1.37) (4.84) (1.48) (-1.71) (0.19) (-0.51) (2.11) (1.01) 
Liquidity -0.005 -0.035*** -0.039*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.003** -0.004** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.008* -0.010*** -0.018*** 
  (-0.51) (-3.83) (-3.12) (-0.95) (-2.39) (-2.16) (-2.20) (-3.78) (-3.73) (-1.90) (-3.46) (-4.17) 
Risk -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002* 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 
  (-1.10) (-0.78) (-1.25) (-0.24) (-0.33) (-0.33) (-1.57) (-0.65) (-1.76) (0.06) (0.92) (0.71) 
R2 0.3184 0.3461 0.1579 0.2372 0.1365 0.1080 0.3438 0.1785 0.2357 0.3449 0.604 0.3689 
F test 13.51 12.14 7.34 5.10 2.77 3.93 2.11 6.86 11.94 12.73 22.66 17.70 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No.of Obs. 960 960 960 840 840 840 750 750 750 980 980 980 
 
The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. * denotes significant at the 10% level. ** denotes significant at the 5% level  
*** denotes significant at the 1% level 
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4.3.1.2 The Effects of Firm-Specific Factors  
 
Profitability 
In table 4.4, the results of the two-way fixed effects estimation suggest a negative 
relationship between profitability and long-term debt. The t-values are statistically 
significant in every sample country, with the exception of Malaysia. The negative 
relationship between profitability and long-term debt was also found in: de Jong et 
al. (2006), Booth et al. (2001), Pandey (2001), and Prasad et al. (2001). By 
contrast, Fan et al. (2003) observed a positive relationship between long-term debt 
and profitability. Table 4.4 also reports a negative relationship between short-term 
debt and profitability and the effect is significant except for the Philippines. A 
significantly negative effect of profitability on total debt is observed in Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand. Although the result shows a negative effect, it is not 
statistically significant for Malaysian firms. This contrasts with previous studies, 
which have found a statistically significant and negative impact of profitability on 
total debt in Malaysia (Fan et al., 2003; Suto, 2003; Deesomsak et al., 2004; 
Booth et al. (2001); Pandey, 2001 and 2004). Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Booth 
et al. (2001) also observed a negative relationship between profitability and total 
debt, amongst Thai listed firms. Deesomsak et al. (2004) found a negative 
relationship, but not statistically significant one. The results suggest that the 
sample developing countries’ firms prefer using internal sources of funding to 
raising external borrowing. This supports Myers’s (1984) pecking order theory, 
but not the tax-shield theory of Modigliani and Miller (1963).  
 
Tangibility 
A positive and statistically significant effect of tangibility on long-term leverage is 
found in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The finding is consistent with Suto 
(2003), Fan et al. (2003), Pandey (2004), and de Jong et al. (2006), but is 
inconsistent with Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Deesomsak et al. (2004), who 
contrariwise, found the relationship to be insignificant in Thailand. The positive 
relationship between long-term debt and tangibility is consistent with the 
argument that tangible assets are the most widely accepted collateral for raising 
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borrowing. Debt holders are more willing to give long-term loans to firms with 
more fixed assets. The results show a negative relationship between tangibility 
and short-term debt. The t-statistics values reveal that the relationship is 
statistically significant only in Indonesia and Malaysia. It is perhaps more 
plausible to explain the negative relationship between short-term debt and 
tangibility by using the maturity matching argument. Firms with less collateralised 
assets will rely more on short-term debt. In terms of total debt position, the results 
reveal a statistically significant effect only in Thailand. The collateral value of 
assets does not appear to be an important factor for a firm in the Philippines, for 
obtaining external borrowing. All in all, the findings appear to be consistent with 
the previous studies of capital structure, including those in developed countries 
that have stated that a firm with more collateralised assets (fixed assets) tends to 
use more long-term borrowing, in order to reduce the agency conflict between 
shareholders and debt holders.  
 
Size 
Some variations in the effects of size on leverage are present in the results. A 
significant and negative impact is found on short-term and total leverage, among 
Indonesian firms. This supports the agency argument that severe conflict between 
shareholders and debt holders in small firms can be mitigated by shortening the 
maturity of debt. The results also reveal a significant and positive effect on short-
term debt is found in Thailand. This implies that larger firms in Thailand tend to 
use more short-term borrowing. This appears to contradict the agency argument. 
The significant and positive effect of size on long-term and total debt in Malaysia 
is observed. This finding is consistent with Rajan and Zingales’s (1995) 
proposition that size can be used as an inverse proxy for bankruptcy. Larger firms 
are less prone to bankruptcy and incur lower cost of debt. Therefore, they have 
more capacity to borrow long-term debt than smaller firms. The results do not 
show any significant effect of size on any types of leverage in the Philippines.  
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Liquidity 
The results reveal a significant and negative effect of liquidity on short-term and 
total leverage, which was similarly found in Deesomsak et al. (2004). A firm with 
more liquid assets tends to borrow less to avoid the agency costs of debt. These 
findings support the argument of Myers (1984) that a firm tends to use its liquid 
assets to finance an investment, in preference to raising external financing. The 
effect of liquidity on long-term debt is insignificant across the sample countries, 
with the exception of the Philippines. However, its t-statistic is only significant at 
the 10% level, suggesting that liquidity may not be an important determinant of 
the long-term borrowing decision among the sample firms. 
 
Risk 
The statistically insignificant t-values of all types of leverage, suggest that earning 
volatility or risk is not considered to be an important factor affecting the financial 
decision in the sample countries. An exception is the negative effect on total debt 
in the Philippines. However, the t-value is statistically significant only at the 10% 
level, with a rather insignificant coefficient of -0.002 and one can conclude that 
the effect is trivial. The results are consistent with evidence of most previous 
studies in Asian developing countries, which have shown an insignificant effect of 
earning volatility on leverage (de Jong et al., 2006; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004; and Fan et al., 2003). An explanation for the insignificant 
relationship between risk and leverage is that firms may have close connections 
with their lenders, which causes them to be less concerned with earning volatility. 
This is certainty applicable for those dominant Indonesian and Thai firms who 
have established their own banks. 
 
4.3.1.3 The Industry Effect  
 
Table 4.6 presents the industry effect of equations (8), (9), and (10) using the 
LSDV estimation. Additional industry dummy variables were included to examine 
any possible industry impact on leverage. The results generally reveal similar 
relationships of leverage, with firm-specific factors, as in the two-way fixed 
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effects model (table 4.4 and 4.5). Therefore, this sub-section will analyse only the 
industry effects.  
 
The results in table 4.6 suggest that there are some industry effects among the 
sample countries. The magnitude of the industry effect on long-term and short-
term debt varies across the industry sectors and the sample countries. In general, 
the industry effect has a negative impact on long-term debt, but a positive effect 
on short-term debt. This suggests that when taking the industry effect into 
account, the sample firms generally use more short-term debt than long-term debt. 
This is consistent with the fact that long-term debt is not considered to be a 
dominant source of finance in developing countries. 
 
In terms of variations across industry sectors, panel A of table 4.6 reveals that all 
of the industry dummy coefficients are negative and statistically significant, with 
the exception of those in Indonesia and the service and the transportation sectors 
in Malaysia. Comparison of the coefficients of IT with manufacturing and trade in 
Malaysia suggests that the negative impact is more severe in the IT industry. A 
firm in the IT generally has less long-term debt than a firm in the manufacturing 
and trade industries. This appears to support Myers’s (1977) argument. However, 
the results from the Philippines and Thailand appear to suggest otherwise. The 
coefficient of the real estate dummy of Thailand shows that a firm in this industry 
sector has comparatively less long-term debt, than a firm in other industry sectors. 
This might reflect the fact that the real estate sector was adversely affected by the 
financial crisis. Hence, firms in the sector generally adopt a more ‘conservative’ 
financial approach. Although the results in panel B show statistically significant 
effects for all industry sectors on short-term debt, they do not present evidence 
supporting the agency conflict argument, namely, that a firm whose value depends 
on intangible assets, such as the IT industry, will have more short-term debt than a 
firm with high tangible assets. In fact, a firm in the IT sector in Malaysia borrows 
more short-term debt than firms in the other industries. Whilst a firm in the real 
estate sector in Indonesia borrows more short-term debt than a firm in any other 
industry, the results suggest the opposite for a real estate firm in Malaysia and the 
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Philippines. The results reveal that a firm in the Thai agriculture industry relies 
more on short-term than long-term borrowing. In terms of total debt position, the 
results in panel C reveal that there is no industry effect on the financial decision of 
firms in Malaysia and in Thailand, with the exception of the mining industry. 
Whilst the results report significant and positive effects for all industry sectors on 
total debt in Indonesia, the effects are negatively significant in the Philippines.  
 
The industry effect appears to be another important factor which determines the 
capital structure decision of firms in: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand. It appears to have different impacts on the maturity of debt. The 
variations of the effect differ from industry to industry, and from country to 
country. This suggests that whilst the industry effect is another factor affecting a 
firm’s financial decision, the country effect plays a more important role in 
determining capital structure.  
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Table 4.6: Industry Effects Using LSDV 
 
Panel A Long-term Leverage 
 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
q ratio 0.114*** -0.003 0.067*** 0.057*** 
  (4.58) (-0.79) (2.79) (4.77) 
Profitability -0.345*** -0.260*** -0.471** -0.441*** 
  (-4.02) (-2.95) (-2.37) (-5.89) 
Tangibility 0.258*** 0.109*** 0.092*** 0.282*** 
  (7.50) (3.68) (3.64) (7.47) 
Size 0.002 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
  (0.45) (3.39) (6.53) (5.69) 
Liquidity -0.017 -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.013*** 
  (-1.59) (-4.35) (-3.30) (-4.09) 
Risk 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.59) (0.11) (-0.04) (0.54) 
dAgri. 0.078 -0.195** -0.187 -0.613*** 
  (0.53) (-2.45) (-1.61) (-5.99) 
dService 0.188 -0.111 -0.539*** -0.534*** 
  (1.40) (-1.29) (-6.42) (-5.39) 
dIT -0.016 -0.191** -0.402*** -0.510*** 
  (-0.11) (-2.44) (-5.47) (-5.06) 
dManufacturing -0.044 -0.168** -0.533*** -0.542*** 
  (-0.30) (-2.25) (-5.97) (-5.47) 
dMining -0.033 
 -0.496*** -0.512*** 
  (-0.23)  (-5.95) (-6.16) 
dRealestate -0.055 -0.140* -0.487*** -0.251** 
  (-0.38) (-1.96) (-5.97) (-2.23) 
dTrade -0.090 -0.181** -0.558*** -0.594*** 
  (-0.62) (-2.37) (-7.21) (-6.06) 
dTransporation 0.057 -0.048 -0.480*** -0.420*** 
  (0.40) (-0.66) (-5.86) (-3.90) 
dConstruction -0.025 -0.182*** -0.527***  
  (-0.19) (-2.60) (-6.23)  
R2 0.2531 0.2136 0.4021 0.3125 
F test 72.19 49.27 34.92 57.20 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 960 840 750 980 
 
The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  
* denotes significant at the 10% level.  
** denotes significant at the 5% level. 
 *** denotes significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4.6: Industry Effects Using LSDV (continued) 
 
Panel B Short-term Leverage 
 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
q ratio -0.078*** -0.020*** -0.051*** -0.112*** 
  (-5.39) (-3.82) (-5.58) (-9.13) 
Profitability -0.170** -0.283*** -0.005 -0.116 
  (-2.13) (-4.30) (-0.21) (-1.28) 
Tangibility -0.190*** -0.028* -0.027 -0.259*** 
  (-5.74) (-1.69) (-1.47) (-9.55) 
Size -0.012*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
  (-3.35) (-0.25) (-1.39) (-0.88) 
Liquidity -0.049*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.031*** 
  (-8.49) (-5.76) (-4.79) (-9.22) 
Risk -0.0001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
  (-0.08) (-0.04) (-0.41) (1.36) 
dAgri. 0.742*** 0.130** 0.270*** 0.656*** 
  (6.54) (2.28) (3.14) (7.54) 
dService 0.588*** 0.090 0.278*** 0.438*** 
  (5.63) (1.63) (3.40) (5.16) 
dIT 0.679*** 0.288*** 0.204*** 0.441*** 
  (5.77) (4.73) (2.94) (5.11) 
dManufacturing 0.720*** 0.157*** 0.280*** 0.517*** 
  (6.64) (2.90) (3.67) (5.93) 
dMining 0.627***  0.196*** 0.303*** 
  (5.96)  (3.11) (3.79) 
dRealestate 0.830*** 0.119** 0.188*** 0.436*** 
  (6.35) (2.28) (2.87) (4.79) 
dTrade 0.623*** 0.186*** 0.345*** 0.463*** 
  (5.23) (3.34) (4.53) (5.24) 
dTransporation 0.512*** 0.160*** 0.183*** 0.456*** 
  (4.66) (2.96) (2.60) (5.23) 
dConstruction 0.503*** 0.130** 0.330***  
  (4.76) (2.36) (4.62)  
Adj. R2 0.3663 0.2079 0.2377 0.4752 
F test 55.77 57.83 41.96 97.29 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 960 840 750 980 
 
The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  
* denotes significant at the 10% level.  
** denotes significant at the 5% level. 
 *** denotes significant at the 1% level 
 156 
Table 4.6: Industry Effects Using LSDV (continued) 
 
Panel C Total Leverage 
 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
q ratio 0.037 -0.023*** 0.016 -0.055*** 
  (1.37) (-5.19) (0.69) (-3.70) 
Profitability -0.515*** -0.542*** -0.476** -0.667*** 
  (-3.95) (-4.25) (-2.25) (-6.32) 
Tangibility 0.067 0.081*** 0.065** 0.023 
  (1.56) (2.69) (2.01) (0.54) 
Size -0.010 0.011*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
  (-1.58) (2.72) (4.12) (3.87) 
Liquidity -0.066*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.043*** 
  (-5.57) (-5.46) (-5.00) (-8.44) 
Risk 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
  (0.46) (0.05) (-0.25) (1.36) 
dAgri. 0.819*** -0.065 0.082 0.043 
  (4.44) (-0.71) (0.62) (0.33) 
dService 0.776*** -0.021 -0.261** -0.096 
  (4.53) (-0.22) (-2.15) (-0.79) 
dIT 0.663*** 0.097 -0.198* -0.068 
  (3.50) (1.14) (-1.83) (-0.54) 
dManufacturing 0.676*** -0.011 -0.252** -0.024 
  (3.68) (-0.13) (-2.01) (-0.20) 
dMining 0.595***  -0.299*** -0.208** 
  (3.38)  (-2.72) (-1.99) 
dRealestate 0.774*** -0.021 -0.299*** 0.185 
  (4.16) (-0.25) (-2.71) (1.31) 
dTrade 0.534*** 0.005 -0.213* -0.131 
  (2.84) (0.05) (-1.81) (-1.04) 
dTransporation 0.570*** 0.112 -0.297*** 0.036 
  (3.14) (1.36) (-2.62) (0.26) 
dConstruction 0.478*** -0.052 -0.197*  
  (2.72) (-0.62) (-1.71)  
R2 0.2455 0.3091 0.3061 0.377 
F test 150.52 147.64 113.36 163.62 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No.of Observations. 960 840 750 980 
 
The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  
* denotes significant at the 10% level.  
** denotes significant at the 5% level. 
 *** denotes significant at the 1% level 
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4.3.2 The Dynamic Panel Model 
 
The results in table 4.7 show a significant and positive effect of the one-period 
lagged dependent variables, for all the sample countries. The statistically 
significant and positive coefficients are consistent with the previous findings of de 
Miguel and Pindado (2001) and Antoniou et al. (2008). The coefficients are 
between 0 and 1, implying that the leverage ratios converge to their target over 
time. The results certainly show the existence of dynamism in the capital structure 
decision, and that the sample firms do adjust their leverage ratios towards the 
target levels. The speed of adjustment is found by 1 – coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable. For instance, the speed of adjustment of long-term leverage 
for Indonesian firms is 1 – 0.399 = 0.601. Alternatively, the coefficient can be 
interpreted as the cost of adjustment.  
 
The speed of adjustment tends to vary across types of leverage, and from one 
sample country to another. For long-term leverage, the speeds of adjustment for 
sample firms in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are approximately 0.31-
0.38. Indonesian firms have the fastest adjustment speed, 0.6, which is almost 
double that of firms in the other sample countries. The speeds of adjustment for 
short-term leverage across sample countries are not very different. They range 
from the lowest of 0.57 in Malaysia to the highest of 0.64 in the Philippines. This 
suggests that the adjustment costs for short-term leverage are lower than those for 
long-term leverage. The sample firms adjust their short-term leverage towards the 
target level faster than their long-term leverage. Whilst those in Malaysia appear 
to adjust their long-term leverage and short-term leverage at the slowest speed, 
their speed of adjustment for total leverage is the highest among the sample 
countries. Overall, the results appear to support the theories of capital structure 
that state that a firm selects its optimal debt and it adjusts its actual debt level 
towards its target level and the speed of adjustment varies according to types of 
debt.  
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Table 4.7: Dynamic Panel Model Results 
 
Panel A 
Long-term Leverage Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Lagged LT lev. 0.399*** 0.691*** 0.618*** 0.617*** 
  (12.02) (25.41) (56.06) (21.64) 
Q ratio 0.101*** -0.004 0.102*** 0.075*** 
  (6.58) (-0.60) (7.40) (9.56) 
Profitability -0.164** 0.089*** -0.477*** -0.342*** 
  (-5.08) (2.98) (-40.99) (-7.84) 
Tangibility 0.13* 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.015*** 
  (1.68) (2.72) (2.73) (4.10) 
Size -0.015 -0.003 0.01*** -0.047*** 
  (-1.31) (-0.27) (3.31) (-3.89) 
Liquidity 0.042*** 0.002** -0.001 0.012*** 
  (4.28) (2.49) (-1.24) (4.83) 
Risk 0.000 0.0001* -0.002*** -0.001*** 
  (0.13) (1.71) (-4.42) (-3.75) 
J-statistic 43.84 36.88 35.36 47.01 
Instrument rank 42.000 42.000 42.000 42.000 
P-value  0.173 0.428 0.50 0.104 
Number of Obs. 768 672 600 784 
 
    
Panel B 
 
     
Short-term Leverage Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Lagged ST lev. 0.411*** 0.431*** 0.357*** 0.426*** 
  (20.36) (42.55) (16.45) (16.16) 
Q ratio -0.067*** -0.002** -0.044*** -0.053*** 
  (-5.92) (-2.17) (-11.86) (-9.68) 
Profitability -0.189** -0.075*** -0.011* -0.227*** 
  (-5.04) (-4.65) (-1.76) (-9.24) 
Tangibility -0.122** -0.051** -0.019 -0.105*** 
  (-2.18) (-2.26) (-1.41) (-3.04) 
Size -0.008 0.009** -0.008** 0.011** 
  (-1.33) (2.50) (-2.22) (1.99) 
Liquidity -0.053*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.021*** 
  (-7.50) (-1.53) (-2.37) (-3.25) 
Risk -0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.0001 
  (-0.30) (0.40) (-1.98) (-0.67) 
J-statistic 40.56 38.89 34.71 42.93 
Instrument rank 42.000 42.000 42.000 42.000 
P-value  0.276 0.341 0.529 0.199 
Number of Obs. 768 672 600 784 
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Table 4.7: Dynamic Panel Model Results (continued) 
 
Panel C 
Total Leverage Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Lagged Total lev. 0.635*** 0.467*** 0.633*** 0.715*** 
  (26.94) (19.69) (55.19) (22.86) 
q ratio 0.017 -0.003 0.048*** 0.031*** 
  (1.15) (-0.70) (4.89) (4.84) 
Profitability -0.368*** -0.062 -0.482*** -0.54*** 
  (-5.83) (-1.33) (-31.02) (-12.10) 
Tangibility 0.056 0.028 -0.019 0.12** 
  (0.78) (0.65) (-0.64) (2.36) 
Size -0.027 0.029** 0.001 0.014 
  (-1.54) (2.34) (0.13) (1.15) 
Liquidity -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.0004 
  (-0.13) (-2.06) (-1.57) (-0.07) 
Risk 0.001 0.0002 -0.003*** -0.001** 
  (0.92) (0.50) (-3.52) (-2.06) 
J-statistic 43.55 32.40 39.95 34.79 
Instrument rank 42.000 42.000 42.000 42.000 
P-value 0.1811 0.64 0.299 0.526 
Number of Obs. 768 672 600 784 
 
* denotes significant at the 10% level.  
** denotes significant at the 5% level. 
*** denotes significant at the 1% level. 
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The results of market power and firm-characteristic factors are similar to those of 
the static model. Positive and statistically significant coefficients of q ratio for 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, suggest that the predation effect 
dominates the use of long-term leverage. At the low level of market power, in 
which the competitive interaction is intense, sample firms avoid the predation 
threat by using long-term debt sparingly.   
 
The presence of intense competition is softened by the use of short-term debt, as 
shown by a significant and negative relationship between short-term leverage and 
the q ratio. The result also suggests that the limited liability effect dominates the 
use of short-term debt among the sample countries. Whilst an insignificant 
relationship between the q ratio and total leverage for sample firms in the 
Philippines and Thailand is found in the static model, the results of the dynamic 
panel model show a statistically significant and positive relationship for both these 
sample countries.  
 
Overall, the results of the dynamic panel model appear to be consistent with the 
static model and it can be posited that there exists some substitutability between 
the use of short-term and long-term debt. At low levels of market power, a firm in 
this region tends to use short-term debt for strategic purposes. Long-term debt, 
resulting in a longer lasting obligation for the firm, would expose it to predation 
threats from its rivals, when facing intense competition. As its market power 
increases, a firm becomes more established in the product market. With its 
monopoly power, which does not necessarily refer to the firm being in the 
monopoly market structure, the firm is more able to obtain long-term financial 
sources.  
 
The negative relationship between profitability and leverage is consistent with the 
pecking order theory of Myers (1984). However, the result in panel B shows a 
positive and statistically significant effect of profit on long-term leverage for 
Malaysia, which was previously observed to be insignificant in the static model. 
The result suggests that sample firms in Malaysia tend to borrow more long-term 
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debt, to lessen the free cashflow problem (Jensen, 1986) or for tax-shield benefit 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963). A significant and positive relationship between 
tangibility and long-term leverage is found in all the sample countries. This 
suggests that the sample firms use tangible assets as collateral for obtaining long-
term finance. The relationship is statistically significant for the Philippines, for 
which this was previously found to be insignificant in the static model. The results 
are also consistent with the maturity matching argument. A firm with less 
collateral assets tends to rely more on short-term debt. This is shown by the 
negative relationship between short-term leverage and tangibility.  
 
Whilst the results of the static model showed that size was a determinant factor of 
capital structure for Indonesian firms, the results of the dynamic panel model 
suggest otherwise. The results are consistent for Malaysian firms, as a positive 
relationship is found in both models, that is, larger firms tend to borrow more. The 
dynamic panel model results for the Philippines contradict those of the static 
model. The effect was found insignificant for all types of leverage in the latter, 
however, a statistically significant relationship in the former is observed. Larger 
firms in the Philippines tend to borrow more long-term and reduce their use of 
short-term debt. The opposite is, however, observed for the sample firms in 
Thailand, where larger firms tend to use more short-term borrowing and less long-
term debt.  
 
Similar to the static model, the dynamic panel model also finds a negative 
relationship between short-term leverage and liquidity. This supports Myers’s 
(1984) pecking order theory that states that a firm with high liquid assets tends to 
use less short-term borrowing. However, the results of the dynamic panel model 
show a positive relationship between liquidity and long-term leverage. The result 
is statistically significant in all the sample countries, with the exception of the 
Philippines, and this would appear to contradict the pecking order theory. An 
explanation for the observed positive effect is that firms in sample countries might 
use high liquid assets as their collateral for obtaining long-term debt. In the static 
model, the study concluded that risk might not be an important determinant factor. 
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By contrast, the results of the dynamic panel model show a statistically significant 
effect of risk on long-term and total leverage, among the sample firms in the 
Philippines and Thailand. The negative relationship suggests that the presence of 
financial distress or the high volatility of earning causes a firm to borrow less.  
 
Unfortunately, the statistical software package, EViews, used for the dynamic 
panel model does not provide the R2 value, therefore, the study is not able to 
suggest whether the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable improves the 
explanatory power of the model. The p-values of the Sargan test allow for the 
study to conclude that the instruments are valid. The null hypothesis of valid over-
identifying restriction is thus not rejected.  
 
4.4 Summary 
 
The study has considered firm-level data for four developing countries in the 
Southeast Asia region, in order to contribute to the research in capital structure, 
which has lately paid a lot of attention to developing countries. Furthermore, this 
researcher wishes to contribute to the on-going research in capital structure and 
the product market. The chapter has empirically examined the effects of market 
power on three types of debt. Given the availability of the data, the simplified q 
ratio has been used as the proxy of market power. Long-term, short-term, and total 
debt, all normalised by the book value of total assets, have been used as the capital 
structure proxies. Firm-specific factors, namely: profitability, tangibility, size, 
liquidity, and risk have also been included as control variables. In addition, 
industry dummy variables have been used to examine the industry effects on 
capital structure. 
 
The notion of market power in the study differs from previous related studies, 
notably Rathinasamy et al. (2000) and Pandey (2004). In their work, market 
power is taken to mean the operation term of market structure. In this study, 
market power reflects the intensity of competition. At high levels of market 
power, the intensity of competition is low. This concept of market power relates 
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closely to the theoretical models developed in the previous chapter, based on 
Fairchild (2004b). A firm with high market power is considered to have local 
monopoly power, owing to its highly differentiated product.  
 
Using the two-way fixed effects model to account for the unobserved firm effect 
and the time effect, the results have shown that market power has different effects 
on debt, depending on its maturity. When considering the results in relation to 
levels of market power, the effect of market power has not been found to be non-
linear, as proposed by Pandey (2004), and Fairchild (2004b). Moreover, it was 
found that the limited liability effect dominates the use of short-term debt, 
whereas the presence of the predation effect determines the use of long-term debt. 
The explanation for the substitutability between short-term and long-term debt as 
the level of market power increases, is also offered by the concentrated ownership 
structure, the managerial disciplinary mechanism, and the characteristics of the 
sample countries.  
 
Evidence has been shown supporting the pecking order theory and the agency 
costs argument. The results are generally consistent with the findings of prior 
studies, in both developed and developing countries. Furthermore, the industry 
effect is arguably another important factor which determines capital structure. In 
addition, a two-step generalised method of moments (GMM) technique has been 
employed to examine the presence of dynamism in the capital structure decisions 
of sample firms. The results of the dynamic panel model suggest that sample firms 
adjust their debt level towards the target level. The speed of adjustment does not 
only vary from country to country, but it also varies according to the types of 
leverage.  
 
However, like many previous empirical studies, this research has its limitations. 
Owing to the lack of continuous financial data, many listed firms had to be 
excluded from the study. As a result, the data available comprised less than half of 
the listed firms from each of the sample countries. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
argued that most empirical studies of capital structure have had to deal with the 
 164 
problem of defining variables. This study is no exception. One might question the 
use of the simplified version of Tobin’s q as the market power proxy. However, 
the researcher strongly believes that, although the use of Tobin’s q is still 
controversial, many studies have justified its use as the proxy of market power. 
However, it is not the aim of this thesis to contribute to this debate. Moreover, this 
researcher is of the belief that there is no variable that can be used as a perfect 
proxy for any of the factors that determine capital structure.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
It is now widely acknowledged that firms’ financial decisions and product market 
strategies may be inter-related. Brander and Lewis’s (1986) seminal limited 
liability approach, in which short-term debt toughened product market behaviour 
under Cournot competition, sparked an extensive research agenda. As discussed in 
the literature review chapter, initial modelling attempts employed a homogenous-
products approach. Recently, there has been growing recognition that product 
differentiation/market power may affect the firm’s use of debt in the product 
market. However, these theoretical works have mostly concentrated on the use of 
short-term debt in the product market. 
 
Inspired by the empirical study of Pandey (2004), this thesis aimed to investigate 
the relationship between capital structure (particularly long-term debt) and market 
power/product differentiation. In doing so, the thesis developed Fairchild’s 
(2004b) theoretical work.19 In chapter 3, theoretical models were developed to 
examine the relationship between product differentiation, long-term debt, and 
product market competition. The empirical study in chapter 4 investigated 
whether the relationship between capital structure and market power is linear 
(positively or negatively) or non-linear. Thus, the thesis not only contributes 
theoretically to the on-going research into capital structure and product market 
competition, its empirical findings also contribute to the debate on the nature of 
the relationship between capital structure and market power. In addition, the 
findings of the empirical study contribute to the research into the determinants of 
capital structure in developing countries.  
                                                
19
 This thesis developed Fairchild’s (2004b) analysis as follows. He analysed a non-spatial 
Bertrand competition model of debt and product market competition. In contrast, this thesis’ non-
spatial approach employed Cournot competition. The thesis then proceeds to consider spatial 
models (employing a Bertrand approach). 
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The theoretical models in chapter 3 demonstrated that long-term debt softens 
product market competition, either by inducing the leveraged firm to decrease 
output in the non-spatial model or to increase prices in the spatial model. The 
results are consistent with previous studies (for example, Glazer’s (1994) long-
term debt in Cournot competition with homogenous products and Fairchild’s 
(2004b) Bertrand competition with differentiated products). The softening effect 
of long-term debt in the theoretical models in this thesis is due to the myopic 
behaviour of the leveraged firm. The models show that by issuing long-term debt, 
a firm becomes more short-termist (myopic) by focusing on short-term profits at 
the expense of the future market share forgone (similar to Dasgupta and Titman, 
1998).  
 
The theoretical models also demonstrated that the use of long-term debt in the 
product market depends on the exogenous degree of market power. In the non-
spatial one-shot game, both firms select the all-equity (zero debt) financial 
contract in equilibrium, regardless of the degree of market power. Thus, the model 
formally proved Dasgupta and Titman’s (1998) intuitive conjecture that ‘with 
quantity competition, firms will be all-equity financed in the absence of other 
benefits associated with debt’. 
 
The model further demonstrated that the firms face a prisoner’s dilemma for high 
levels of product market competition. That is, although they both choose the all-
equity contract in equilibrium, they would both be better off by selecting the long-
term debt contract. This naturally leads to an analysis of collusion over the 
financial structure in a repeated-game framework.  
 
The results in the spatial model demonstrated that long-term debt is decreasing in 
market power, which is represented by the transportation cost per unit. In the 
horizontally differentiated cases, firms simultaneously decrease their long-term 
debt levels as their market power/product differentiation reduces (the predation 
effect). The models demonstrate that the domination of the predation effect is 
more significant in the quadratic transportation cost case, because firms face more 
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intense product market competition from the supply side of the market (firms are 
located closer to one another) and from the demand side of the market (a decrease 
in the level of the transportation cost per unit).  
 
In the vertically-differentiated model, firms could invest in improving product 
quality, prior to choosing their financial structure and product market behaviour. 
Depending on the parameters of the model, there was a possibility of asymmetric 
debt levels in equilibrium (with the firm that invested in quality being able to 
choose a higher debt level than its low-quality rival).  
 
In summary, the theoretical models have demonstrated that the relationship 
between capital structure and product market competition is a complex one. It is 
affected by factors such as whether competition is Bertrand competition or 
Cournot competition, the nature of the modelling approach (non-spatial or spatial), 
and whether the model considers a one-shot game or repeated interactions 
between firms, the maturity of debt, that is short-term debt or long-term debt (the 
theoretical models focus on the latter). The complexity in the nature of the 
relationship between market power and capital structure naturally led to an 
empirical investigation in chapter 4. 
 
The empirical study in chapter 4 employed firm-level data on four Southeast 
Asian tiger economies. Tobin’s q was used as the market power proxy, whilst 
long-term leverage ratio, short-term leverage ratio, and total leverage ratio were 
used as the capital structure proxies. The results of the empirical study showed 
that the relationship between capital structure and market power is arguably linear. 
When one considers the type of debt, then it can be observed that market power is 
positively related to long-term leverage, but is negatively related to short-term 
leverage. The results suggested that while the predation effect dominates for the 
use of long-term debt, the limited liability effect influences the use of short-term 
debt. The findings of the empirical study also suggested some substitutability 
between short-term and long-term leverage. 
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The theoretical models and the results in this thesis have emphasised the 
importance for future researchers to continue analysing the complex relationship 
between capital structure and product market competition. This research area has 
built upon traditional capital structure theories, which only consider how a firm 
makes its financial decision, without a consideration of the product market 
decision. The thesis has clearly demonstrated that when the firm makes the 
financial decision, it should not only take its own but also its rivals’ product 
market decision into consideration.  
 
Following de Bettignies and Brander (2007) and Fairchild (2007b), the theoretical 
models in this thesis can be considered at both a descriptive and normative level. 
The models have been based on the assumption (as is standard in most research in 
economics and finance) that firms are run by fully rational utility-maximising 
managers. The firms’ managers are assumed to have the ability to completely 
anticipate their product market actions (and those of their rivals) given their 
financial decisions. If we assume that the world really behaves in this way, then 
the models in this chapter could be considered as descriptive. 
 
However, behavioural economists are increasingly recognising that agents’ 
decision-making may be subject to limitations and psychological biases; that is, 
they may be less than fully-rational. A recent growing body of research in 
behavioural corporate finance argues that the psychological biases of managers 
can bias the financial decision (Fairchild, 2007b). Taking this viewpoint, the 
thesis’ existing rationally-based models may be considered as 
normative/prescriptive.  Managerial biases may be incorporated into the models to 
provide a more accurate description of the way that firms may actually behave.   
 
There is a growing area of research incorporating behavioural factors into 
corporate finance decision-making (see Fairchild (2007a) for a review). However, 
as far as this author is aware, there is no research that analyses the effect of 
behavioural factors when considering the relationship between product market 
competition and financial decisions. Hence, incorporating managerial biases into 
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this thesis’ models may provide rich conclusions compared with the fully-rational 
model. For example, we could consider the effect of managerial bounded 
rationality and cognitive biases.20 The models could assume that one firm’s 
manager is overconfident, and examine how this would affect his decision in the 
product market, given the chosen long-term debt level.  Intuitively, given that the 
overconfident manager believes that he has higher ability than his rival manager, 
the former might take on more long-term debt even at intense levels of potential 
product market competition since he underestimates predation. In addition, the 
non-spatial model with collusion could be augmented by incorporating the 
behavioural issues of ‘fairness’ and ‘trust’, to see how this would affect firms’ 
decisions to collude in the common financial contract.  
 
Furthermore, the theoretical models have assumed that firms face the same 
discount rates. It would be interesting to consider the case where firms have 
different levels of myopia (hyperbolic discounting).  
 
Finally, we could consider bounded rationality, whereby one firm is unaware of 
the product market implications of its financial decisions. For example, consider a 
firm that is unaware of the presence of a competitive rival, and therefore chooses 
its debt level due to standard corporate finance reasons (for instance, to discipline 
managers in an agency framework, or to provide a positive signal to the market in 
a world of informational asymmetries). Its rival is aware of the impending product 
market competition. The author conjectures that the boundedly-rational firm may 
choose an excessively high debt level, and be subject to predation from its less 
leveraged rival. Hence, it may be possible to obtain asymmetric debt levels due to 
behavioural reasons.   
                                                
20
 The former refers to limits on their ability to process information sufficiently to make fully 
rational decisions, whilst the latter refers to systematic deviations from full rationality (de 
Bettignies and Brander, 2007). 
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As mentioned in chapter 4, the lack of data has led the study to use Tobin’s q ratio 
as the market power proxy (as justified by Pandey 2004). An avenue for future 
empirical research is to use an alternative proxy, such as the Lerner index. The 
study could also employ a product competitiveness measure such as the 
competitive strategy measure (CSM) of Sundaram et al (1996) in order to 
empirically investigate the effect of capital structure on product market 
competition. Furthermore, the empirical study could augment the static model by 
including interaction terms, for instance, (q ratio * industry sector dummy 
variables) as independent variables, to capture potentially different sensitivities of 
capital structure to market power across industry sectors. 
 
In summary, this thesis has provided important theoretical and empirical 
developments of the research into the relationship between firms’ financial 
decisions and product market behaviour, and has identified important areas for 
future research.  
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Appendix A 
List of Sample Firms 
 
Indonesia 
 
• Agriculture 
1. Astra Agro Lestari Tbk, PT 
2. Bakrie Sumatera Plantation Tbk, PT 
3. Cipendawa Agroindustri Tbk, PT 
4. Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Tbk, PT 
5. Multibreeder Adirama Indonesia Tbk, PT 
6. Perusahaan Perkebunan London Sumatra Indonesia Tbk, PT 
7. Sierad Produce Tbk, PT 
8. Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology Tbk, PT 
 
• Construction 
9. Bakrieland Development Tbk, PT 
10. Indonesia Prima Property Tbk, PT 
  
• IT and information 
11. Astra Graphia Tbk, PT 
12. Indosat Tbk, PT 
13. Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Persero) Tbk, PT 
 
• Manufacturing 
 Apparel 
14. Ever Shine Tex Tbk, PT 
15. Indo Acidatama Tbk, PT 
16. Pan Brothers Tbk, PT 
 
 Automotive 
17. Astra Otoparts Tbk, PT 
18. Indomobil Sukses International Tbk, PT 
19. Multi Prima Sejahtera Tbk, PT 
20. Selamat Sempurna Tbk, PT 
 
 Cement and glass 
21. Intikeramilk Alamasri Tbk, PT 
22. Mulia Industrindo 
23. Semen Gresik (Persero) Tbk, PT 
24. Surya Toto Indonesia Tbk, PT 
 
Computing 
25. Metrodata Electronics Tbk, PT 
 
Fabricated material 
26. Indospring Tbk, PT 
27. Kedaung Indah Can Tbk, PT 
28. Kedawung Setia Industrial Tbk, PT 
29. Lion Metal Works Tbk, PT 
30. Prima Alloy Steel Universal Tbk, PT 
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Food and beverages 
31. Aqua Golden Mississippi Tbk, PT 
32. Bahtera Adimina Samudra Tbk, PT 
33. BAT Indonesia Tbk, PT 
34. Cahaya Kalbar Tbk, PT 
35. Fast Food Indonesia Tbk, PT 
36. Gudang Garam Tbk, PT 
37. Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk, PT 
38. Sekar Laut Tbk, PT 
39. Siantar Top Tbk, PT 
40. Suba Indah Tbk, PT 
41. Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk, PT 
42. Tunas Baru Lampung Tbk, PT 
 
Household appliances 
43. GT Kabel Indonesia Tbk, PT 
44. Jembo Cable Company Tbk, PT 
45. Langgeng Makmur Industri Tbk, PT 
46. Sumi Indo Kabel Tbk, PT 
47. Tembaga Mulia Semanan Tbk, PT 
 
Iron and steel 
48. Alumino Tbk, PT 
49. Citra Tubindo Tbk, PT 
50. Jakarta Kyoei Steel Works Limited Tbk, PT 
51. Timah (Persero) Tbk, PT 
 
Leather 
52. Primarindo Asia Infrastructure Tbk, PT 
53. Sepatu Bata Tbk 
 
Machinery 
54. Enseval Putera Megatrading Tbk, PT 
55. Tira Austenite Tbk, PT 
56. United Tractors Tbk, PT 
 
Paper 
57. Argha Karya Prima Industry Tbk, PT 
58. Surabaya Agung Industri Pulp & Kertas Tbk, PT 
 
Pharmaceutical 
59. Kalbe Farma Tbk, PT 
60. Lautan Luas Tbk, PT 
61. Mandom Indonesia Tbk, PT 
62. Merck Tbk, PT 
63. Modern Internasional Tbk, PT 
64. Mustika Ratu Tbk, PT 
65. Resource Alam Indonesia Tbk, PT 
66. Sorini Corporation Tbk, PT 
67. Tempo Scan Pacific Tbk, PT 
68. Trias Sentosa Tbk, PT 
 
Plastic and rubber 
69. Asiaplast Industries Tbk, PT 
70. Berlina, Tbk PT 
71. Dynaplast Tbk, PT 
72. Gajah Tunggal Tbk, PT 
73. Polychem Indonesia Tbk, PT 
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Textile 
74. Argo Pantes Tbk, PT 
75. Panasia Filament Inti Tbk, PT 
76. Sunson Textile Manufacturer Tbk, PT 
 
Wood 
77. Barito Pacific Timber Tbk, PT 
78. Daya Sakti Unggul Corporindo Tbk, PT 
 
• Mining 
79. Aneka Tambang (Persero) Tbk, PT 
80. Bumi Resources Tbk, PT 
81. Citatah Tbk, PT 
82. Medco Energi Internasional Tbk, PT 
 
• Realestates 
83. Jakarta Setiabudi International Tbk, PT 
84. Mulialand Tbk, PT 
 
• Service 
85. Hotel Sahid Jaya International Tbk, PT 
86. Pudjiadi & Sons Tbk, PT 
 
• Trade 
87. Matahari Putra Prima Tbk, PT 
88. Ramayana Lestari Sentosa Tbk, PT 
89. AKR Corporindo Tbk, PT 
90. Alfa Retailindo Tbk, PT 
91. Asia Grain International Tbk, PT 
92. Hexindo Adiperkasa Tbk, PT 
93. Inter Delta Tbk, PT 
 
• Transportation and warehouse 
94. Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada Tbk, PT 
95. Humpuss Intermoda Transportasi Tbk, PT 
96. Steady Safe Tbk, PT 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
• Agriculture 
1. Glenealy Plantations (Malaya) Berhad 
2. Golden Hope Plantations Berhad 
3. Guthrie Ropel Berhad 
4. Highlands & Lowlands Berhad 
5. IOI Corporation Berhad 
6. Keck Seng (Malaysia) Berhad 
7. Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad 
8. Kulim (Malaysia) Berhad 
9. Kurnia Setia Berhad 
10. Leong Hup Holdings Berhad 
11. Lingui Developments Berhad 
12. Negri Sembilan Oil Palms Bhd 
13. United Plantations Berhad 
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• Construction 
14. Dolomite Corporation Berhad 
15. Hock Seng Lee Berhad 
16. Ken Holdings Berhad 
 
• IT and information 
17. Nanyang Press Holdings Berhad 
 
• Manufacturing 
 Apparel 
18. John Master Industries Berhad 
19. Ramatex Berhad 
 
Automotive 
20. Delloyd Ventures Berhad 
21. Oriental Holdings Berhad 
22. UMW Holdings Berhad 
 
Cement and glass 
23. Goh Ban Huat Bhd. 
24. Hume Industries (Malaysia) Berhad 
25. Kia Lim Berhad 
26. Kim Hin Industry Berhad 
27. YTL Cement Berhad 
 
Chemical/ Pharmaceutical 
28. Chemical Company of Malaysia Berhad 
 
Fabricated metal 
29. Aluminium Company of Malaysia Berhad 
30. Choo Bee Metal Industries Berhad 
31. Globetronics Technology Bhd 
32. Kian Joo Can Factory Berhad 
33. KKB Engineering Berhad 
34. Lion Corporation Berhad 
35. Yung Kong Galvanising Industries Bhd. 
 
Food and beverages 
36. Ajiya Berhad 
37. Dutch Lady Milk Industries Berhad 
38. JT International Berhad 
39. KFC Holdings (Malaysia) Bhd 
40. Khee San Berhad 
41. Nestlé (Malaysia) Berhad 
42. Yeo Hiap Seng (Malaysia) Bhd. 
 
Household appliances 
43. Fiamma Holdings Berhad 
44. GUH Holdings Berhad 
45. Leader Universal Holdings Berhad 
 
Iron and steel 
46. FACB Industries Incorporated Berhad 
 
Paper 
47. Muda Holdings Berhad 
48. Public Packages Holdings Berhad 
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Petrochemical 
49. Eastern Pacific Industrial Corporation Berhad 
50. Esso Malaysia Berhad 
 
Plastic and rubber 
51. Formosa Prosonic Industries Berhad 
52. Integrax Berhad 
53. Rubberex Corporation (M) Berhad 
 
Wood 
54. Jaya Tiasa Holdings Berhad 
 
• Real estate 
55. Bandar Raya Developments Berhad 
56. Damansara Realty Berhad 
57. Golden Plus Holdings Berhad 
58. Gopeng Berhad 
59. IGB Corporation Berhad 
60. IOI Properties Berhad 
61. Johor Land Berhad 
62. Negara Properties (M) Berhad 
63. RB Land Holdings Berhad 
 
• Service 
64. Resorts World Bhd 
65. Grand Central Enterprises Bhd 
66. Landmarks Berhad 
 
• Trade 
67. Sapura Resources Berhad 
68. SHH Resources Holdings Berhad 
69. Suiwah Corporation Bhd 
70. Tan Chong Motor Holdings Berhad 
71. AIC Corporation Berhad 
72. Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd 
73. Ipmuda Berhad 
74. Kossan Rubber Industries Bhd 
75. Lafarge Malayan Cement Berhad 
76. Yee Lee Corporation Bhd 
 
• Transportation and warehouse 
77. Global Carriers Berhad 
78. Halim Mazmin Berhad 
79. Konsortium Logistik Berhad 
80. Nationwide Express Courier Services Berhad 
81. Nepline Berhad 
82. PDZ Holdings Bhd 
83. Tamadam Bonded Warehouse Berhad 
84. Transocean Holdings Bhd 
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The Philippines 
 
• Agriculture 
1. Vitarich Corporation 
 
• Construction 
2. Concrete Aggregates Corp 
3. DMCI Corp 
4. Eei Corporation 
 
• IT and information 
5. Abs-Cbn Broadcasting Corporation 
6. APC Group, Inc 
7. Benpres Holdings Corporation 
8. Ipeople Inc 
9. Ivantage Corporation 
10. Liberty Telecoms Holdings, Inc. 
11. Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation 
12. Manila Broadcasting Company 
13. MIC Holdings Corporation 
14. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company 
15. Pilipino Telephone Corporation 
16. Premiere Entertainment Productions, Inc. 
 
• Manufacturing 
 Cement 
17. Fortune Cement Corporation 
18. Mariwasa Manufacturing Inc 
 
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 
19. Interphil Laboratories Inc 
20. LMG Chemicals Corporation 
21. Mabuhay Vinyl Corporation 
 
Computing 
22. Ionics Inc 
23. Music Semiconductors Corporation 
24. Panasonic Manufacturing Philippines Corporation 
25. Solid Group Inc 
 
Food and beverages 
26. Alaska Milk Corporation 
27. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co Inc 
28. Cosmos Bottling Corporation 
29. Ginebra San Miguel Inc 
30. JG Summit Holdings 
31. Jollibee Foods Corporation 
32. Liberty Flour Mills Inc 
33. RFM Inc 
34. San Miguel Corporation 
35. San Miguel Pure Foods Company Inc 
36. Tanduay Distillers Inc 
 
Machinery 
37. Philippine Aerosol Container Inc 
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Paper 
38. Picop Resources Inc 
39. Steniel Manufacturing Corporation 
 
Petroleum 
40. Oriental Petroleum and Minerals Corporation 
41. Petron Corporation 
 
Textile 
42. Filsyn Corporation 
 
• Mining 
43. APC Group, Inc. 
44. Basic Energy Corporation 
45. Benguet Corporation 
46. Crown Equities Inc 
47. Dizon Copper Silver Mines, Inc. 
48. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company 
49. Manila Mining Corporation 
50. Semirara Mining Corporation 
51. Vulcan Industrial & Mining Corporation 
 
• Real estate 
52. A. Brown Company Inc 
53. Alsons Land Corporation 
54. Cebu Holdings Inc 
55. Cebu Property Ventures and Development Corp. 
56. Crown Equities Inc 
57. Edsa Properties Holdings Inc 
58. Empire East Land Holdings Inc 
59. Ever-Gotesco Resources & Holdings, Inc. 
60. Keppel Philippines Properties Inc 
61. Mabuhay Holding Corporation 
62. Megaworld Corporation 
63. Metro Pacific Corporation 
64. Philippine Realty & Holdings Corporation 
65. Philippine Estates Corporation 
66. Pryce Corporation 
67. San Miguel Properties Inc 
68. Sm Prime Holdings Inc 
 
• Trade 
69. Philippine Seven Corporation 
70. Macondray Plastics Inc 
 
• Transportation and warehouse 
71. Aboitiz Transport System Atsc Corporation 
72. Keppel Philippines Marine, Inc. 
73. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation 
 
• Service 
74. Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation 
75. Manila Jockey Club Inc 
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Thailand 
• Agriculture 
1. United Palm Oil Industry PCL 
 
• IT and information 
2. AIS PCL 
3. Amarin Publishing PCL 
4. GMM Grammy PCL 
5. Nation Multimedia Group PCL 
6. Siam Sport Syndicate PCL 
  
• Manufacturing 
 Apparel 
 7. Castle Peak Holdings PCL 
8. D.T.C. Industries PCL 
9. Hua Thai Manufacturing PCL 
10.  Textile Prestige PCL 
11. Thai Wacoal PCL 
12. Union Pioneer PCL 
13. Union Textile Industries PCL 
 
Automotive 
14. Asian Marine PCL 
15.  Thai Rung Union Car PCL 
 
 Cement and glass 
16.  Siam City Cement PCL 
17. Tipco Asphalt PCL 
 
 Chemical 
18.  AJ Plast PCL 
19. Thai Central Chemical PCL 
 
 Electronics 
20. CVD Entertainment PCL 
21. Draco PCB PCL 
22.  Hana Microelectronics PCL 
23. KCE Electronics PCL 
24.  Muramoto Electron (Thailand) PCL 
 
 Fabricated metal 
25.  Alucon PCL 
 
 Food and beverages 
26. Asian Seafood PCL 
27. Crown Seal PCL 
28. Haad Thip PCL 
29. Kiang Huat Sea Gull Trading Frozen Food PCL 
30. Lee Feed Mill PCL 
31. Malee Sampran PCL 
32. Pakfood PCL 
33. Patum Rice Mill And Granary PCL 
34. S.Khonkaen Food Industry PCL 
35. Surapon Foods PCL 
36. Thai Agri Foods PCL 
37. Thai President Foods PCL 
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38. Thai Theparos Food Products PCL 
39. Thai Union Frozen Products PCL 
40. Thai Vegetable Oil PCL 
41. Thai Wah Food Products PCL 
42. Tropical Canning (Thailand) PCL 
43. United Flour Mill PCL 
 
 
 Household appliances 
44. Charoong Thai Wire & Cable PCL 
45. Modernform Group PCL 
 
 Iron and steel 
46. Furukawa Metal (Thailand) PCL 
47. Sahaviriya Steel Industries PCL 
 
 Leather 
48. Chai Watana Tannery Group PCL 
49. C.P.L. Group PCL 
 
 Machinery 
50.  Kulthorn Kirby PCL 
51. Patkol PCL 
 
 Paper 
52. Thai Cane Paper PCL 
53. Thai Carbon Black PCL 
54.  Thai Packaging & Printing PCL 
 
 Pharmaceutical 
55. Jack Chia Industries (Thailand) PCL 
56. The Aromatics (Thailand) PCL 
57. Vinythai PCL 
58. Yong Thai PCL 
 
 Plastic and rubber 
59. General Engineering PCL 
60. Goodyear (Thailand) PCL 
61. Inoue Rubber (Thailand) PCL 
62. Sri Trang Agro-Industry PCL 
63. Thai Nam Plastic PCL 
64.  Thai O.P.P. PCL 
65. Thai Plastic And Chemicals PCL 
66. Thai Rubber Latex Corporation (Thailand) PCL 
 
 Wood 
67. Vanachai Group PCL 
 
• Mining 
68. Tongkah Harbour PCL 
 
• Real estate 
69. Supalai PCL 
 
• Service 
70. Aikachol Hospital PCL 
71. Bamrungrad Hospital PCL 
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72. Bangkokdusit Hospital PCL 
73. Chiangmai medical Hospital PCL 
74. Nonthavej Hospital PCL 
75. Mahachai Hospital PCL 
76. Vibhawadi Hospital PCL 
77. Shrangila Hotel PCL 
78. Asia Hotel PCL 
79. Centralplaza Hotel PCL 
80. Dusit Thani Hotel PCL 
81. Laguna Resort PCL 
82. Mandarin Hotel PCL 
83. Royal Orchid Hotel PCL 
 
• Trade 
84. Newcity (Bangkok) PCL 
85. O.C.C. PCL 
86. Siam Makro PCL 
87. Berli Jucker PCL 
88. Big C Supercenter PCL 
89. Boutique Newcity PCL 
90. I.C.C. International PCL 
91. Robinson Department Store PCL 
92. The Siam Pan Group PCL 
93. White Group PCL 
 
• Transportation and warehouse 
 94. Jutha Maritime PCL 
95. Precious Shipping PCL 
96. Regional Container Lines PCL 
97. Safari World PCL 
98. Sub Sri Thai Warehouse PCL 
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Appendix B 
 
One-Way Fixed Effects Results (The Linear Models) 
 
  Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
  a b c a B c a b c a b c 
  LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. 
Constant 0.507*** 0.966*** 1.473*** -0.740*** 0.004 -0.736*** -0.086 0.274*** 0.188 1.227*** 0.058 1.285*** 
  (2.69) (5.25) (6.00) (-4.98) (0.03) (-4.40) (-0.72) (3.29) (1.36) (4.99) (0.27) (4.74) 
q ratio 0.111*** -0.068*** 0.042*** 0.007* -0.012*** -0.005 0.082*** -0.047*** 0.034*** 0.055*** -0.095*** -0.040*** 
  (11.59) (-7.34) (3.40) (1.92) (-3.99) (-1.24) (8.66) (-7.29) (3.18) (6.07) (-12.12) (-4.01) 
Profitability -0.163*** -0.193*** -0.356*** 0.025 -0.170*** -0.145** -0.380*** 0.011 -0.369*** -0.285*** -0.230*** -0.515*** 
  (-4.27) (-5.20) (-7.18) (0.50) (-4.04) (-2.54) (-14.52) (0.60) (-12.39) (-5.03) (-4.70) (-8.26) 
Tangibility 0.245*** -0.176*** 0.069 0.161*** -0.065** 0.096** -0.032 0.004 -0.028 0.166*** -0.043 0.123** 
  (4.22) (-3.11) (0.91) (4.76) (-2.31) (2.52) (-0.74) (0.13) (-0.58) (3.24) (-0.96) (2.19) 
Size -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.041*** 0.040*** 0.007 0.046*** 0.007 -0.007* 0.0004 -0.055*** 0.011 -0.045*** 
  (-2.73) (-3.38) (-4.62) (5.28) (1.09) (5.49) (1.26) (-1.73) (0.06) (-4.90) (1.08) (-3.61) 
Liquidity 0.011* -0.052*** -0.041*** -0.002 -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007** -0.018*** -0.025*** 
  (1.65) (-7.80) (-4.58) (-1.29) (-2.16) (-2.74) (-1.25) (-2.68) (-2.73) (-2.05) (-5.77) (-6.40) 
Risk -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.0004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.0002 0.001 0.001 
  (-1.03) (-0.13) (-0.89) (0.05) (-0.70) (-0.47) (-1.22) (-0.25) (-1.23) (0.35) (1.39) (1.41) 
R2 0.2113 0.1969 0.117 0.0658 0.0469 0.0761 0.3136 0.1005 0.2168 0.0888 0.3232 0.2822 
F test 38.32 60.39 18.94 8.81 6.14 10.30 50.93 12.45 30.86 14.23 69.71 57.39 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
χ
2(6) 57.74 5.58 21.94 41.43 13.56 67.83 10.54 3.93 8.32 13.38 39.32 22.51 
No.of Obs. 960 960 960 840 840 840 750 750 750 980 980 980 
 
* denotes significant at 10% level. ** denotes significant at 5% level. *** denotes significant at 1% level.
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One-Way Random Effects Results (The Linear Models) 
 
  Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
  a b c a B c A b c a B C 
  LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. LT lev. ST lev.  Total lev. 
Constant 0.241 0.802*** 1.062*** -0.285*** 0.076 -0.258** -0.293*** 0.207*** -0.068 0.156 0.183 0.517*** 
  (1.63) (5.39) (5.38) (-2.67) (0.85) (-2.02) (-3.26) (3.05) (-0.63) (0.96) (1.34) (2.59) 
q ratio 0.111*** -0.070*** 0.040*** 0.003 -0.013*** -0.01** 0.078*** -0.047*** 0.032*** 0.051*** -0.102*** -0.048*** 
  (11.92) (-7.86) (3.34) (0.76) (-4.66) (-2.52) (8.60) (-7.55) (3.06) (5.71) (-13.40) (-4.91) 
Profitability -0.205*** -0.187*** -0.384*** -0.026 -0.185*** -0.02*** -0.391*** 0.010 -0.378*** -0.33*** -0.222*** -0.543*** 
  (-5.38) (-5.13) (-7.81) (-0.53) (-4.54) (-3.54) (-14.85) (0.58) (-12.63) (-5.85) (-4.60) (-8.76) 
Tangibility 0.297*** -0.174*** 0.118* 0.144*** -0.049** 0.095*** 0.036 0.002 0.026 0.246*** -0.147*** 0.112** 
  (6.54) (-3.80) (1.95) (5.06) (-2.09) (2.87) (1.04) (0.07) (0.64) (6.22) (-4.41) (2.38) 
Size -0.009* -0.017*** -0.026*** 0.017*** 0.003 0.022*** 0.016*** -0.004 0.012** -0.007 0.007 -0.008 
  (-1.70) (-3.07) (-3.68) (3.18) (0.64) (3.50) (3.77) (-1.12) (2.31) (-0.93) (1.18) (-0.91) 
Liquidity 0.002 -0.051*** -0.047*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.001*** -0.019*** -0.027*** 
  (0.28) (-8.02) (-5.56) (-2.34) (-3.06) (-4.04) (-2.00) (-3.29) (-3.69) (-2.58) (-6.67) (-7.12) 
Risk -0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.002 0.0003 0.001 0.001 
  (-0.52) (-0.10) (-0.54) (0.13) (-0.52) (-0.28) (-1.02) (-0.28) (-1.11) (0.41) (1.52) (1.50) 
R2 0.2043 0.2962 0.1125 0.0511 0.0450 0.0618 0.3077 0.0994 0.2113 0.0681 0.3190 0.2744 
No.of Obs. 960 960 960 840 840 840 750 750 750 980 980 980 
 
* denotes significant at 10% level. ** denotes significant at 5% level. *** denotes significant at 1% level. 
 
